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HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING IN COMPLEX DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTS 
William B. Rouse 
Bimonthly Report 
For the Period June 1, 1982 - July 31, 1982 
For 
Contract MDA 903-82-C-0145 
(June 1, 1982 - July 1, 1982) 
Center for Man-Machine Systems Research 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, GA 30332 
(404-894-3996) 
t 
This program of research was initiated during this reporting 
period. Most of our efforts during this period have been devoted 
to the design and programming of a problem solving scenario 
involving the hierarchial display of a multi—page representation 
of a dynamic message processing network. A prototype system 
should soon be ready for testing. 
Also during this period, efforts were invested in collecting 
literature on alternative approaches to displaying information 
about large—scale systems. As expected, very few empirical 
results were located, but several interesting although untested 
design concepts were found. 
As of July 31, 1982, approximately $9,000 had been spent. 
t 
HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING IN COMPLEX DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTS 
William B. Rouse 
Bimonthly Report 
For the Period August 1, 1982 - September 30, 1982 
Contract MDA 903-82-C-0145 
(June 1, 1982 - July 1, 1983) 
Center for Man-Machine Systems Research 
Georgia Insitute of Technology 
Atlanta, GA 30332 
(404/894-3996) 
During this reporting period, work continued on the problem 
solving scenario which is now termed MABEL (Monitoring, 
Assessing, Browsing, and Exploring Limits.) An initial version of 
this hierachical display of a multi-page representation of a 
dynamic message processing network is now operational and an 
experiment will soon be underway involving three independent 
variables: 1) number of elements per page, 2) number of levels 
of pages, and 3) message load scenario. The attached paper 
summarizes MABEL and the experimental plans; however, as this 
paper was written one month ago, it is already a little out of 
date with regard to the format and operations (and even the name) 
of MABEL. 
As of September 30, 1982, approximately $12,000 had been 
spent. 
. Proceeding of IEEE International Large Scale Systems Symposium, Virginia Beach, 
Virginia, October 1982. 
HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING 
IN LARGE SCALE NETWORKS 
Richard L. Henneman and William B. Rouse 
Center for Man-Machine Systems Research 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, Georgia 	30332 USA 
ABSTRACT 
The role of the human operator in 
monitoring and control of large scale 
networks is discussed. An experimental 
scenario 	is 	presented that has been 
developed from the study 	of 	factors 
affecting 	humans 	in 	this role. 	An 
experiment currently in 	progress is 
considered and reasearch goals discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
Current trends in computer technology 
are leading to the development of many 
highly integrated systems in the domains 
of communications, transportation, 
manufacturing, etc. Most of these systems 
can be represented as large networks of 
nodes and arcs where nodes denote people, 
destinations, or machines and arcs denote 
communication lines, transportation 
routes, or a variety of activities. It is 
not unusual for there to be hundreds or 
thousands of nodes and arcs. Networks of 
this size and level of interconnectivity 
are truly complex systems. 
The 	complexity 	of 	problems 	in 
general, and of these networks in 
particular, is also affected by their 
dynamic nature [1]. The states of the 
nodes and arcs (i.e., levels, flows, etc.) 
usually evolve in time and are not 
amenable 	to 	instantaneous 	control. 
Further, the demands placed upon the 
networks are often time-varying, 	with 
occurences of peak demands not always 
being predictable. 
There are two primary ways in which 
humans become involved with complex 
dynamic networks. The first, and probably 
the most familiar, way is as users. Most 
people are users of communications and 
transportation networks. The use of 
command and control networks by military  
commanders 	has 	received 	considerable 
attention [2,3,4,5,6]. The problem 
addressed in this paper, however, is not 
the user but instead is the network 
controller or operator. 
The task of the network controller is 
to manage the assets of the network (i.e., 
nodes and arcs) so as to maximize network 
efficiency [7]. Further, during peak 
demand periods, the controller may have to 
implement control procedures such as load 
shedding and priority scheduling to assure 
that overloads do not degrade network 
performance [8]. 
For many aspects of this task, the 
network controller has computer aids or, 
in fact, may simply have to monitor an 
automatic system which performs many 
functions [9,10]. However, system 
failures or unusual environmental demands 
can require that the human intervene and 
manually control the network. The human's 
abilities to solve these types of problem 
are not well understood. 
Several issues need to be considered. 
The first issue is the human's ability to 
decide that intervention is necessary. 
While increasingly sophisticated alarm 
techniques may handle most of this 
function [11], human factors research is 
still needed to determine the best way to 
display sophisticated alarm information. 
Given that intervention is necessary, 
the human must then coordinate two goals: 
compensation and diagnosis. Compensation 
involves configuring the network so as to 
counteract the symptoms of the problem and 
continue network operation. Diagnosis 
involves collecting information so as to 
isolate the source of the problem. The 
coordination of these two goals is 
complicated by the fact that delaying 
diagnosis may result in total loss of the 
network's functions. On the other hand, 
focusing on diagnosis may result in an 
unacceptable interruption of network 
operation. 
2_ 
While considerable attention has been 
devoted to the human's diagnostic 
abilitites [12), only a limited amount of 
research has dealt with the human's 
abilities to coordinate compensation and 
diagnosis [13,14,15]. Further, little if 
any research has focused on truly large 
dynamic networks. The program of research 
upon which this paper is based is focusing 
on the tasks of compensating for and 
diagnosing problems in complex dynamic 
networks. 
In the following section, the general 
experimental scenario being used for this 
research program is discussed. Then, an 
experimental investigation currently in 
progress is considered. Finally, the 
longer-term goals of this research program 
are briefly summarized. 
EXPERIMENTAL SCENARIO 
LCDS (Large Complex Dynamic System) 
is a simulation of a large-scale queueing 
network. It is programmed in Pascal on a 
VAX 11/780, and operates in real time. 
The network is not designed to represent 
any one type of large-scale dynamic 
network; 	instead, it is designed 	to 
simulate features 	of various complex 
systems. In general, LCDS is structured 
as groups of networks which, in turn, are 
structured as larger networks. Below is a 
summary of LCDS, beginning with a 
description of its basic structural 
elements, followed by a description of how 
the system typically operates in both 
normal and failure situations. 
Network Structure  
Several elements are basic to the 
structure of LCDS. A node represents the 
smallest structural unit in the network. 
Customers are passed from node to node, 
following a path that will minimize their 
expected time in the system. Thus, 
customers form queues at nodes, waiting 
until they can be serviced and passed on 
to the next nodes in their paths. Nodes 
are grouped into network structures called 
clusters. The cluster structure defines 
the most elemental relationship between 
nodes. Clusters are grouped accordingly 
into levels in the hierarchy. Levels 
define the relationships between clusters. 
Thus, customers travel horizontally 
through the system via nodes which are 
contained within clusters. Customers 
travel vertically through the system via 
clusters, which are contained within 
levels. 
	
Typically a customer 	enters 	the 
system through a node which is contained 
in a cluster at the lowest level. 	The 
customer must work its way horizontally 
through the system until it reaches the 
end of its current cluster. At this 
point, the customer is transferred to the 
next level through a connecting cluster. 
In this way, the customer moves up or down 
through the system from its source to its 
sink node. 
The system can perhaps 	be 	best 
visualized by imagining a pyramid. Each 
block in the pyramid's structure is 
supported by a group of stones underneath 
it. Similarly, in LCDS, every node in a 
cluster is "supported" by another group of 
clusters in a lower level. 
Customers arrive at the lowest level 
in the system according to a Poisson 
process. Service times are distributed 
exponentially with a constant mean for all 
nodes within a given level. Upon arrival, 
customers are assigned both a source and 
sink node. The shortest horizontal path 
is determined for their current cluster, 
as well as their overall vertical path 
between levels. 
Operator Interface  
Important 	information 	about 	the 
system is presented to the network 
controller through a split-screen display 
format as shown in Figure 1. The right 
side of the screen displays a cluster of 
nodes, each of which is represented by a 
small rectangle. Due to the large number 
of nodes, the person monitoring LCDS is 
unable to ever view the entire network. 
Thus, only one cluster may be viewed on 
the screen at a time. By selecting the 
appropriate command (Figure 1), the user 
may travel up or down through the 
hierarchy, thereby viewing another 
cluster. Each node on the screen contains 
the current number of customers waiting to 
be serviced at that node. (In the cluster 
depicted, there are currently no customers 
waiting to be serviced.) Additionally, an 
indication on the side of the node 
represents the level of that node in the 
hierarchy. 
The left side of the screen is used 
to display a variety of user-requested 
information. This information ranges from 
overall system performance statistics 
(total serviced, number in system, and 
average overall time in system) to 
detailed information about a particular 
node. The top of the screen shows the 
current time, while the bottom line 
prompts the user for his next command. 
LCDS will, under normal conditions, 
control the path of customers efficiently 
without any interference from the 
operator. 	However, even though when a 
node fails the system will eventually 
avoid routing customers through it as the 
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Figure 1: LCDS Display 
node's average service time increases, the 
system is unable to automatically diagnose 
failures. Hence, when a failure occurs, 
the human operator is confronted with a 
situation the system cannot handle on its 
own. Nodes can fail in two ways: 1) the 
node can simply break down and be unable 
to service customers; or 2) the number of 
customers in the node can exceed its 
maximum allowable queue size, thereby 
inducing a failure. It is easy to see 
that these failures will propagate through 
the system as nodes reach their maximum 
queue size and refuse to accept more 
customers. 
Problem Solving Scenarios  
	
The problems 	for 	the 	operator, 
therefore, become compounded as time 
proceeds. Not only must he detect and 
diagnose the failed nodes, but he must 
compensate for failures (in order to avoid 
further failures) by any of several 
different means: repairing nodes. 
reconfiguring the network, shedding load, 
or prioritizing customers. 
An important consideration in LCDS, 
thus, is the time varying nature of the 
number of customers requiring service in 
the network--the arrival rate. Large 
scale systems of this nature typically are 
busier at certain times than at others; 
hopefully, though, the system is designed , 
such that it is capable of handling all of 
the load. However, during failures and 
certain high-level loading situations, the 
system is not capable of processing all of 
the load. The operator, thus, must 
recognize the overload situation and 
compensate for it by specifying the amount 
of load he wishes the system to service. 
Different problem solving scenarios are 
achieved in LCDS by varying the arrival 
rate as a function of time. 
To summarize, subjects serving as 
operators in LCDS are required to monitor 
the hierarchical network for failures. 
compensating for both failures and the 
fluctuating demand. 
EXPERIMENT IN PROGRESS 
An experiment currently in progress 
has been designed to explore the impact of 
the structure of the large-scale hierarchy 
on the ability of the human to detect, 
diagnose, and compensate for failures. 
The major independent variables in 
the 	study 	are 	the number of nodes 
displayed to the user on the screen 
(cluster size), number of levels, and 
arrival rate variations (problem solving 
scenario). The levels of the variables 
were selected to produce approximately the 
same number of nodes at the bottom level 
of each network. Thus, subjects monitor 
networks with: 1) 8 nodes/cluster and 4 
levels; 2) 16 nodes/cluster and 3 levels; 
3) 10 nodes/cluster and 4 levels; and 4) 
'20 nodes/cluster and 3 levels. (The 8 and 
16 node/cluster networks result in 4096 
nodes at the bottom level, while the 10 
node/cluster and the 20 node/cluster 
networks result in 10000 and 8000 nodes. 
respectively, at the bottom level). The 
problem solving scenario is varied by 
having subjects monitor networks with 1) a 
constant arrival rate, and 2) an arrival 
rate that is initially constant, increases 
to some peak level, and decreases to the 
initial level). Subjects (who are 
graduate students in engineering) are 
required to monitor networks that vary in 
terms of the above factors, trying to 
serve as many customers as possible while 
both minimizing their waiting time in the 
system and coping with failures. 
Major response variables include the 
average waiting time for customers, total 
number of customers served in a given 
period of time, average time to locate a 
failure, and total number of failures 
found by the operator. Also of interest 
are the search strategies used by 
subjects. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This brief paper has considered the 
role 	of the human in monitoring and 
control of large scale networks, 	and 
presented an experimental scenario_ 
developed to evaluate the factors that may 
affect this role. While the immediate 
goal of this research is to assess the 
effects of these factors, the longer-term 
goals include modeling human behavior in 
these types of tasks and developing aids 
to asist the human in such tasks. At this 
point in time, the model of human problem 
solving proposed by one of the authors 
[12] is being considered as a possible 
description of human behavior in the task 
outlined in this paper. 
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During this reporting period, the MABEL problem solving 
scenario was extended and refined to the point that an initial 
experiment should start soon, probably in January. 
Now that the conceptual basis of MABEL has been formed, 
context-specific aspects of the problem solving scenario are 
becoming important. To gather this contextual information. 
initial contacts have been made in both the military (Ft. 
Gordon) and commerical (Southern Bell Telephone) communications 
domains. These contacts will be pursued over the next month to 
develop a good perspective of real-life control of large-scale 
communications networks. This information will be used to modify 
MABEL as necessary so as to reflect the types of decision that 
predominate in the military and/or commercial network control 
environments. 
As of November 30, 1982, approximately $20,000 had been 
spent. 
- 	— 
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During this reporting period, information obtained from 
military communication networks (Ft. Gordon) and commercial 
networks (Southern Bell) was used to modify MABEL prior to 
experimentation. Fortunately, the modifications needed were 
relatively minor and pilot testing of the experimental conditions 
is now underway. Formal data collection should begin within one 
or two weeks. Independent variables under investigation include: 
nodes per display page, numbers of levels in hierarchy, and 
failure rate per node. 
As of January 31, 1983, approximately $30,000 had been 
spent. 
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CC: L. H. Bowman 
F. Cochran 
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During this reporting period, the first formal experiment 
with MABEL was completed. The independent variables were: 
number of nodes per display page, number of levels in the 
hierarchy, and failure rate per node. Twelve subjects each 
participated in nine sessions of approximately one-half hour in 
length. Subjects were crossed with numbers of nodes and levels, 
and nested with failure rate. Preliminary data analyses indicate 
that numbers of nodes and levels significantly affected 
performance while failure rate did not have a significant effect. 
Detailed analyses of this data will be pursued during the next 
reporting period. 
As of March 31, 1983, approximately $62,000 had been spent. 
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Richard L. Henneman and William B. Rouse 
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Atlanta, Georgia 30332 USA 
ABSTRACT 
Human performance in monitoring and controlling 
activities in a hierarchical large scale network, such 
as a communications system, is considered. A scenario 
is described that is used in an experiment to examine 
three factors affecting humans functioning as network 
supervisor: cluster size (number of elements per 
display page), number of levels of pages in the 
hierarchy, and failure rate per element. Results 
indicate that increasing cluster size improves 
performance, increasing number of levels degrades 
performance, and failure rate affects only subjects' 
strategies. 
INTRODUCTION 
Advances in computer technology are leading to the 
development of highly automated lar:-scale systems. Often these 
systems are structured as interconnected hierarchical networks 
consisting of a very large number of nodes and arcs. Examples 
exist in a variety of domains, including communications networks, 
transportation systems, and power distribution grids. 
Theoretical methods of performance optimization and control have 
been developed to cope with the complex environments these 
systems create [1,2]. Thus, many functions associated with the 
operation of these systems that were previously handled by a 
human can now be controlled by a computer. Unfortunately, there 
inevitably will be instances, such as during failure situations, 
that the computer will not be programmed to handle. At these 
times, theoretical approaches to control may break down, and a 
human is required to intervene and control the system in order to 
ameliorate the problem situation. 
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As has been argued previously 131, human abilities in 
dealing with these types of situation are not well understood. 
This lack of understanding is especially pronounced in the area 
of large scale systems. The dynamics of the system, its 
structure, and the human-system interface all combine to create 
tasks of possibly enormous complexity. Human performance in such 
tasks has not been investigated to any great extent. 
Several issues surrounding human performance in these large 
systems are of particular importance. For instance, due to the 
large number of nodes in the system, only a limited amount of 
system information can be displayed to the human monitor at any 
one time. Thus, a trade-off exists between the number of items 
displayed to the human on each display page and the number of 
levels of pages in the hierarchy. Almost no guidance exists 
relative to what system configuration will result in the best 
human performance. Another set of issues surrounds the way 
humans access various portions of the ey3tem. While some work 
has been done in this area 14,5], it is not clear if performance 
will improve if humans scroll, window, or page through the system 
levels. Other important issues involve the human-system dialogue 
and performance aiding. 
Underlying these issues is a need to investigate some of the 
basic factors that affect human performance in large scale 
systems. This paper proposes a means to assess these factors. 
In the next section an experimental scenario is described that 
incorporates important features of a typical large scale system. 
This scenario is used in an experiment to assess the effects of 
three large scale system parameters on human performance. 
TASK DESCRIPTION 
Before considering the scenario used in this experiment, it 
is worthwhile to discuss briefly a typical large scale system, 
namely, the nationwide telephone network of the Bell System. 
This example will establish a basis for the general discussion of 
the experimental task that follows. 
The nationwide telephone system 16,71 is designed as a 
five-level hierarchical network composed of more than 170 million 
telephones and more than 22000 switching centers. The network 
consists of two basic elements: transmission and switching. The 
transmission elements are the actual communication paths that 
messages take through the system; the switching stations serve 
to economically interconnect calls. 
A major feature of the system is its high degree of 
automation. Messages are sent through the system via direct or 
alternate paths that have been pre-determined. The system 
operates under normal conditions without any manual intervention. 
The switching stations, serving as repositories of network 
intelligence, automatically perform such tasks as : 1) 
determining source, sink, and path through the network; 	2) 
testing lines for busy conditions before establishing a path; 
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and 3) continual checking of circuit conditions. 
Nonetheless, human monitoring and maintaining of the system 
is still a necessity. During overload situations or in the case 
of major equipment failures, network performance can degrade 
rapidly. Human network controllers, thus, must intervene when 
the automatic solutions are excessively expensive or when a 
problem arises requiring human judgement. To deal with these 
situations, the human operator has at his disposal such tools as 
cancellation of alternate routing, reroutes, line load controls, 
and recorded announcements. 
Using features of the Bell System as a general model*, a 
computerized simulation of a generic large scale dynamic system 
was developed. This simulation is referred to as MABEL because 
of the obvious connotation, but also because it requires 
operators to Bonitor, Access' Drowse, and Evaluate Limits in the 
process of monitoring and controlling the system. MABEL is 
programmed in Pascal on a VAX 11/780 compucer and operates in 
real time. It is structured as a large network that can range in 
size from hundreds to thousands of nodes. Customers travel 
through the system from a randomly selected source node to a 
random destination. Subjects monitor this system activity via a 
CRT display. When they detect a problem in the system (possibly 
due to a failure), subjects issue an appropriate command through 
a keyboard to correct and compensate for the abnormal situation. 
The overall system objectives are to maximize the number of 
customers served while minimizing the time they spend in the 
system. 
The following sections discuss MABEL in more detail. 
Emphasis is placed on the structure of MABEL, the operator 
interface and typical system operation. 
System strpcture  
Several elements are basic to the structure of MABEL. A 
pode represents the smallest stz--:.tural unit in the network. 
Customers are processed at nodes with service times following an 
exponential distribution. Each customer is passed from node to 
node, following a path that will minimize its expected time in 
the system. If a node in a customer's path is currently busy, 
the customer joins a waiting line at that node until the node 
becomes idle. 
As mentioned above, MABEL can consist of hundreds or 
thousands of nodes. It is impossible for the human operator to 
perceive and process information about all of the nodes at one 
time. On a more practical level, it is impossible to display 
*The simulation also parallels several aspects of military 
communications networks [8,9]. However, because automation is 
not as prevalent in the tactical military domain, the face 
validity of the simulation is higher for the current commercial 
network. 
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information about all of these nodes at one time. Thus, nodes 
are grouped into relatively small networks called clusters. 
 Human operators are restricted to viewing only one cluster at a 
time on the MABEL display. 
These clusters are grouped into hierarchical levels. 	A 
customer typically enters the system through a cluster in the 
lowest level. It proceeds through that cluster to a node that 
connects to a cluster in the next higher level. This process 
repeats until the customer reaches the top level of the system. 
At this point, the process reverses: the customer travels 
through a cluster and then "jumps" down to the next lower level. 
The process repeats until the customer reaches its destination. 
Thus, as noted above, the system is analogous to a telephone 
communications system. Imagine a call being placed from 
Americus, GA to Mason City, IA. The message first travels from 
Americus to Macon to Atlanta via a network if telephone lines and 
switching stations. The message then travels from Atlanta to 
Chicago. It is then transferred to Davenport, IA, and finally 
proceeds to Mason City. Atlanta and Chicago are at the highest 
level of the hierarchical system; Macon and Davenport are at the 
second level, while Americus and Mason City are at the lowest 
level. 
Customers initially arrive at a node in the lowest level in 
the system. These arrivals are scheduled according to a Poisson 
process. Routing through the system is completed automatically 
as determined by a shortest path algorithm. Thus, customers are 
routed through nodes that will minimize the time they spend in 
the system. 
DxgrAtzkr int e rl ace  
Subjects obtain information about MABEL from a video display 
(Figure 1). The screen is divided into several sections. The 
upper right portion of the screen df -nlays a cluster of nodes. 
The dim numbers to the left of each node identify the node, while 
the numbers inside each node represent the current queue size 
(the number of customers waiting to be served). This portion of 
the screen is updated approximately every two seconds. A 
different cluster of nodes is viewed by entering an appropriate 
command. 
The lower right portion of the screen is an aid to the user 
to identify the current displayed cluster. Each letter (A,B,C) 
represents a level in the hierarchy. Each number (1,2,3,...) 
represents either a node or a cluster. Bright and dim characters 
are used to indicate the subject's current position in the 
hierarchy. A row of characters that is completely bright 
represents the cluster that is currently displayed on the screen. 
One bright character in a row of dim characters indicates the 
node above the currently displayed cluster. In Figure 1. 
therefore, the displayed cluster is in Level B. This cluster is 
beneath Node 7 of Level A. 
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The upper left portion of the screen is used to display the 
current time. As already noted, the time is updated 
approximately every two seconds. Since the system operates in 
real time, customers will keep arriving to the system whether any 
action is taken by the operator or not. 
The middle left portion is used to display a variety of 
user-requested information about the system. This information is 
input at the prompt "Your action:", located at the lower left 
part of the screen. Ten different commands are available to the 
user. These can be grouped into four categories: 
1. Commands that access cluster displays. 
2. Commands that allow monitoring critical system variables. 
3. Commands that provide diagnostic information by testing for 
failures. 
4. Commands that control the system. 
The ten different commands are summarized in Table 1. 
Typical system operation  
Under normal circumstances, MABEL will operate automatically 
without any interference from the human monitor. When a node 
failure occurs, however, the human must act to diagnose and 
repair it. Node failures can occur in two ways: 
1. Total failure due to malfunctioning equipment: In this case 
a node is unable to service any customers waiting at it. All 
customers waiting at this node are lost, thereby reducing the 
queue size to zero. Additionally, the node refuses to accept 
any customers passed to it from another node. 	These 
customers are retained at their previous node. Since they 
are unable to proceed, the situation may lead to the 
following type of failure. 
2. Failure due to exceeding the capacity of the node: Each node 
has a maximum number of customers that it can "store" at any 
one time -- that is, each node has a maximum queue size. 	If 
this queue size is exceeded, the node fails. Its behavior 
after this point is identical to equipment failures. The 
node is unable to accept customers, and thus, new customers 
are retained at their old node. 	Once a failure occurs, 
therefore, it is likely to lead to other failures. In the 
extreme case, if nothing is done to repair failed nodes, the 
entire system will fail. 
It is, of course, also possible for this type of failure 
to be induced simply by trying to service too many customers: 
i.e., the system is trying to handle too much of the load. 
In this case, customers arrive at a node at a rate faster 
than the node can service them. 
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Subjects locate failures by monitoring critical system 
states and testing suspect nodes or clusters of nodes. If a 
failure is found, the subject dispatches a crew to repair the 
node. If the system becomes too crowded with customers, the 
subject can issue a command to reduce the number of customers 
admitted to the system. 
METHOD 
Subjects  
Twelve subjects volunteered to participate in this 
experiment. All subjects were members of the research staff at 
the Center for Man-Machine Systems Research at Georgia Tech, with 
backgrounds in either engineering or psychology. Eight subjects 
were enrolled in graduate school, two were senior undergraduate 
students, and two were faculty. 
Training  
Subjects were initially exposed to MABEL via a set of 
written instructions. These 19 pages of instructions contained a 
detailed explanation of the overall structure and normal 
operation of MABEL, a -summary of the commands, and a section 
explaining the subject's role in operating MABEL during 
off-normal situations. Each section of the instructions 
concluded with a set of questions which were used to assess the 
subject's comprehension of the material in that section. The 
system and its operation was very complex to the novice; thus, 
these questions served to assure that subjects acquired a good 
understanding of MABEL. 
Following the reading of these instructions, subjects were 
presented with a set of basic principles of operation and a 
summary of MABEL's structure. This material was organized and 
formatted for easy reference during MABEL operation. They were 
then given one final quiz to verify their understanding of the 
effects of failures on system performance. 
The last part of the training session used a special version 
of MABEL that allowed subjects to stop the execution of the 
program at any time during the experimental run. This training 
program had the advantages of allowing subjects to become 
familiar with the commands and to become aware of the effects of 
failures on both display features and system performance, without 
being overwhelmed by the progressive effects of failures. If a 
situation became too complex, the subject could simply halt the 
dynamic system, solve the problem, and proceed. Subjects 
supervised two different training scenarios: a 16 node network 
with 2 levels, and a 9 node network with 3 levels. 
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Experimental Design 
Cluster size (i.e., number of nodes per display) and number 
of levels functioned as within-subject factors and failure rate 
served as a between-subjects factor. Cluster size varied between 
4, 9, and 16; number of levels varied between 2 and 3. Failure 
rate was defined as the probability that a randomly selected node 
in the system would fail during each iteration of the MABEL 
program. One iteration occurred after each activity in the 
network (for example, the arrival of a new customer to the 
system). Failure rate was either low (probability of 
failure/iteration .0005) or high (probability of 
failure/iteration = .001). The six subjects in each group saw 
six experimental conditions which consisted of all possible 
combinations of cluster size and number of levels. The order of 
presentation to subjects was balanced in order to average out any 
residual training effect. 
Performance Measures  
A number of different performance measures were evaluated 
for each MABEL session. These measures can be classified as one 
of two types: product measures or process measures. Product 
measures assess the final result of a problem solving session, 
such as number of customers served. Process measures assess how 
that result was obtained by evaluating individual steps in a 
subject's strategic approach to supervising the system. In the 
following section, both product and process measures are 
discussed. 
Product measures. These measures calculate the amount of 
time customers spend in the system and tabulate the number of 
customers served during an experimental run. Biases naturally 
exist in these measures simply due to inherent differences among 
the various MABEL systems. (For example, a 4 node network with 2 
levels would be expected to process customers in less time than 
one with 16 nodes and 3 levels.) Thus, an effort was made to 
correct for this bias. 
This correction was done by first developing an optimal 
solution for MABEL. This solution was derived by controlling 
MABEL with a computer program that had perfect knowledge of all 
system states. Thus, all failures were detected and repaired 
immediately. A set of optimal performance measures were 
collected from these sessions. 	Subjects' scores were then 
corrected by this optimal solution. 	Any deviation from 
optimality could, therefore, be accounted for by human 
limitations in dealing with the system. Measures developed using 
this approach were 1) average service time, and 2) number of 
customers served. 
Process Measures. Three different sets of measures were 
classified as process measures: 1) errors, 2) failure diagnosis 
performance, and 3) strategy. The measures that composed each of 
these sets are discussed below. 
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Three measures of error were assessed. The first of these 
counted the number of times a subject saw a particular cluster of 
nodes that contained a failed node but did not repair the fault. 
The second error measure was actually a subset of the first: it 
counted the number of times a subject determined the presence of 
a failure via a test command but did not subsequently repair it. 
The third error measure counted the number of false alarms 
(repairing a node that had not failed). 
A second set of measures assessed subjects' ability to 
locate failures. These measures were the average time to 
diagnose a failure and the percent of failures found in the 
system. 
The third set of process measures looked at subjects' 
strategic approach to controlling MABEL. Measures included the 
average time between actions as well as the average amount of 
simulated time spent performing the four types of command 
activity (i.e., accessing, monitorin;-, diagnosing, and 
controlling). 
RESULTS 
Analyses of variance were performed to determine the 
significance of the main fixed effects (cluster size, number of 
levels, and failure rate) on each of the twelve dependent 
measures discussed above. Subjects were treated as a random 
effect. The analyses were performed using the BMDP statistical 
library [101. 
Product Measures 
Deviations from the optimal average time spent in the system 
were significantly affected by the cluster size and number of 
levels, F(2,20) = 8.06, p < .005 and F(1,10) = 20.30, p < .005, 
respectively. As the number of levels increased from two to 
three, the corrected average time in the system increased from 
0.96 seconds to 2.07 seconds. As tgim cluster size increased from 
4 to 9 to 16 nodes, however, the corrected score decreased (from 
2.26 seconds to 1.66 to 0.62). While a Newman-Reuls test 
indicated that there was no pair-wise difference between the 
means for four and nine node displays (p < .05), the overall 
trend exhibited by this data is representative of many of the 
results found in this analysis. Subject performance degraded 
with increasing number of levels, while it improved with 
increasing display size. 
Similar results were found from the ANOVA using the number 
of customers served (corrected for the optimal solution). In 
this case, however, the interaction of cluster size and number of 
levels had a significant effect on performance, F(2,20) = 4.70, p 
< .03. Figure 2 indicates the nature of this interaction. 
Increasing the cluster size leads to improved performance at both 
two and three levels, with the difference in performance between 
levels most pronounced with four node networks. An analysis of 
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the simple main effect of number of levels with cluster size held 
constant indicated that performance means were different at 4 
node and 9 node cluster sizes (F(1,10) = 8.87, p < .015, F(1,10) 
= 6.54, p < .03, respectively), while there was no significant 
difference with the 16 node network. Apparently the number of 
levels plays a greater role in shaping performance when cluster 
size is smaller. 
Process peasures 
Errors. 	Three ANOVAs were performed using the error 
measures. The first dependent variable was the number of times a 
subject viewed a cluster that contained a failure but did not 
take any repair action. This ANOVA indicated a significant main 
effect of cluster size, F(2,20) = 9.9, p < .001. As cluster size 
increased, the mean number of errors made by subjects decreased 
from 38.25 to 21.29 to 10.70. (A Newman-Keels analysis indicated 
there was no reason to suspect a difference between the latter 
two means, p < .05.) 
The next ANOVA used the number of tests made of a failed 
node with no subsequent repair action taken as the dependent 
variable. This analysis indicated a significant interaction 
between cluster size and number of levels, F(2,20) = 4.16, p < 
.04 (Figure 3). An analysis of simple main effects indicated 
that only the nine node network produced a significant difference 
between performance at two and three levels, F(I,10) = 6.29, p < 
.035. Despite the large difference between mean estimates at the 
four node cluster size, this difference was not significant 
because of an extremely high level of variance associated with 
performance when monitoring the small system. Increased system 
size led not only to improved performance, but decreased 
performance variability as well. 
The number of false alarms did not result in any significant 
main effects or interactions. Relatively few false alarms were 
made by subjects (the mean number was .53 per trial). 
Failure diagnosis. Another set of performance measures 
evaluated subjects' performance in locating failures. The 
average time to diagnose a failure was significantly affected by 
the interaction of cluster size and number of levels, F(2,20) = 
11.86, p < .0005 (Figure 4). Increasing cluster size and number 
of levels led to longer times for diagnosis. Thus, despite the 
degradation of the system performance measures with decreasing 
cluster size, failure diagnosis time actually was less for 
smaller clusters. This may have been due to the fact that larger 
systems appear to be more tolerant of system failures (i.e., 
propagation of effects was slower). 
Similar trends were indicated by the significant interaction 
between cluster size and number of levels in terms of the effect 
on percent failures found in the system, F(2,20) = 86.92, p < 
.0001 (Figure 5). Perhaps surprisingly, even though subjects 
found relatively fewer failures in the larger systems, the 
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overall system performance as shown in Figures 2 through 4 was 
nevertheless better for the larger systems. 
Strategy. An interesting question concerns whether the 
above performance differences were the result of inherent system 
differences or whether they were the result of subjects employing 
different control strategies. 	To answer this question, an 
analysis of several measures of strategy was performed. 	First. 
the average time between commands as the dependent measure 
resulted in a significant cluster size main effect, F(2,20) = 
4.81, p < .02. Subjects issued more commands with the smaller 
systems than the larger systems. The mean times in seconds for 
the 4, 9, and 16 node networks were 1.38, 1.71, and 1.77. (A 
Newman-Keuls analysis indicated no difference between the last 
two means, p < .05). 
The average time spent accessiDg parts of the system was 
significantly affected by the failure ratz, F(1,10) = 5.08, p < 
.05. Subjects in the low failure rate group spent about 18% of 
their time maneuvering through the system, while subjects in the 
high failure rate group spent about 27% of their time performing 
this activity. 
Since subjects in the high failure rate group spent more 
time accessing the system, they apparently had less time to 
monitor the system. 	Failure rate significantly affected the 
amount of time spent monitoring: 	F(1,10) = 9.97, p < .015. 
Means were 43.3% and 25.8% for low and high rate, respectively). 
The cluster size also affected the amount of monitoring, F(2,20) 
= 3.78, p < .05. The means were 29.5%, 36.6%, and 37.7% for the 
4, 9, and 16 node networks. A Newman-Keuls analysis showed no 
difference between the values for the 9 and 16 node networks. 
The time spent performing diagnostic activities was affected 
by the interaction of cluster size and failure rate, F(2,20) = 
4.49, p < .025 (Figure 6). 	Mean performance differed greatly 
between levels for the 4 node 	se, while as before it was 
similar for the 9 and 16 node case. 
Finally, the amount of time spent controlling the system was 
significantly affected by all three variables: cluster size 
(F(2,20) = 13.55, p < .0003), number of levels (F(1,10) = 6.88, p 
< .03), and failure rate (F(1,10) = 7.39, p < .025). Increasing 
the failure rate increased the percent control time from 6.4% to 
8.8%. Changing from two to three levels increased the percent 
control time from 6.4% to 8.8%, while increasing the cluster size 
decreased the percent time spent controlling from 11.0% to 7.3% 
to 4.9%. 
Pearson product-moment correlations were calculated between 
the measures of strategy and the other performance measures. In 
order to perform the analyses, the measures were averaged across 
all six experimental sessions for each subject. Results 
indicated that performance was independent of subjects' strategic 
time allocation. Significiant correlations (p < .01) did exist, 
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however, between the percent time monitoring and the percent time 
accessing the system (r = -.955) and between the percent time 
monitoring and the percent time diagnosing (r = -.837). 
These results suggest the prevalence of two basic strategies 
for supervisory control of MABEL. One strategy involved staying 
at higher levels and using monitor commands to assess the state 
of lower levels. The other strategy involved actually accessing 
the lower levels and performing tests to diagnose failures. 
Subjects with low failure rate conditions tended to choose the 
former strategy while subjects with high failure rate conditions 
tended toward the latter strategy. Apparently both strategies 
were effective in that performance was independent of either 
approach. 
Figure 7 summarizes the difference in time allocation 
between the high and low failure rate groups. The results seem 
to agree with intuition, in that subjects v:Ith more failures to 
deal with would naturally be required to spend more of their time 
accessing parts of the system, diagnosing failures and 
controlling the system. The low failure rate group, on the other 
hand, would be enabled to monitor more often. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The major determinants of subjects' performance in this task 
were the size of each displayed cluster and the number of levels 
in the system hierarchy. Often the interaction between these two 
variables was significant. 	Failure rate only affected the way 
subjects allocated their time among various activities. 	Perhaps 
the altered strategy of the high failure rate group enabled those 
subjects to maintain a level of performance consistent with that 
of the low failure rate group. 
Increasing the number of levels tended to decrease the 
quality of performance. This effect was expected: the greater 
the percentage of nodes hidden f - gym view, the greater the 
difficulty subjects experienced in supervising the system. For 
instance, the three level systems resulted in substantially 
longer times to diagnose failures. Since it took a longer length 
of time for the effects of lower-level failures to become obvious 
at the higher levels, the effects tended to be more serious than 
in the two level systems. This lengthened diagnosis time tended 
to degrade practically all other dimensions of performance. 
A trend not predicted prior to the start of the experiment 
was that increasing cluster size would lead to improved 
performance. One would suspect that larger numbers of nodes per 
display should lead to increased task complexity. Thus, as the 
number of components that the human must deal with increases, 
performance should degrade. This is not the case in MABEL. 
There exist two non-independent explanations for this 
phenomena. In order to normalize experimental conditions, each 
system was designed to process approximately the same number of 
Page 12 
customers over the length of each experimental run. Moreover, 
each system was designed to be utilized to approximately the same 
degree. (For instance, each node in the top level of each system 
was busy approximately 50% of the time.) To achieve this 
uniformity, nodes in small systems had to have shorter mean 
service times than nodes in larger networks. Consequently, when 
a failure occurred, its effects became apparent quite rapidly. 
(Recall the shorter diagnosis times for small . systems.) Unlike 
the large systems, therefore, one failure in the small system 
could quickly produce devastating effects to overall system 
performance due to the relative speed with which failures could 
propogate. 
The second reason is that each node in a small network 
represents a larger fraction of the total size of the system than 
does one node in a large network. In other words, when a node 
fails in a small network, a relatively large portion of the 
overall system fails. Due to this failitre, there are fewer 
available channels through which customers can be rerouted. 
Thus, customers tend to be retained more frequently at nodes when 
they have fewer alternate paths through the system. This also 
leads to faster propagation of failures in the smaller systems. 
Therefore, smaller clusters were more vulnerable to failures 
due to both experimental normalizations and inherently fewer 
resources to absorb the effects of failures. Yet, the 
interaction of cluster size and failure rate did not 
significantly affect overall performance. Apparently, the 
aforementioned strategy shift was sufficient to compensate for 
increased failure rate, but not sufficient to deal with the more 
resource-constrained networks. 
Overall, this initial experiment with MABEL produced two 
results of particular interest. First, as evidenced by Figures 2 
through 5, the effects of number of levels in a hierarchical 
display system can be very strong, producing up to five-fold 
degradations for a modest change from_two to three levels. This 
phenomenon deserves careful further investigation. 
The second result of note is that strategies can be adapted 
to compensate for some situations (i.e., increased failure rate), 
but apparently not for others (i.e., small clusters with 
constrained resources). Of course, since failure rate was a 
between-subjects variable while cluster 	size 	was 	a 
within-subjects variable, there is no evidence that any 
individual subject can adapt his strategy as conditions change. 
Further research is needed to determine whether individual 
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Figure 2: Number Served — Optimal vs. 
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Figure 3: Number of Tests of a Failed Node with 
No Subsequent Repair Action vs. Cluster Size 
(at 2 and 3 Levels) 






















Figure 4: Average Time for Diagnosis vs. Cluster Size 


























Figure 5: Percent of Failures Found vs. 




















Figure 6: Percent Time Performing Diagnostic 
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Figure 7: Percent Time Performing Command Activities 
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test cluster for failures 
n node information 
CONTROL COMMANDS 
r 	 replace node 
1 reduce load 
Table 1: MABEL Command Set 
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During this reporting period, the results of the first 
formal experiment with MABEL (reported in our Annual Interim Report) 
were used as a basis for beginning three new directions. 
The first involved a modification of MABEL to include a 
geographical context involving regions, cities, and local exchanges 
in a telephone network. A small experiment (N=4) is currently 
being performed by Dick Henneman, to assess the effects of this 
context. 
Dick Henneman is also beginning to test various measures of 
task complexity relative to the problem solving and control 
aspects of MABEL. Initial analyses of correlations between the 
uncertainty associated with each display page, which is strategy-
dependent, and task performance look promising. A literature 
search on large-scale systems and complexity is also underway. 
The third new direction initiated during this reporting 
period was the development of a rule-based model of human problem 
solving with MABEL. Eduardo Viteri is pursuing this work as his 
M.S. thesis. In order to expedite progress on this effort, 
which should have been initiated earlier but lacked staffing, 
Annette Knaeuper who is a new member of the Center's professional 
research staff will be working with Eduardo. 
As of July 31, 1983, approximately $90,000 had been spent. 
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During the October-November reporting period, Dick Henneman s 
study of complexity progressed. A draft review of the complexity literature 
was completed and will be included in his Ph.D. thesis. Based on this 
review, as well as the characteristics of MABEL, work continued on developing 
measures of complexity for large-scale, dynamic networks. In October, 
Dick presented a paper on this work at the 27th Annual Meeting of the 
Human Factors Society in Norfolk. 
Eduardo Viteri and Annette Knaeuper continued their work on 
developing a rule-based model of human problem solving with MABEL. The 
model structure is based on a hypothesis that emerged from an earlier ARI 
grant on diagnostic behavior. The model has been flow charted and programming 
has begun. 
As of November 30, 1983, approximately $118,000 had been spent. 
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During the December-January reporting period, Dick Henneman developed 
a candidate complexity measure for MABEL that includes two sets of attributes 
that reflect: 1) system characteristics (e.g., redundancy), and 2) behavioral 
characteristics (e.g., strategy). Comparisons of this measure with data from 
the first experiment with MABEL produced fairly good results. 
Also during this reporting period, a new version of MABEL was 
developed. CAIN (Contextually Augmented Integrated Networks) is structurally 
identical to MABEL, but is heavily laden with the context of a telephone network 
scenario including geographical labeling of clusters, demands for services 
varying with time zones, and outages that propagate locally. The purpose of 
adding the context is to make the task more meaningful for subjects and 
therefore encourage richer strategies. 
Eduardo Viteri and Annette Knaeuper continued programming the model 
of human problem solving with MABEL. Currently, the issue being addressed is 
communicating the state of the network from MABEL to the model, and commands 
from the model to MABEL. 
As of January 31, 1984, approximately $138,000 has been spent. 
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(404/894-3996) 
INTRODUCTION 
Current trends in computer and communications technology are 
leading to the development of many highly integrated systems in 
the domains of communications, transportation, manufacturing, 
etc. Most of these systems can be represented as large networks 
of nodes and arcs where nodes denote people, destinations, or 
machines and arcs denote communication lines, transportation 
routes, or a variety of activities. Because these systems are 
highly integrated, it is not unusual for there to be hundreds or 
thousands of nodes and arcs. Networks of this size and level of 
connectivity are very complex systems. 
Complexity is further increased by the dynamic nature of 
these networks. The states of the nodes and arcs (i.e., levels 
flows, etc.) usually evolve in time and are not amenable to 
instantaneous control. Further, the demands placed upon the 
networks are often time-varying, with occurences of peak demands 
not always being predictable. 
This program of research is concerned with the problem 
solving behavior of the human whose role is network controller or 
operator. The job of the network controller is to manage the 
assets of the network (i.e., nodes and arcs) so as to maximize 
network efficiency. Further, during peak demand periods, the 
controller may have to implement control procedures such as load 
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shedding and priority scheduling to assure that overloads do not 
degrade network performance. 
For many aspects of this job, the network controller has 
computer aids or, in fact, may simply have to monitor an 
automated system which performs many of the above functions. 
However, system failures or unusual environmental demands can 
require that the human intervene and manually control the 
network. 	The human's abilities to solve these types of problem 
are not well understood. 	In fact, human problem solving in 
complex dynamic environments is an area where few research 
results are available. This area is the topic of the research 
program whose progress is reported here. 
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PROGRESS 
This section briefly summarizes progress during the first 
two years of this three-year program of research. Considerable 
more detail can be found in the papers included in the Appendix. 
Most of the first year was devoted to developing an 
experimental scenario and evaluating the impact of its parameters 
on human problem solving performance [Henneman and Rouse, 1984a]. 
Communications networks were chosen as the experimental context. 
After reviewing a variety of documentation on human control tasks 
in both commercial and military communications networks, an 
experimental scenario called MABEL was designed and programmed. 
MABEL requires subjects to monitor a large-scale automated 
communications network via a hierarchical multi-page CRT display. 
Much as discussed in the Introduction, subjects have to manage 
network assets and, in the event of a failure, intervene to 
diagnose the failure, compensate for its impact, and restore 
normal operation. 
For the first formal experiment with MABEL, the effects of 
three independent variables were studied: 1) number of nodes per 
display, 2) number of levels in the display hierarchy, and 3) 
failure rate per node. Twelve subjects each participated in six 
experimental sessions. Overall, this initial experiment with 
MABEL produced two results of particular interest. First, the 
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effects of number of levels in the hierarchy were often very 
strong, producing up to a five-fold degradation of performance 
for a modest change from two to three levels. The second result 
of note is that rather different strategies seemed best for 
different combinations of independent variables. This leads to 
the question of whether humans can be trained to adapt 
appropriately or if some form of aided adaptation is needed. 
The second year of this research involved two efforts. 	One 
effort concerned the development of a rule-based model of human 
problem solving in the MABEL environment. Eduardo Viteri pursued 
this modeling work in conjunction with his M.S. thesis. A 
summary of the model and a comparison of its behavior with that 
of subjects is included in the Appendix. 
One general impression that emerged from the experiment and 
modeling efforts noted above was that MABEL lacked the contextual 
richness necessary to provide the type of problem solving 
environment required for this research. Perhaps the best 
indication of this is the simplicity of Viteri's model even 
though it compares fairly well with subjects' behavior. 
This observation led to a decision to enhance substantially 
the contextual aspects of MABEL. A new experimental scenario 
emerged, CAIN for Contextually-Augmented Integrated Network. 
CAIN is structurally equivalent to MABEL, but has been augmented 
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to include many of the contextual elements of the telephone 
system in the United States (e.g., geography and effects of time 
of day, weather, and even construction projects). CAIN is 
summarized in a paper in the Appendix. 
The first formal experiment with CAIN considered the effects 
of number of levels in the display hierarchy and level of network 
redundancy [Henneman and Rouse, 1984b]. Eight subjects each 
participated in thirteen experimental sessions. The purpose of 
having this large number of sessions was to study the effects of 
practice on strategies employed and resulting performance. 
While the data analysis is only partially completed, several 
interesting results have emerged. First, similar to the 
experiment with MABEL, increasing the number of levels in the 
display hierarchy led to a degradation of failure diagnosis 
performance. Second, a fine-grained analysis of command usage by 
subjects indicated that rather disparate strategies can produce 
equivalent overall performance. Finally, a measure of problem 
complexity that includes both structural and strategic elements 
was found to correlate highly with diagnostic performance. 
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APPENDIX 
ASSESSING THE COMPLEXITY OF A LARGE SCALE SYSTEM: 
MEASURES OF SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND HUMAN STRATEGY 
Richard L. Henneman and William B. Rouse 
Center for Man-Machine Systems Research 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, GA 30332 
Abstract  
The role of humans in monitoring and controlling activities in a 
hierarchical large-scale system, such as a communication network, is 
considered. An experiment was conducted in which subjects were required to 
monitor and control a large simulated network. The major control activity 
consisted of detecting and repairing system failures and relieving network 
overcrowding. Factors suspected of contributing to task complexity (e.g., 
number of hierarchical levels and degree of network connectivity) were varied. 
Data were analyzed from three perspectives, namely an analysis of variance of 
the effects of the independent variables, a fine-grained analysis of subject 
strategies, and an on-going development of measures of task complexity. It is 
proposed that the complexity of an operators task is related to both system 
defined elements and the humans understanding of the system as reflected by 
his strategy. Time series analysis was used to identify transfer functions 
between the two types of complexity (structural and strategic) and the average 
time to failure diagnosis. Preliminary results suggest that the distinction 
between structural and strategic complexity is appropriate. 
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I. Introduction  
Recent technological advances have enabled the development of highly 
automated large scale systems. These systems frequently are represented as 
networks that consist of a number of nodes connected by arcs. In addition, 
these systems often are arranged hierarchically, with the extent of control 
increasing with successive hierarchic levels. The network size, degree of 
integration, and hierarchic structure all combine to create systems of 
potentially enormous complexity. The complexity is compounded by the fact that 
these systems are dynamic -- the states of the arcs and nodes evolve over time 
and are not amenable to instantaneous control. Examples of this type of system 
exist in many domains. Commercial and military communication networks, and 
transportation, manufacturing, and power systems can all be represented as 
large hierarchic dynamic networks. 
Of major concern is the ability of people to monitor and control these 
networks. Despite these systems', high level of automation, human intervention 
and control is necessary when unexpected events occur, such as system failures 
or network overcrowding. The research addressed within this paper considers 
these human abilities. 
This paper is divided into seven sections. In the next section, an 
experimental scenario is described which was used to investigate the 
relationship between large scale system complexity and human performance. The 
scenario extends the context-free, large-scale simulation reported in Henneman 
and Rouse [3] by introducing a high level of contextual detail. Section III 
describes an experiment that was conducted using this simulation, while 
Sections IV, V, and VI analyze and discuss results from this experiment. 
Section IV includes the results of an analysis of variance of the independent 
experimental variables. Section V examines the experimental data on a more 
detailed level by making inferences relative to subject strategy from the 
analysis of individual commands. Section VI discusses the complexity of large 
scale systems and its implications for human performance. Finally, Section VII 
summarizes the results of this research. 
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II. Description of Experimental Scenario  
A previous experiment [3] considered human performance in the monitoring 
and control of a generic large scale system. Subjects monitored activity 
within a relatively context-free simulated environment referred to as MABEL 
(due both to the obvious connotation with the nationwide telephone network and 
the fact that it required subjects to Monitor, Access, Browse, and Evaluate 
Limits in the process of controlling the system). The network is structured as 
a hierarchical network composed of nodes, clusters, and levels. MABEL is 
programmed in Pascal and operates on a VAX 11/780 computer. The simulation is 
relatively context-free in that it can represent any of several large-scale 
domains (e.g., manufacturing system, transportation network, communication 
network); subject training, however, emphasized the similarity to the 
nationwide phone network of the Bell System. 
Of substantial theoretical interest is the extent to which human abilities 
in coping with the complexity created by this type of system is a function of 
the level of abstraction present in the human-system interface; i.e., is 
better performance in some situations facilitated through the addition of 
increased contextual information? While this question will not be addressed in 
this paper, the issue did provide partially the motivation for expanding the 
MABEL scenario to contain a higher level of contextual information. In 
addition, the contextually augmented scenario increases the experimental 
validity by increasing the simulation fidelity. 
Henneman and Rouse [3] describe the MABEL system in detail. Below are 
summarized aspects of MABEL (i.e, the structure, interface, and typical system 
operation) that are common to both MABEL and the new scenario. The new 
scenario is then described in more detail. 
MABEL 
The physical structure of MABEL is composed of a very large number of 
nodes. Customers are processed at nodes and passed on to other nodes, 
following a path that minimizes the time between their source and sink nodes. 
The system operates, therefore, as a very large queueing network. 
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Due to the size of the system, it is impractical and unnecessary to 
display all potentially relevant system information to the human operator. 
Thus, nodes are grouped into relatively small networks called clusters. 
Operators may view only one cluster of nodes at a time on the MABEL display. 
Clusters are grouped, in turn, into hierarchical levels. 
During normal operation, human subjects monitor activity in the system via 
a CRT display. Since MABEL operates in real time, the critical system states 
(namely, the number of customers waiting at each node) change with time. This 
information is updated every three seconds on the display. In addition, a 
variety of other information pertinent to proper system functioning is 
displayed as requested by the user. Subjects communicate with the system by 
inputting commands via an alphanumeric keyboard. 
Under normal circumstances, MABEL operates automatically without any 
direct control action by the human monitor. When a critical event occurs, 
however, such as a node failing or system overcrowding, the operator must first 
identify that the event has occurred and then issue corrective action. Control 
action in MABEL takes the form of either node repair or load reduction. 
CAIN 
MABEL was substantially altered to produce CAIN (Contextually Augmented 
Integrated Network). While the physical hierarchical structure of MABEL was 
preserved. the addition of contextual information necessitated changing certain 
features of the interface. In the MABEL scenario, for example, all nodes on 
any particular display page are identified by a number on the CRT display. 
Each displayed node in a cluster, therefore, looks physically the same as nodes 
in other clusters. The MABEL interface has a generic quality in that all 
system sections are physically similar; no contextual cues exist. On the 
other hand. system elements in CAIN are identified via specific geographic 
locations. In MABEL, for example, if a subject wanted to display a lower level 
cluster, he might input the command "d9", which would display the cluster 
beneath Node 9. In CAIN, on the other hand, the subject might type 
"dSanFranc", which would display the cities beneath San Francisco (e.g., 
Berkeley, San Jose). Thus, subjects could form associations or links between 
the system parts due to the existence of the contextual information. 
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Simply introducing geographic names as node labels is not enough, however, 
to facilitate a change or difference in subject task performance. A small 
experiment (n=3) replicated the first MABEL experiment, with the exception that 
nodes were given geographic names. No significant difference existed in terms 
of performance between subjects using either of the two task scenarios. A 
possible explanation is that the additional context must be necessary to 
adequately perform the task, otherwise it is of no use to the operator. Thus, 
events must occur that are related to specific locations in the system. 
Such context-dependent events were introduced to CAIN. Although equipment 
in nodes fails randomly, some equipment experiences a higher probability of 
failure. For example, a thunderstorm in Little Rock, AR may make equipment in 
that city susceptible to lightening damage. Similarly, vandals in Newark, NJ 
might be more apt to damage equipment than farmers living near Council Bluffs, 
IA. Therefore, equipment in certain cities exhibits a greater tendency to'fail 
than in other cities. Subjects are informed of these locations via warning 
alarms that flash on the bottom of the display. Subjects can directly monitor 
activities within these trouble spots via a special "watch" command. 
Besides recurring failures, another type of context-dependent event was 
introduced to CAIN. At different times, certain sections of the system may be 
more prone to experience heavy loading than other sections. For example, 
certain times of day are busier in one part of the country than in others. 
Similarly, a major political or sports event in one section of the country may 
increase the number of messages sent. As with the recurring failures, subjects 
are informed of the location of these fluctuating loads via messages at the 
bottom of the screen. 
A final change that was implemented in CAIN involved the way in which 
subjects can access information about the various clusters. In MABEL, movement 
is constrained in that subjects can only display the cluster of nodes in a 
level immediately above or below the current display. Thus, it is not possible 
to "jump" laterally across the network. In CAIN, however, it is possible to 
move from any part of the system to any other part. Thus, if a subject recalls 
that the cluster associated with Bangor, ME was previously experiencing 
problems, it is relatively easy to call up that cluster display. 
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In summary, therefore, despite the structural isomorphism of the two 
simulations, CAIN represents a significant departure from the context-free 
scenario of MABEL. Through the addition of contextual detail and the addition 
of events that are dependent upon this contextual information, the level of 
fidelity of the simulation has been enhanced significantly. 
III. Experiment Two 
Motivation  
The main goal of Experiment Two was to investigate the nature of 
complexity in a large scale human-machine system. The general assumption was 
made that task complexity can only be measured relative to an individual's 
understanding of the system and his expertise in dealing with problem 
situations within that system. (More detail relative to complexity may be 
found in Section VI of this paper.) Thus, complexity is considered to be 
dynamic, varying across time and among subjects. Accordingly, subjects were 
required to perform the task (CAIN) over a relatively long period of time. 
Subjects 
Eight junior and senior engineering majors at Georgia Tech served as 
subjects in this experiment. Due to the nature of the task, potential subjects 
were screened via a typing test (minimum ability level was 25 words/minute). 
Subjects were paid a total of $65: $5.00 for each training session (3) and 
each experimental session (10). 
Training  
Subjects were trained via a combination of written instructions and 
hands-on experience with CAIN. Subjects initially were given two sets of 
written instructions on consecutive days explaining the system, the goals of 
their task, and methods for achieving these goals. Self-test questions were 
contained within the text to insure mastery of the material. The experimenter 
reviewed this material with each subject at the beginning of each training 
session. In addition, subjects were given one-page summaries detailing the 
structure of the system, operation of the system, and available commands. 
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Subjects completed each training session by controlling a two-level CAIN 
system. A third training session was spent controlling a three-level CAIN 
system. These sessions were performed using a version of CAIN that allowed 
subjects to start and stop the progiam execution. Thus, subjects could 
investigate normal and abnormal system functions without being overwhelmed by 
the progressive effects of failures. The experimenter was present during all 
training sessions to answer questions. 
Experimental Design  
Results from Experiment One suggested that the degree of interconnectivity 
between nodes in MABEL had a particularly strong effect on task performance. 
Another result from Experiment One showed the very strong effect of number of 
levels within the 'hierarchical system. Thus, two independent variables 
selected for Experiment Two were the number of levels in the system and the 
degree of redundancy. Redundancy varied between low (6 connections/node) and 
high (13 connections/node) and number of levels varied between two and three. 
Cluster size was kept constant at 16 in order to emphasize the non-varying 
features of the contextual display. 
Of major interest in this experiment was the way in which complexity 
changes with increasing subject expertise. Thus, the order of presentation of 
experimental conditions to subjects was not randomized. All subjects saw the 
same experimental conditions in exactly the same order. A final independent 
variable, therefore, was the order of presentation of experimental conditions. 
In summary, the experimental sessions (S1 - S10) were performed in the 
following order: Sl,S2: 2 levels, high redundancy; S3,S4,S5: 3 levels, high 
redundancy; S6,S7: 2 levels, low redundancy; S8,S9,S10: 3 levels, low 
redundancy. Each experimental session was performed on consecutive days and 
lasted about 45 minutes. 
IV. General Results from Experiment Two 
Data files from Experiment Two were analyzed using the same performance 
measures as Experiment One [3]. Results from Experiment One led to the 
following conclusions. First, the major determinants of subject performance 
were the size of each displayed cluster and the number of levels in the system 
hierarchy. Often the interaction between these two variables was significant. 
Page 8 
In general, increasing the number of levels tended to degrade the quality of 
performance, while increasing the cluster size tended to improve performance. 
Failure rate only affected the way subjects allocated their time among various 
activities. 
Perhaps the most surprising result from the Experiment Two data is the 
relatively strong effect of number of levels. Although this finding in itself 
is not surprising, the direction of the effect is: both number of customers 
served and average time spent in the system were significantly affected by 
increasing the number of levels from two to three. Increasing the number of 
levels actually improved performance. While these results are disconcerting at 
first considering the strong effect in the opposite direction found in 
Experiment One, they may be explained in light of changes made in the 
experimental scenario. 
Due to the addition of contextual information to CAIN, changes were 
necessarily made in the temporal sequencing of events existing in MABEL. Thus, 
the real time length of each experimental run increased as the number of system 
levels increased. This increase had the net effect of slowing down the 
dynamics in the three level systems. Thus, the three level system allowed 
subjects more time to make critical decisions. This increase in time 
apparently had the effect of improving subject performance in terms of global 
measures of performance. 
It is important to note, however, that these findings only exist for the 
product measures of performance (e.g., number of customers served and average 
time in the system). When considering measures of the problem solving process 
the results are similar to those of Experiment One. For example, increasing 
the number of levels from 2 to 3 increased the average time to failure 
detection from 23.07s to 42.71s (F(1,7) = 76.65, p < .0001). In addition, the 
percent of failures found decreased from .950 to .723 (F(1,7) = 529.54, p < 
.0001). Increasing the number of levels, therefore, significantly decreases 
the ability of subjects to locate failures. 
It can be argued that these process measures that are related to failure 
diagnosis ability are better indices of subject performance than the product 
measures. Process measures are more direct metrics of subject ability in that 
they are assessing subject related characteristics rather than system-dependent 
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characteristics, such as number of customers served. From this perspective, 
the general results from Experiment Two are quite consistent with those from 
Experiment One. 
The remaining independent variables, degree of redundancy and session, 
both affected performance as expected. In general, decreasing the degree of 
redundancy tended to degrade performance. If a node has fewer connections, 
less alternate routes existed for customers through the system, thereby leading 
to more capacity failures. In addition, subject performance tended to improve 
with increasing experience. For example, the average time to failure diagnosis 
decreased from 38.00s to 27.75s the last time a particular experimental 
condition was seen by subjects (F(1,7) = 57.05, p < .0001). This result is 
typical of many of the remaining performance measures; thus, they will not be 
reported here. 
In summary, these analyses of variance yielded several useful results. 
Results confirmed hypotheses relative to the effect of the independent 
variables: subjects improved with experience, and as the number of connections 
per node decreased, subject performance degraded. A second main result 
confirmed results from Experiment One concerning the effect of number of levels 
on subject performance; those measures directly related to subjects' fault 
detection ability degraded with increasing number of levels. 
V. Command Level Analysis  
Beyond the general analysis completed above, it is of considerable 
interest to examine the strategies that people use in operating CAIN. In a 
dynamic task such as CAIN, an individual's strategy is not only dependent on 
what action is performed, but also when it is performed. Thus, an operator may 
perform a highly appropriate action in light of the current system state; if 
the action is not implemented soon enough, however, worse system performance 
may result. 
The analysis that follows, therefore, considers both the nature and the 
timing of subjects' actions. First, the frequency of individual commands and 
pairs of commands will be tabulated. Second, the average real time between 
commands will be determined. These summaries will then be used both 
qualitatively and quantitatively in an analysis of strategy. 
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Qualitative Strategy Analysis  
Transition matrices were tabulated that counted the frequency of every 
possible command transition for each subject and for each experimental session. 
A cursory examination of these matrices yields several interesting results. 
First, wide variations exist between subjects simply in terms of the number of 
commands issued. For example, during Session 4 one subject issued 1655 
commands while another issued only 874. Their performance in terms of average 
time to failure detection was approximately the same (67.64s vs. 67.28s). 
Since subjects could apparently achieve comparable results using very different 
numbers of commands, this observation suggests that several different 
strategies were appropriate for controlling CAIN. 
Second, wide variations exist between types of system: 	in particular, 
subjects issued many more commands when operating a three—level system than 
when operating a two—level system. This observation is particularly relevant 
in light of the effects of number of levels found in Section IV. Third, wide 
variations exist between the frequency with which command types were used. 
Related to this result is the observation that less frequently used commands 
had longer latencies. This tradeoff concerning the degree of automaticity of 
command use will be considered more quantitatively in the next section. 
Finally, wide variations exist between usage of sequences of commands. 
The way in which these strategies differ may be explained by considering 
two apparent "dimensions" of strategy. The first dimension involves the manner 
in which information seeking is pursued by the operator: does the subject 
actively seek information or passively observe the system state? In general, a 
subjects position along this continuum should be related to his overall 
frequency of command use. A subject who issues many commands can be considered 
a more active information seeker than one who issues few commands. 
The second dimension involves the way in which subjects make decisions 
relative to proceeding down a "path" in the network. A subject may explore, 
for example, a lower system level because of an observed critical system 
variable noted on the information display (i.e., a large queue size). On the 
other hand, a subject may explore a lower system level because of information 
gathered from a command that displays data about the activity in the next lower 
level. The former approach relies on inferring the lower system state on the 
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basis of upper level clues, while the latter strategy makes inferences based on 
directly observing the lower system state.* 
The degree to which a subject uses one approach or the other may be 
estimated by examining the frequency of certain command sequences. In CAIN, a 
common command sequence consists of displaying a cluster in the level beneath 
the currently displayed level (a "d" command), and testing the new cluster for 
failures (a "t" command). If this "d-t" command sequence is preceded by the 
command that allows direct monitoring of the lower system state ("m" - monitor 
command), it suggests that the subject is examining the next level due to an 
observation made from the monitor command. Thus, the extent to which a subject 
uses a monitoring approach rather than an inferential approach may be estimated 
by calculating the percent of times that a subject preceded a "d-t" sequence 
with an "m". 
Quantitative Analysis  
Besides the frequency of command use, subject strategy is also related to 
the time needed to issue a command. These times vary as a function of command 
type (e.g., a frequently used command typically takes less time to issue than a 
less used command) and also with subjects. 
With these observations in mind, graphs which plotted command frequency 
vs. inter-command time (or command latency) were developed. These plots were 
considered for each session and for each subject. The general result was that 
the plotted points tend to fall along a negative diagonal (as expected) with 
one significant exception: the "down" command, typically associated with a 
high frequency of use, also tends to have relatively long latencies. This 
command appears to be related to an aspect of strategy different from the other 
commands. It can be argued that the critical task in CAIN involves deciding 
when to examine a lower level in the system. Thus, it is reasonable that the 
inter-command time associated with the down command is longer than would be 
predicted otherwise. The analysis proceeded by performing a simple linear 
regression to estimate the slope of the line relating command frequency to 
command latency (omitting the down command). 
*Of course, subjects using this direct assessment approach could also have 
used the inferential strategy as that information was always available on the 
display. 
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These slopes were then used with "d"-command frequency in a regression 
analysis to predict some of the global measures of subject performance, namely, 
number of customers served (corrected by the optimal), average service time 
(corrected by the optimal), and average time to failure detection. Table 1 
summarizes the regression equations, which are based on data from all sessions 
and all subjects. 
Regression analyses were also performed using subsets of the original data 
to determine the degree to which the equations are affected by the experimental 
variables (i.e., number of levels and degree of redundancy). Redundancy had no 
effect on the regression equations in terms of both significance of the model 
and the amount of variance explained. In addition, all model coefficients were 
of the same order of magnitude. 
On the other hand, using data from only the two and three level systems 
lowered the percent variance explained and the overall significance of the 
model. Nevertheless, no significant difference existed in terms of the 
regression coefficients for either the number served or average service time 
equations. In terms of the equations for average time until failure detection, 
however, a significant difference did exist between the two sets of 
coefficients. While the equation for the three level system was not 
significant, the two level system resulted in an equation with F(3,74) = 21.10, 
p < .0001, and R = .770, a large improvement over the combined model. The 
reason for the improvement is probably that failure detection times for the 
three level systems are much more variable than those for the two level 
systems; thus, these times are more difficult to predict. 
In each equation, the coefficients may be interpreted as follows: as the 
slope becomes more negative, performance improves. In addition, as the 
frequency of down commands decreases, performance improves. These results 
suggest that best performance was achieved by subjects who issued relatively 
few "down" commands, but tended to issue other commands more frequently and/or 
quickly (thereby increasing the slope). 
The extent to which subjects achieve varying levels of performance 
relative to this apparent tradeoff between command frequency and latency was 
analyzed by estimating for each subject and session the x- and y-intercepts of 
the individual regression equations. By examining the standard deviation of 
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the mean of these values across all sessions (i.e., the intercepts), it should 
be possible to estimate the extent to which frequency or latency contributes to 
the slope. 
The analysis showed that the y-intercept (corresponding to command 
frequency) was 132.69 with a standard deviation of 61.08, resulting in a 
coefficient of variation of .460. The x-intercept (corresponding to command 
latency) was 6.986, with a standard deviation of 1.866, resulting in a 
coefficient of variation of .267. The results indicate that there is 
considerably less variability in the command latency measure (.267) than 
command frequency measure (.460). Thus, these results suggest that subjects 
are enabled to gain more information about the system by issuing more commands 
other than down commands. This gain in information is reflected by an 
improvement in subject performance. 
VI. Assessing the Complexity of a Large Scale.  System 
As mentioned in Section III, the main purpose of this experiment was to 
examine the nature of complexity in a large scale system and its impact on 
human performance. While this analysis has not been completed, this section 
serves as an introduction to the underlying premise of the approach, as well as 
a description of the statistical methodology used to analyze the data. Time 
series analysis was used to develop transfer functions relating the two 
complexity measures to the average time until failure repair. 
Large Scale System Complexity 
A review of the literature [4] has suggested that the complexity of a 
large scale system may be described in terms of 1) the physical structure of 
the system and 2) the operator's understanding of the system as reflected by 
his strategy. From this perspective, a system that is complex or difficult to 
control for one supervisor may be relatively easy to control for another 
supervisor. Similarly, the complexity of any particular system may vary with 
time for any particular operator. Some systems, however, may be complex 
regardless of any particular control strategy due to their inherent structural 
complexity. 
Page 14 
The measure of structural complexity is estimated by calculating the total 
number of display pages the subject must view in order to repair all failures 
in the system. If the subject performs perfectly, this measure represents the 
minimum number of pages necessary to discover all failures. Thus, the 
structural complexity measure represents optimal performance given the 
constraints of the structure or arrangement of the system components. This 
measure is only affected by subject performance in that any given subject may 
have more or fewer failures in the system depending upon their fault finding 
ability. 
The strategic complexity measure, on the other hand, explicitly considers 
the subject's performance. When a subject is deciding which "path" through the 
system is most likely to lead to finding a failure, he makes a tradeoff between 
the time since his last observation of that part of the system and his 
expectations of finding a failure in that part of the system. High uncertainty 
about a part of the system may be acceptable, for example, if a relatively low 
probability exists of finding a failure in that section. The converse also is 
true. The measure of strategic complexity multiplies these two metrics (state 
uncertainty and probability of finding a failure given the system state) and 
sums them across the entire system. 
The literature review [4] has further suggested that an appropriate 
dependent measure of complexity is the time until failure repair. Thus, the 
two independent measures of complexity (structural and strategic) were combined 
in one equation to predict the time until failure repair. More specifically, 
the dependent complexity measure is the average time until the subject issued a 
repair command for a failed node. The average includes only the five previous 
repairs. 
Development of Transfer Functions  
Since the dynamics of a large scale system are not instantaneous, the 
effects of complexity at any given time may not manifest themselves for some 
time lag. Thus, time series analysis was identified as a suitable means of 
developing transfer functions that relate the two complexity measures at 
various time lags to the current value of the average time until repair. 
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The basic methodology is that espoused by Box and Jenkins [1]. Carter [2] 
discusses the use of time series models in human factors research, while 
Montgomery and Weatherby [5] provide a good tutorial on the development of two 
independent variable transfer function models. Their approach is outlined in 
Renneman [4]. 
Initial Results  
Data for the time series analysis were generated by replaying subject data 
files. Following every 3 seconds of real time, both complexity measures and 
the average time until failure repair were calculated. These measures 
represented the two input and output time series. Results of this complexity 
analysis are not complete. In general, findings so far support the conclusion 
that the two complexity measures are related to the difficulty subjects have in 
locating system failures. The transfer function models that use these measures 
explain between 85% and 95% of the variance within the data. A problem arises, 
however, in the interpretation of the transfer functions. In particular, it is 
not clear how to correctly interpret the meaning of the lags and coefficients 
in the equations. Current work is considering refinement of the measures and 
possible explanations of the equations. 
VII. Conclusions  
In summary, the work reported in this paper represents an effort to 
understand human problem solving in the monitoring and control of large scale 
systems. The analysis of results has considered human performance in a 
simulated task at increasing levels of detail, ranging from global measures of 
problem solving performance and their relation to certain aspects of system 
design (e.g., number of levels and degree of redundancy), to a more 
fine-grained analysis of subject strategy. In addition, a means was proposed 
to relate the system structure and a subject's strategy to a measure of task 
complexity. 
It should be emphasized that although bits and pieces of a global 
understanding of human problem solving in large scale systems are beginning to 
emerge from this research, it is premature to propose a unified conceptual 
approach to these results. In general, however, the results presented in this 
paper suggest that human performance in the monitoring and control of large 
scale systems can be severely limited by both the structure of the system 
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(i.e., number of levels) and the human:s understanding of the system as 
reflected by his strategy. 
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A RULE-BASED MODEL OF HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING FOR A DYNAMIC PLANT 
Eduardo T. Viteri 
August, 1984 
INTRODUCTION 
A rule-based model has been developed to mimic a human operator of a 
complex communication network. The communication network is specified by 
MABEL (Monitor, Access, Browse, and Evaluate Limits). Very briefly, MABEL is 
a computerized simulation of a generic large scale dynamic environment very 
much like the AT&T telephone network. The objectives of the operator are: 
1. Maximize the customers who flow through the system, while 
2. Observing this flow for signs of network failure such as queue 
length, and 
3. Repairing failures as quickly as possible. 
In order to develop this model, it was necessary to become familiar with 
the simulation. Once this was accomplished, the next step was to formalize 
procedures to be employed in the model in such a way that it would be feasible 
to write a computer code. The procedures had to be general, but at the same 
time, they had to be effective in controlling and operating the system. The 
model was named KARLA as a follow up of a previous research effort of the 
Center for Man-Machine Systems Research, namely KARL. A flow chart of KARLA 









REPAIRING ACCESSING SCANNING 
Figure 1. Flow-chart of KARLA 
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The model consists of a series of procedures that mimic human actions. 
Since the ultimate goal of a rule-based model is to duplicate the behavior of 
the human being modeled, rather than concentratring on final results (Hunt, 
1981), special care was taken to include rules that duplicate observed human 
behavior. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES 
There are a number of methodologies that could be used to design the 
model. The approach chosen was to use a rule-based model with features 
typical of human information processing. Alternative approaches might be a 
rule-based expert system approach, which would be similar except that it would 
try to outperform humans. A decision-theoretic or control-theoretic model 
could also be developed. For this reason, the main issues from a 
psychological perspective that were implemented in the model are sequences of 
commands, short term memory limits, optimal repair behavior, scanning, revisit 
inhibit, and reaction time delay. 
Commands issued as sequences: Minsky (1975), Schenk and Abelson (1977), 
and Rich (1977) have developed several models to show how people trade off 
between storage and computation. Basically, humans represent knowledge not in 
purely cannonical or literal form, but with a certain tradeoff between storage 
and computation. The model acts similarly. On one side of the spectrum, it 
could employ no memory and just issue one action at a time. This is the way 
KARL (Knaeuper, 1983) does it. 	On the other hand, the model could be 
comprised of different scripts. Each script could represent whole sets of 
strategies appropriate for different situations. Humans are not likely to 
represent knowledge either way. Rasmussen and Jensen (1974) argue that a 
troubleshooter must have some sort of a mental model of the environment being 
monitored. Studying the subjects' performance- it became clear that operators 
coupled their knowledge of the model with their increasing expertise to 
structure short series of commands. These series of commands are 
situation-dependent, i.e., goals trigger the use of familiar scripts which in 
turn cause the execution of an array of actions (Schenk and Abelson, 1977). 
This coding scheme has been called "chunking" (Miller, 1956). For instance, 
when the queue length in a node becomes too large to the point that it almost 
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reaches the capacity of the node, both the subjects and KARLA issue a "down" 
command followed by a "test" command. 
Short-term memory limit: Due to STM limitations, troubleshooters have a 
maximum number of actions that they can incorporate in their procedures. 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) conclude that the more slots that are filled in an 
operator's memory, the less working space is available for problem solving and 
other calculations. Reasonable estimates range from five to nine items. Due 
to the dynamic nature of the task, a maximum of four commands per script was 
viewed as realistic. This is the strategy that the model incorporates in its 
knowledge base. For instance. after the model has finished repairing a node, 
its "memory" of commands is blank and must look for familiar situations that 
would trigger rules and fill its memory of commands. 
Optimal repair behavior: Not all failures have the same importance in 
the environment that KARLA controls. When simultaneous failures occur, the 
model will look for those that are more important in the system, and 
compensate for them first; once this is accomplished, it will take care of 
the failures with lesser importance. Failure compensation, thus, can be done 
in two levels. The first level compensates for a failure as it occurs 
(Knaeuper, 1983). The second level maximizes the failure compensation 
according to the conditions of the system. "Maximizing compensation" means 
that failures are repaired following a hierarchy of importance. This is what 
distinguishes a good from a bad operator: the former will not only do his 
job, but will try to do it the best possible way; the latter will just "get 
it over with." KARLA takes the "good" operator approach to the failure 
compensation issue (Henneman and Rouse. 1984). 
Scanning: Operators were observed to seek out failures, even when there 
was no apparent cause to suspect one, rather than just wait and respond when 
there was a reason to suspect a failure. This was particulary true in the low 
failure rate systems. The model incorporates a similar strategy. During 
periods of little or no action it scans the system looking for failures. 
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Revisit inhibit: This simply means that the model will not re-examine a 
node that is known to be without failures because it was recently tested. 
This is actually another form of short term memory. It was incorporated in 
the model because subjects were known to behave this way. In a research 
effort, Platz, Rasmussen and Skanborg (1975) concluded that human response to 
alarms were faster if the operator could have had some prior knowledge of the 
failure. In revisit inhibit, the model knows there is not a failure in a 
specific node and can concentrate its troubleshooting on the other nodes. 
Reaction time: The model's response to the inputs is not immediate. 
Rather, there is a lag between the moment an alarm occurs and the instance 
when the model tries to stabilize the system. Rouse (1980) observes that a 
simple model mapping a single input to a single output is inadequate because 
of two main reasons. First, humans require a finite amount of time to react 
to stimuli, and, secondly, human's neuromotor system prohibits the 
instanteneous movement of limbs. KARLA includes this consideration and defers 
its reaction to alarms mimicking neuromuscular lag and reaction time. 
RESULTS 
Two kinds of performance were assessed. The first one, 	called 
"open-loop," involved letting the model run by itself, just like a regular 
operator, and obtaining the production measures at the end of the run. The 
second one, termed "closed-loop," involved behavioral comparisons. In other 
words, subjects' data files and the model run in paralell with the subjects 
controlling the scenario. The commands issued by both were recorded and later 
compared to determine whether or not the subjects and the model issued the 
same comand when they were controlling the same situation. 
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Open-loop Run 
To compare the model with the subjects on total performance, KARLA was 
allowed to run by itself, in an open loop manner without any knowledge of the 
subjects,". actions. Seven different measures of production performance were 
used: number of customers left in the system, average time in the system, 
number of customers lost, number of customers denied service, total number of 
customers served, and number of failures repaired. 
Table 1 shows the number of customers left in the system for both the 
subjects and KARLA under the different experimental conditions. The number of 
customers left in the system seems to be affected by the failure rate, number 
of nodes, and number of levels. KARLA's performance seemed to be the most 
affected in a 16 node system. The differences between the subjects and KARLA 
was small. 
Average time spent in the system is depicted in Table 2. The model 
performed consistently better than the subjects. Only in the high failure 
rate group of the 16-nodes, three-level systems was the average of the 
subjects better than the model's performance. As the systems started 
increasing in size, the times also started increasing, this is only natural 
since it takes a longer time to be processed in a larger system. The main 
reason behind customers being delayed in the system is the number of failures 
in the simulation. KARLe.s performance can be explained from this point of 
view. Simply put, the model",s strategies caused less failures in the system, 
therefore, the average travel time of a call was reduced. 
Closed-Loop Run 
In the closed-loop run, the scenario was controlled by the subject's 
actions. Given a particular situation, the subject and the model decided what 
the appropriate action should be and both actions were recorded, but it was 
actually the subject's command that was fed back to MABEL and, in turn, 
determined the next state. 
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At the end of a run, matches between the subject's commands and KARLA's 
commands were established. Basically, three types of match were considered. 
The first type of match is the one when the subject and the model gave the 
same command at the same time. For instance, both KARLA and the subject 
issued It', or at the same time. The second type of matching relates to 
the fact that, according to Renneman (1982), there are four types of command: 
access commands (d, u), monitor commands (m, s, c), diagnostic commands (t, 
n), and, control commands (r, 1). Commands within each category try to 
accomplish a common goal, i.e., access, control, etc., therefore, when the 
subject issued a command, and, KARLA issued a command from that same group, a 
match was recorded. 
The third matching sequence measure was similar to the second except that 
out—of—sequence agreement was allowed. In some instances, a subject would 
issue a series of commands with a specific purpose in mind, e.g., to find out 
if there is a failure in a node one level below, the subject types: 
,. At the same time, the model would try to accomplish the same 
purpose, but the strategy could be different, e.g., In this 
case, the objective is the same but the sequence of commands differs. 
The performance of KARLA on the three levels of matching is as follows: 




Since the percentage matching measures are independent from each other, 






Number of Customers 
KARLA AVG. PERCENTAGE 
DIFFERENCE 
222C 18.83 20 - 6.21 % 
222D 16.83 22 -30.72 % 
223C 45.50 18 60.44 % 
223D 33.83 36 - 6.41 % 
332C 72.17 59 18.25 % 
332D 82.50 74 10.30 % 
333C 139.50 116 16.85 % 
333D 131.17 176 -34.18 % 
442C 230.33 204 11.43 
442D 222.50 240 - 7.87 % 
443C 527.00 500 5.12 







Average Time in the System 
KARLA 	 AVG. PERCENTAGE 
DIFFERENCE 
222C 2.28 1.84 19.30 
222D 2.90 2.42 16.55 
223C 5.36 2.01 6.25 
223D 4.76 4.54 -0.23 
332C 7.96 7.63 4.15 
332D 8.68 8.35 3.80 
333C 14.44 13.49 6.58 
333D 15.51 13.99 9.80 
442C 25.33 25.16 0.67 
442D 26.79 26.30 1.83 
443C 63.91 63.78 0.20 
443D 64.00 64.17 -0.27 2 
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During the February-March reporting period, Dick Henneman completed 
development of CAIN, the contextually-augmented version of MABEL. The first 
formal experiment with CAIN was performed involving eight subjects, each of 
whom performed 13 sessions of approximately one hour in length each. Independent 
variables included number of levels in the display heirarchy and degree of 
interconnectivity among nodes. Analysis of the wealth of data produced is 
focusing on evaluating measures of large-scale system complexity as well as 
comparisons with the results of the earlier experiment with MABEL. The results 
of these two experiments, particularly in terms of complexity of problem solving, 
will be the basis of Dick's Ph.D. thesis, which should be completed in the next 
two or three months. 
The initial model of human problem solving with MABEL has been programmed 
and is being evaluated by Eduardo Viteri. This work will comprise Eduardo's 
M.S. thesis, which should be completed this summer. 
As of March 31, 1984, approximately $153,000 has been spent. 
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Work has continued relative to the development and assessment of 
measures of large scale system complexity. Time series analysis is being 
used to determine transfer functions relating two measures of complexity, 
namely structural and strategic complexity, to the average time to find 
failures within the system. These efforts should be completed within the 
very near future, and the results will be reported in the PhD thesis of 
Richard Henneman. 
In addition, a detailed analysis of subjects' strategies in operating 
the context-specific simulation was performed. Results suggest that 
subjects achieve better performance by issuing more monitoring commands 
rather than commands related to moving among display pages. In other words, 
the better subjects achieve higher levels of performance by using the more 
powerful monitoring commands to gain more information about the system than 
could efficiently be gained by actually branching among display pages. 
As of,July 31, 1984, approximately $187,000 has been spent. 
HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING IN COMPLEX DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTS 
William B. Rouse 
Bimonthly Report 
For the Period August 1, 1984 - September 30, 1984 
Contract MDA 903-82-C-0145 
(June 1, 1982 - July 1, 1985) 
Center for Man-Machine Systems Research 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, GA 30332 
(404/894-3996) 
Work over the past two months has concentrated on further 
investigating the nature of complexity in large scale systems, 
specifically, the simulated communication network (CAIN) described in a 
previous progress report. It was hypothesized that the complexity of the 
system (as reflected by the difficulty that people have in finding faults 
in the system) is shaped by two things: the structure of the system and 
the human's understanding of the system as reflected by his strategy. 
From this perspective, the complexity of a system changes with time. 
Due to the dynamic nature of complexity, time series analysis was 
identified as the appropriate methodological tool with which to analyze 
the data. Two input (i.e., the two complexity measures) transfer 
function models were developed for each subject to predict the average 
time needed to locate failures within the system. The approach was quite 
successful in that no structure remained in the autocorrelation function 
of the residuals and the models consistently explained more than 80% of 
the variance within the original data. 
A problem arose in trying to find a consistent interpretation of the 
transfer functions. The equations contained terms at time lags ranging 
from a few seconds to a few minutes. In addition, there appeared to be 
little consistency among subjects in terms of the structure of the 
equations. 
A reasonable explanation for this high degree of variability lies in 
identifying several different modes of failure identification (e.g., 
topographic, symptomatic, and serendipitous) and also several different 
types of event associated with the identification of a failure. For 
example, it can be shown that the complexity of the system at the time a 
failure occurs can increase the time needed to locate that failure; on 
the other hand, the complexity of the system at the time a symptom of 
that failure first occurs can decrease the time needed to locate the 
failure. There appears to exist a relationship between these inter—event 
times and the lags present in the transfer functions. 
More detail relative to these results may be found in the 
forthcoming Ph.D thesis of Richard Henneman. This work should be 
completed within the next several weeks. 
As of September 30, 1984, approximately $195,000 had been spent. 
October through December has been the "home stretch" for both Dick 
Henneman and Eduardo Viteri. Dick's Ph.D. thesis on "Human Problem 
Solving in Complex Hierarchical Large Scale Systems" was completed in 
mid-December and he will give his oral defense in early January. 
Eduardo's M.S. thesis on "A Rule-Based Model of a Human Operator 
Controlling a Complex Communication Network" was also completed in 
mid-December. Copies of the Center technical reports based on these 
theses will be forwarded to ARI in early 1985. 
As of November 30, 1984, approximately $222,000 had been spent. 
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William B. Rouse 
Bimonthly Report 
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Contract MDA 903-82-C-0145 
(June 1, 1982 - July 1, 1985) 
Center for Man-Machine Systems Research 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, GA 30332 
(404-894-3996) 
Work over the past two months has been focused on the interpretation 
of results from the second experiment from the perspective of measuring 
system complexity. Transfer functions were developed that related 
measures of structural and strategic complexity to average time to 
failure diagnosis. The analysis suggested that important factors; 
affecting the structure of these equations (and hence, failure diignosis 
time) were system related (e.g., the speed with which failure symptoms 
propagate through the system) and strategy related (e.g., whether 
subjects rely on a symptomatic, topographic, or serendipitous search 
strategy.) 
Results also emphasized the different implications that complexity 
may have for normal system operation and human failure diagnosis 
performance. Although certain system characteristics (such as multiple 
levels and high degree of interconnectedness) may help to avoid the short 
term effects of failures, these same characteristics may have the dual 
effect of making the human supervisory controller's task more difficult. 
These findings are reported in the Ph.D. thesis of Dick Henneman. 
The thesis, which was completed in January, will be forthcoming as a 
technical report. Eduardo Viteri's Master's thesis (the development and 
analysis of a rule—based model that controls the simulated communication 
network) will also appear as a technical report. The abstracts of these 
theses are attached. 
As of January 31, 1985, approximately $240,000 had been spent. 
A RULE-BASED MODEL OF A HUMAN OPERATOR IN A 
COMPLEX COMMUNICATION NETWORK 
Eduardo T. Viteri 
51 Pages 
Directed by Dr. John Hammer 
Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the time humans have 
spent in manual activities has decreased drastically and, on the other hand, 
more and more time has been spent in monitoring automated processes and 
solving occasional problems caused by the machines that have supplanted the 
manual laborers. One of the environments where automation is playing an 
increasingly crucial role is the communications field. This thesis is 
concerned with the development of a rule-based model of human behavior in 
fault diagnosis of a large scale hierarchical communication system. The model 
has been named KARLA as a follow up of a model developed by Knaeuper and Rouse 
(1983). 
The predecessor of the model developed in this thesis is presented. 
Then, the simulation that KARLA controls is explained. Next, the structure of 
KARLA is explained. Results are presented from applying this model to 
modeling a human operator in a complex communication network. 
/ 	. 
406 Hammer, Advisor. 
Human Problem Solving in Complex 
Hierarchical Large Scale Systems 
Richard L. Henneman 
-240 Pages 
Directed by Dr. William B. Rouse 
Humans supervising highly automated, hierarchical, large scale 
dynamic systems, such as a communications network, must often take 
control action during unforeseen failure or emergency situations. These 
unexpected events combine with the system size and structure to produce 
possibly complex tasks for humans. This thesis explores human 
performance in monitoring and controlling these complex systems. 
Two experiments used versions of a computer simulated 
communication network. Subjects monitored and controlled the system via 
a video display and keyboard. Subjects were told to optimize system 
performance (e.g., maximize number of customers served and minimize 
customer processing time) by diagnosing failed components and managing 
network resources (e.g., by shedding load). 
The first experiment used a relatively context-free representation 
of a communication network in an experiment that varied the number of 
system levels, cluster size (number of nodes/display page), and node 
failure rate. Subject performance degraded with increasing number of 
levels and decreasing cluster size. Failure rate only affected subjects' 
strategy. The unexpected result concerning cluster size was suggested to 
be due to the number of connections between nodes. 
The second experiment used a contextually augmented version of the 
original simulation. Experimental variables were number of connections 
between nodes and number of levels. Cluster size remained constant. 
Results supported those from Experiment One: increasing number of levels 
and decreasing the connectivity'between nodes degraded performance. 
The second experiment also investigated the nature of complexity 
in a large scale system. Two dimensions (and associated measures) of 
complexity were proposed: complexity due to system structure and 
complexity:due to human strategy. Transfer functions relating the two 
complexity measures to average time to failure diagnosis were developed. 
Results indicated that the distinction between structural complexity and 
strategic complexity is appropriate. 
Results also emphasized the different implications that complexity 
may have for normal system operation and human failure diagnosis 
performance. Although certain system characteristics (such as multiple 
levels and high redundancy) may help to avoid the short term effects of 
failure, these same characteristics may have the dual effect of making 
the human supervisory controller's task more difficult. 
William B. Rouse, Advisor 
• 
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Conceptual work on a model of human performance in CAIN was 
initiated. The problem solving model of Rouse [1983] was used as a 
starting point; however, due to several features of the CAIN environment, 
the original model must be augmented. For example, since multiple 
failures can exist in CAIN, the human operator may have several different 
tasks to perform at any one time. Moreover, since the states of the 
system evolve with time, the relative importance of these tasks will also 
change. In light of these domain characteristics, the proposed model is 
characterized by a number of "low-level" tasks ( .g., recognition and 
classification, planning, and execution) that are prioritized according 
to a higher level planning function. 
Besides task prioritization, the role of contextual knowledge is of 
importance to the performance of this control task. The proposed model, 
therefore, incorporates two types of knowledge: knowledge about the 
system structure and context, and knowledge about how to do things (i.e., 
procedural knowledge). Rob Andes, a new masters degree student, has 
started reviewing the literature relative to the role of contextual 
knowledge in human problem solving. 
The goal of this modeling effort is to support an on-line aid or 
"coach" to human operators performing the task. A robust, flexible model 
of human performance in this task should be able to support operators 
using any of a variety of strategies and functioning at differing levels 
of expertise. 
As of March 31, 1985, approximately $272,000 had been spent. 
HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING IN COMPLEX DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTS 
William B. Rouse 
Richard L. Henneman 
Annual Interim Report 
For the Period June 1, 1984 - May 31, 1985 
Contract MDA 903-82-C-0145 
(June 1, 1982 - June 1, 1986) 
Center for Man-Machine Systems Research 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, GA 30332 
(404-894-3996) 
INTRODUCTION 
Current trends in computer and communications technology are leading 
to the development of many highly integrated systems in the domains of 
communications, transportation, manufacturing, etc. Most of these 
systems can be represented as large networks of nodes and arcs where 
nodes denote people, destinations, or machines and arcs denote 
communication lines, transportation routes, or a variety of activities. 
Because these systems are highly integrated, it is not unusual for there 
to be hundreds or thousands of nodes and arcs. Networks of this size and 
level of connectivity are very complex systems. 
Complexity is further increased by the dynamic nature of these 
networks. The states of the nodes and arcs (i.e., levels, flows, etc.) 
usually evolve in time and are not amenable to instantaneous control. 
Further, the demands placed upon the networks are often time-varying, 
with occurrences of peak demands not always being predictable. 
This program of research is concerned with the problem solving 
behavior of the human whose role is network controller or operator. The 
job of the network controller is to manage the assets of the network 
(i.e., nodes and arcs) so as to maximize network efficiency. Further, 
during peak demand periods, the controller may have to implement control 
procedures such as load shedding and priority scheduling to assure that 
overloads do not degrade network performance. 
For many aspects of this job, the network controller has computer 
aids or, in fact, may simply have to monitor an automated system which 
performs many of the above functions. However, system failures or 
unusual environmental demands can require that the human intervene and 
manually control the network. The human's abilities to solve these types 
of problem are not well understood. In fact, human problem solving in 
complex dynamic environments is an area where few research results are 
available. This area is the topic of the research program whose progress 
is reported here. 
PROGRESS 
This section briefly summarizes progress during the first three 
years of this four-year program of research. Considerably more detail 
about the most recent results can be found in the papers included in the 
Appendix. 
Most of the first year was devoted to developing an experimental 
scenario and evaluating the impact of its parameters on human problem 
solving performance [Henneman and Rouse, 1984a]. Communications networks 
were chosen as the experimental context. After reviewing a variety of 
documentation on human control tasks in both commercial and military 
communications networks, an experimental scenario called MABEL was 
designed and programmed. MABEL requires subjects to monitor a 
large-scale automated communications network via a hierarchical multi-
page CRT display. Much as discussed in the Introduction, subjects have 
to manage network assets and, in the event of a failure, intervene to 
diagnose the failure, compensate for its impact, and restore normal 
operation. 
For the first formal experiment with MABEL, the effects of three 
independent variables were studied: 1) number of nodes per display, 2) 
number of levels in the display hierarchy, and 3) failure rate per node. 
Twelve subjects each participated in six experimental sessions. Overall, 
this initial experiment with MABEL produced two results of particular 
interest. First, the effects of number of levels in the hierarchy were 
often very strong, producing up to a five-fold degradation of performance 
for a modest change from two to three levels. The second result of note 
is that rather different strategies seemed best for different 
combinations of independent variables. This leads to the question of 
whether humans can be trained to adapt appropriately or if some form of 
aided adaptation is needed. 
The second year of this research involved two efforts. One effort 
concerned the development of a rule-based model of human problem solving 
in the MABEL environment [Viteri 1984]. One general impression that 
emerged from the experiment and the modeling efforts was that MABEL 
lacked the contextual richness necessary to provide the type of problem 
solving environment required for this research. Perhaps the best 
indication of this is the simplicity of Viteri's model even though it 
compares fairly well with subjects' behavior. 
This observation led to a decision to enhance substantially the 
contextual aspects of MABEL. The second formal experiment [Henneman and 
Rouse 1984b, 1985, Henneman 1985] used a contextually augmented version 
of MABEL called CAIN (Contextually Augmented Integrated Network). The 
scenario contained cues and associative links (e.g., non-varying 
geographic node names, recurring failures, and non-uniform loading) to 
produce a higher fidelity simulation. Cluster size was kept constant at 
16 so that subjects could learn and recall context-dependent aspects of 
the system. Experimental variables were number of connections between 
nodes (high,low) and number of levels (2,3). Eight subjects each 
participated in thirteen experimental sessions. Results supported those 
from Experiment One: increasing number of levels degraded performance, 
as did decreasing the connectivity between nodes. 
Efforts in the third year of this research have been directed 
towards realizing a major objective of the second experiment, namely, to 
investigate the nature of complexity in a large scale system [Henneman 
and Rouse 1985, Henneman 1985]. Two dimensions (and associated measures) 
of complexity were proposed: complexity due to the structure of the 
system and complexity due to the strategy of the person trying to control 
the system. Complexity was considered to be a dynamic property of a 
human-machine system. Complexity is time-dependent and 
multi-dimensional; thus, time series analysis was used to develop 
transfer functions relating the two complexity measures to average time 
to failure diagnosis. Results indicated that the distinction between 
structural complexity and strategic complexity is appropriate. 
Results also emphasized the different implications that complexity 
may have for normal system operation and human failure diagnosis 
performance. A very complex system may function quite well under normal 
operating conditions. The system is able to absorb the effects of 
failures to a certain extent while maintaining an adequate level of 
performance. However, when the problem becomes so critical that the 
human monitor must intervene and find the problem, the task of failure 
diagnosis may be very difficult. In summary, although certain system 
design characteristics may help to avoid the short term effects of 
failures, these same characteristics may have the dual effect of making 
the human supervisory controller's task more difficult. These results 
are presented in the paper included in the Appendix [Henneman and Rouse 
1985]. 
Other efforts in the third year of this research have been directed 
towards the conceptual development of a sophisticated model-based 
performance aid for humans monitoring and controlling CAIN. The proposed 
rule-based model is described in a paper in the Appendix [Henneman 
1985b]. The model is characterized by three stages of problem solving 
(recognition/classification, planning, and execution) that are 
prioritized according to the model's knowledge about the task and about 
the system (e.g., contextual relationships among components). 
FUTURE WORK 
On-line implementation of the model proposed in the paper in the 
Appendix has just started. Future plans include the experimental 
evaluation of the model as an on-line performance aid. The proposed 
experiment should compare the task performance of two groups of subjects, 
one of which performs without the aid and the other with the aid. An 
interesting side issue to explore involves the representation and use of 
the contextual information included in the experimental scenario. 
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APPENDIX 
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Work during this period has been directed towards refining and 
implementing the model based aid for human performance in monitoring and 
controlling CAIN. In particular, theoretical consideration has been given 
to how knowledge should be represented in each of the model components 
(i.e., prioritization, recognition/classification, planning, execution, and 
contextual knowledge). Also, efforts have been made towards determining 
means of structuring these knowledge representations in a computer program. 
The VAX 11/780 of the Center for Man—Machine Systems Research has 
recently changed to a UNIX operating system; thus, the model will be 
programmed in C. In addition, due to the change in operating system, 
modifications were made to the CAIN Pascal program in order to make it UNIX 
compatible. 
As of July 31, 1985, approximately $317,000 had been spent. 
HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING IN COMPLEX DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTS 
William B. Rouse 
Bimonthly Report 
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Work during this period has continued the development of the model of 
human performance in monitoring and controlling the CAIN system. Efforts 
have focused on the identification of rules that adequately describe aspects 
of task performance. In this task, the decision of what rule to apply is, 
in general, not difficult. A much more difficult decision (and, hence, an 
aspect of performance more difficult to model) is when to apply a particular 
rule. Thus, additional efforts have focused on the prioritization and 
timing of rules that apply to various task situations. Recent ideas have 
considered a fuzzy prioritization process, perhaps based on the notions of 
complexity and uncertainty used in Henneman's thesis. 
Two personnel changes have occurred during this period. Rob Andes left 
school to take a job. Klaus Zinser, a new M.S. student from Germany, has 
started to work on the project. 
As of September 30, 1985, approximately $337,000 had been spent. 
HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING IN COMPLEX DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTS 
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Current Work  
Work during this period has concentrated on implementing the model of 
human performance in CAIN. The general form of the model has been presented 
in an earlier report; some of the specific implementation details that are 
currently being incorporated into the model include a frame representation 
of system (contextual) knowledge and a fuzzy decision making process that 
prioritizes subtasks. In addition, CAIN is being moved to run on an AT&T 
3B2 computer with enhanced graphics capabilities. AT&T made a gift of two 
of these computers to the Center for Man-Machine Systems Research. By 
running the CAIN system and the human performance model in parallel on 
separate machines, there will be no competition for computer resources from 
either of the two programs or other users. This competition has been a 
problem in previous experiments. 
Work Remaining  
Given that six months remain on this contract, the rest of this report 
will present a list of remaining tasks, and the major issues that will be 
considered in the final phase of this research program. Considering the 
tasks remaining first, the following list describes each task, gives the 
approximate date of completion, and indicates who will be responsible for 
the task (RLH = Henneman, KZ = Zinser, WBR = Rouse). 
1. Transfer CAIN to AT&T 3B2/Dec 1985 (RLH) 
2. Complete programming of model/Jan 1986 (KZ) 
3. Collect subject data to compare model performance/Jan 1986 (KZ,RLH) 
4. Implementation of model-based aid/Feb-Mar 1986 (KZ,RLH) 
5. Run experiment comparing aided vs. unaided subjects/April 1986 (KZ) 
6. Data analysis and interpretation/May 1986 (KZ,RLH) 
7. Final report (RLH,WBR) 
Theoretical Considerations  
These tasks are to be conducted in light of the theoretical issue of 
human knowledge representation. We are concerned with how people represent 
knowledge and how that representation changes with time. More specifically, 
we are interested in knowledge representation in a complex task environment, 
an environment in which the system state is dynamic and decisions are often 
made on the basis of incomplete knowledge. Thus, a related (but higher 
level) issue involves decision making in a complex task: how does both the 
representation of knowledge and aspects of the task environment affect human 
decision making in a complex environment? 
The current modeling efforts should help in resolving these issues. 
One potentially useful idea under consideration is to compare the 
performance of a model that makes full use of its context-dependent 
knowledge structures to that of a model stripped of its contextual 
knowledge. Differences in model performance patterns should give insight to 
aspects of human performance that are independent of the context of the 
system. 
In addition, an increased understanding of human knowledge 
representation and decision making should suggest ways to aid human 
performance in complex envronments. The means of aiding human performance 
in this task will rely on an on-line model of a human operator. The model 
is such that it will contain knowledge structures and performance mechanisms 
consistent with that of a human operator. Thus, the model should be able to 
provide aid consistent with the human operator's needs. 
Practical Considerations  
The implementation of such a model based performance aid raises several 
important practical issues. These issues can be broadly grouped into three 
main categories. First, decisions relating to what information should be 
provided must be made. For example, the aid may be capable of presenting 
several different types of information (e.g., procedural and contextual). 
What information will be most useful to the human operator? In order for 
the advice to be useful, it must not be superfluous to the operator's 
current state of knowledge. The model basis for the aid should provide 
guidance relative to the operator's current state of knowledge. 
Second, decisions relating to when advice should be provided must be 
made. In a dynamic environment, the system state is constantly changing. 
Relevant advice at one point in time may be irrelevant at a later time. 
Thus, some very important questions ask when information should be 
presented, and, perhaps just as important, when should information stop 
being presented? 
Finally, third, how the information is presented, or the mode of 
presentation, must be selected. The resolution of this issue is probably 
more technology driven than the other two issues, but there are some 
interesting questions that can be raised relative to mode of display (e.g., 
visual vs. auditory) and integration of the advice with the actual system 
display. 
Other questions combine elements of all these three issues. For 
example, if the aid provides advice and the human performs an action 
completely different from the advice, how should the aid respond? It is 
important to note that the resolution of these issues should have major 
implications for not only the simulated system under consideration here, but 
for any real life system that is to provide intelligent aid to a human 
operator. 
Conclusion  
To conclude, the ideas presented in this report represent a refinement 
of the originally proposed work. The emphasis has shifted to address how 
people represent and use knowledge in controlling a very large and complex 
system. Means of using this understanding will be explored in order to aid 
human operators. 
As of November 30, 1985, approximately $369,000 had been spent. 
HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING IN COMPLEX DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTS 
MDA 903-82-C-0145 	 1 June 1982 - 31 May 1986 
Georgia Institute of Technology 	 William B. Rouse 
SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVES: The primary objectives of this project are to 
understand and support human performance in the task of monitoring and 
controlling a large dynamic system, such as a communication network or a 
command and control network. Emphasis is placed on both human-system design 
requirements and human performance modeling. 
APPROACH: An experimental scenario has been developed that involves 
monitoring and control of a large-scale, dynamic network that is very 
similar to the current telephone system in the United States. Network 
information is displayed to subjects in a hierarchical, multi-page manner 
that is similar to display systems found in many large-scale systems. 
Independent variables that can be manipulated include: 1) number of nodes 
per display page, 2) number of levels of pages in the hierarchy, 3) failure 
rate per node, and 4) level of network redundancy. Subjects are instructed 
to control the network such that all demands are satisfied while avoiding 
inordinate processing delays. In addition, they must diagnose and correct 
node failures that lead to losses of resources that could eventually 
compromise the overall performance objectives of satisfying demands and 
avoiding delays. 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS: Thus far, two experiments have been performed. 
The first experiment involved 12 subjects and considered the effects of 
nodes per display page, number of levels of pages, and failure rate per 
node. Number of levels of pages was found to have the strongest effect, 
producing up to a five-fold degradation of performance for a modest change 
from two to three levels. The second experiment involved 8 subjects and 
considered the effects of number of levels of pages and level of network 
redundancy. The primary purpose of this experiment was to evaluate two 
measures of problem solving complexity. The first measure is dependent upon 
the structure of the system; the second measure is dependent on the strategy 
of the person controlling the system. Results suggest that this distinction 
is appropriate. In addition, results emphasize the different imp4.ications - 
that complexity can have for normal system operation and human failure 
diagnosis performance. Although system design characteristics such as 
redundancy may help to avoid the short term effects of failures, these same 
characteristics may have the dual effect of making the human supervisory 
controller's task more difficult. 
Recent efforts have been directed towards developing a model-based 
performance aid for people controlling large scale systems. The model 
consists of four main components: task prioritization, recognition/ 
classification of failure situations, planning, and task execution and 
monitoring. In addition, the model contains an explicit representation of 
the contextual knowledge needed to control the system effectively. The 
model will operate on-line, while assisting people in such activities as 
prioritizing tasks and recalling contextual knowledge about the system 
structure. At least one more experiment is planned to evaluate the 
effectiveness of this aiding approach. 
POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS: Applications of results from this project are two 
fold. First, results from the empirical experiments and theoretical 
investigation of complexity have direct relevance to the design of large 
scale human-machine systems. Second, the demonstration of the viability of 
the model-based performance aiding approach should suggest a useful means of 
improving human-system performance in a variety of complex environments. 
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ARI: Bimonthly Report 	December 1, 1985 - January 31, 1986 
Work during this period has continued the development of the 
model of human performance in CAIN. A working model now exists, 
although the rules and the procedure for ranking rules needs to be 
refined. The model is being implemented on the VAX 11/780, which 
is a change from the proposed idea to implement it on the AT&T 
3B2. The floating point processor on the 3B2 is too slow to handle 
the real-time processing needs of the simulation and the model. 
We plan soon to evaluate the model by comparing its 
performance with that of human subjects who participated in the 
most recent experiment. Both open-loop and action-by-action 
comparisons will be made. 
As of January 31, 1986, approximately $393,000 had been spent. 
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A UNIT OF THE UNIVERS:TY SYSTEM OF GEOROtA 
ARI Bi-monthly Report: 1 February 1986 - 31 March 1986 
Substantial progress has been made during this period towards implementing 
the model of human performance in CAIN. The model contains a fairly small number 
of rules (about 22), which seem to describe the range of possible actions in CAIN. 
The way in which the model selects rules is based on a fuzzy-weighting scheme that 
takes into account an a priori ranking of rules, the current state of the system, 
and the model's contextual knowledge of the system. Thus, the model's performance 
changes with time; as the contextual representations become richer, those aspects 
of performance related to the contextual knowledge will improve. 
The model's contextual knowledge is represented as a set of hierarchically 
connected frames. Each frame contains slots of information about relevant system 
properties (e.g., high loading rate, recurring failure area). As the model becomes 
more "expert" the structure of the frame should more closely resemble that of the 
real system. 
An experiment to validate the model and to test the effectiveness of an on-
line model-based performance aid will begin in the next several weeks. Two groups 
of 10 subjects will be used. The first group will participate in a total of ninc 
sessions controlling CAIN (3 training, 6 data collection). All subjects will contr-
a 3-level, 16 node CAIN system for each of the sessions. The data collected from 
this group will be used to evaluate the model. (Both open-loop and action-by-action 
comparisons will be made.) A performance aid based on this model will then be im-
plemented. The second group of ten subjects will control the same systems as the 
first group, but with the help of the aid. Performance of the aided and the un-
aided groups will then be compared. Independent variables, therefore, are aid vs. 
no aid and session number. Dependent variables will include those used for th. 
previous experiments, including the complexity measures. 
As of 31 March 1986, approximately $402,230 had been spent. 
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ABSTRACT 
The complexity of monitoring and controlling a large scale system, 
such as a communication network, is considered. Relevant literature is 
reviewed, with emphasis on both behavioral and non-behavioral approaches 
to measuring complexity. A simulated large scale network is described 
that is used in an experiment to assess the effect of network redundancy 
and number of system levels on human fault diagnosis performance. 
Experimental data is also used to evaluate two time-varying measures of 
task complexity (using ANOVA and time-series analysis). The first 
measure is dependent upon the structure of the system; the second measure 
is dependent on the strategy of the person controlling the system. 
Results suggest that this distinction is appropriate. In addition, 
results emphasize the different implications that complexity can have for 
normal system operation and human failure diagnosis performance. 
Although system design characteristics such as redundancy may help to 
avoid the short term effects of failures, these same characteristics may 
have the dual effect of making the human supervisory controller's task 
more difficult. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent trends toward increased automation in large scale engineering 
systems are causing a parallel shift in the role that humans play in 
these systems. People are increasingly being required to interact with 
systems only during unforeseen events, such as when a part of the system 
fails. During these times, proper system functioning is dependent upon 
the human's decision making and problem solving skills. These human 
abilities can be enhanced or degraded by a parallel shift in display 
capabilities: not only is the computer changing the level of automation 
in systems, but it is fundamentally changing the nature of communication 
between the human and the system. These changes have the potential of 
producing tasks of possibly enormous complexity. In light of this 
potential, it is of basic importance to consider human abilities in 
monitoring and controlling these complex environments. 
Research activity over the past several years has considered the 
fault diagnosis abilities of humans in a supervisory control context 
[1], although much of this work has been confined to the process control 
domain. Of additional importance is the consideration of human 
performance in monitoring and controlling large scale hierarchical 
networks, such as communication or command and control systems. These 
systems typically can be represented as large queueing networks, with the 
extent of control increasing with successive hierarchic levels. Due to 
the enormous size of the system, not all relevant information can be 
displayed to the human operator at one time; thus, multi-page computer 
generated displays are frequently used. Human limitations in dealing 
with systems of this type have not been investigated to any great extent 
[2]. 
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The work reported in this paper is an effort to relate aspects of 
system design to the complexity of the human operator's monitoring and 
control task. Emphasis is placed in the following section, therefore, on 
identifying a variety of perspectives on complexity. A simulated large 
scale system (an extension of the one reported in Henneman and Rouse [2]) 
is then described, which is used in an experiment to evaluate two dynamic 
measures of task complexity that are based on the structure of the system 
and the strategy of the human operator. 
BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this section is to review discussions and 
investigations of complexity that have taken place within a number of 
disciplines. Computer scientists, for example, are often interested in 
the computational complexity of a particular algorithm. Computer 
scientists also often measure the complexity of a piece of software. 
General systems scientists postulate theories about the inherent 
complexity of large scale systems, while theoretical biologists discuss 
the complexity of biological systems. Psychologists relate the 
complexity of symbolic or spatial patterns to human behavior. 
Man—machine systems engineers are interested in system complexity as it 
relates to human problem solving and system control. In this section, 
the issue of complexity is addressed from these and several other 
perspectives. For organizational purposes, non—behavioral perspectives 
are considered first, followed by behavioral complexity 
perspectives. 
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Non-behavioral perspectives  
Computational complexity. An issue that has interested computer 
scientists, operations researchers and others is that of the relative 
computational difficulty of computable functions (i.e., why is one 
function more difficult to compute than another?). In general, 
computational, combinatorial, or algorithmic complexity is defined as the 
length of time or amount of space (memory requirements) required to 
compute a certain function on a certain type of machine [3,4]. 
Algorithms are classified in terms of the amount of time (e.g., 
polynomial or exponential) and/or memory they take to be solved on a 
computer [5,6,7]. Examples include an analysis of a graph theory 
algorithm for cluster analysis [8], a consideration of the complexity of 
mathematical models in manipulator control systems [9], some observations 
regarding the complexity of matrix factorization [10], and an examination 
of the time required to solve problems in a system of communicating 
sequential processes [11]. 
As Rouse and Rouse [12] have noted, a relatively large amount of 
work has been done to analyze the complexity of automatic fault detection 
algorithms. Fujiwara and Kinoshita [13], for example, analyze several 
problems of instantaneous and sequential fault diagnosis of systems. 
They show that these algorithms are polynomially complete (i.e., they can 
be solved in polynomial time if and only if the traveling salesman 
problem, knapsack problem, etc., can be solved in polynomial time.) 
Priester and Clary [14], using results from system identification 
theory, develop measures of failure test complexity. Rouse and Rouse 
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[12] try to relate human performance to an optimal solution of a fault 
finding task. 
Software complexity. Somewhat related to the measurement of 
computational complexity is the measurement of software complexity. 
While computational complexity estimates the time and memory requirements 
of implementing a particular algorithm on a computer, software complexity 
estimates such quantities as programming time and program length. By 
controlling the software complexity, production costs should reduce while 
overall software quality should increase [15]. 
Halstead [16] has proposed a theory of software science that is 
based on a measure which counts the number of operators and operands in a 
program in order to estimate program length, volume, program level, 
language level, programming effort, and programming time. Despite a high 
degree of predictive power, criticism has been leveled at the approach 
from a theoretical perspective [17,18]. Other approaches include a 
graph-theory based measure of McCabe [19], an information theory based 
measure [15], and a control structure/flow measure [15]. Davis [20] 
notes that none of these approaches are based on a satisfactory model of 
programmer cognitive processes, and thus, proposes and evaluates measures 
based on "chunks", or related program concepts that can be understood by 
programmers / as a single cognitive unit. Chaudhary and Sahasrabuddhe 
[21] conclude on the basis of experimental results that complexity not 
only involves the control structure of a program but also the executional 
difficulty of the program. 
Complexity of physical systems. Besides the complexity of 
mathematical algorithms or computer software, complexity has also been 
discussed in the context of a physical system. Typically these 
investigations are of a general, theoretical nature, although some of the 
discussions are applicable to the consideration of human performance in 
large scale systems. In the following paragraphs, the general systems 
approach to understanding complexity is considered. 
Weaver [22] has distinguished between problems of simplicity, 
disorganized complexity, and organized complexity. Problems of 
simplicity include the largely two variable problems considered by the 
physical sciences before 1900. Problems of disorganized complexity 
contain a very large number of variables, each of which may possess an 
erratic or unknown behavior. By applying techniques of probability 
theory or statistical mechanics, the behavior of the system as a whole 
may be analyzed and characterized by its average tendencies. An 
important range of problems lies between the extremes of simplicity and 
disorganized complexity. These problems may contain a relatively large 
number of variables; however, they also exhibit a high degree of 
organization. Problems of organized complexity are ones in which "a 
sizeable number of factors ... are interrelated into an organic whole" 
[22]. In general, these problems are of interest to the system 
scientist. Systems of all types -- biological, social, economic, 
ecological, or physical -- can be characterized as highly interrelated 
subsets of variables. 
Redundancy and complexity. A recurrent theme throughout the 
literature is the identification of system size and degree of 
interconnectedness as indices or attributes of system complexity. 
Example domains include general systems [23,24], architectural design 
[25], and political systems [26]. 
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A highly connected system is complex, however, only in the sense 
that it is difficult for a person to understand the causal net of 
relations among system components and variables. Thus, a high level of 
connectivity (or redundancy) should lead to increased difficulty in 
solving problems related to system operation (i.e., failure detection, 
resource management, etc.). Waller [27], for example, proposes that 
large, highly connected systems are complex and difficult for humans to 
understand because of inherent human information processing limitations. 
With respect to normal system control, however, the concept of 
redundancy has quite different implications. Mackinnon and Wearing 
[28] investigated a complex decision making environment in which the 
number of elements in the system, the degree and pattern of 
interconnections in the system, and the presence/lack of uncertainties in 
the system were varied. The results indicated that the complex (or 
highly interconnected) systems did not always lead to poorer levels of 
performance. In these cases, therefore, a high level of redundancy led 
to improved system performance. The authors claim that this effect is 
due to the insensitivity of highly redundant systems to faults and 
mistakes made by subjects. 
Thus, at least two different interpretations of the relationship 
between redundancy and system complexity exist. The first 
interpretation, generally espoused by social scientists and general 
systems theorists, is related to the difficulty of understanding the 
system. When a failure occurs it may be difficult to locate its cause 
due to the presence of multiple paths through the system. On the other 
hand, when a system is highly redundant, its ability to carry on normal 
operation is greatly increased -- the redundancy serves to stabilize the 
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network. This interpretation is largely held by biologists and 
engineers. Thus, the level of interconnectedness in a system affects the 
level of two types of complexity: problem solving complexity and system 
control complexity. 
These two interpretations are consistent with standard results from 
reliability theory [29,30,31]. As the number of alternate paths (or 
components) increases in a system, the reliability increases, as 
expressed by the mean time between failures. However, data has shown 
that as the redundancy (and hence, the reliability) increases, the 
maintainability of the system decreases, i.e., the mean time to repair 
increases [30]. Thus, more complex (or redundant) systems lead to longer 
repair times. The availability of the system (or the probability that 
the system is operating satisfactorily at any point in time) is shown by 
von Alven [31] to be a function of both reliability and maintainability; 
thus, it too is a function of system redundancy. 
Subjective nature of complexity. A final theme within the 
complexity literature is that of the relative or subjective nature of 
complexity. Ashby [32] illustrates this concept by considering a sheep's 
brain. While the internal mechanisms of the brain are very complex to a 
neurophysiologist, a butcher only has to distinguish a sheep's brain from 
about 30 other cuts of meat (or about 5 bits). Several other authors 
also equate complexity with descriptions of objects, rather than with 
intrinsic properties of objects [33,34,35]. This perspective leads quite 
naturally to the discussion of behavioral complexity which is pursued 
below. 
Summary. The following conclusions can be made on the basis of the 
review so far: 
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1. Complexity is related to the size of the system as well as the 
level of redundancy (or connectivity) among components. 
2. The effects of redundancy on complexity differ depending upon 
one's perspective. A highly redundant system may lead to better 
overall performance; however, it may also lead to increased 
human problem solving difficulty. 
3. Complexity can only be measured relative to a person's 
understanding of the system. 
Behavioral complexity  
The preceding discussion has made only oblique reference to human 
abilities in perceiving information about the system or in solving 
problems within the environment created by the system. From a 
psychological perspective, the relationship between complexity and human 
performance is of fundamental importance. This relationship is explored 
in the following sections. Perceptual complexity is considered first, 
followed by problem solving complexity. 
Perceptual complexity. Rouse and Rouse [12] describe studies of 
perceptual complexity as dealing with "... the human's ability to 
recognize, rotate, reverse, etc. displayed patterns as a function of 
various attributes of the pattern, including number of line segments, 
symmetry, etc." This form of complexity has typically been investigated 
via some simple experimental scenarios. Greenberg and Krueger [36], for 
example, use a letter searching task to examine the relationship between 
task difficulty (in terms of letter orientation and redundancy) and speed 
of search. Other studies examine such aspects of complexity as color 
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[37], stress and its relation to a visual discrimination task [38], and 
relations between visual complexity and verbal associative value [39]. 
Hochberg and Brooks [40] derive a complexity measure based on the 
number of angles, number of lines, and the variety of angles contained 
within a drawing. Vitz and Todd [41] also propose a complexity metric of 
non—representational shapes based on a sampling of elements in the 
drawing. Butler [42] extends this work by using a complexity measure 
based on information load and the number of lines in the drawing. 
Attneave [43] develops a complexity measure based on the physical 
characteristics of shapes. Kimchi and Palmer [44] relate the number of 
elements in a drawing and its size to subjects' similarity judgements and 
their verbal descriptions. Finally, Simon [45] reviews several different 
approaches to relating the perceptual complexity of patterned sequences 
of symbols to human behavior. Simon concludes that all of the theories 
share a common central core: subjects perform the tasks by inducing 
pattern descriptions from the sequences. These descriptions all involve 
the same rules between symbols, iteration of subpatterns, and a 
hierarchic phrase structure. 
Relative to the role perception plays in the complexity of fault 
diagnosis tasks, Rouse and Rouse [12], in their study of complexity 
measures of fault diagnosis tasks, use the number of displayed components 
as a measure of perceptual complexity. Results indicate that this 
measure is not a good predictor of fault diagnosis performance. 
Since the number of components displayed on the screen is a function of 
the equipment's inherent complexity, not peculiarities of the display, 
the authors advise that a systematic variation of display characteristics 
might indicate that fault diagnosis tasks can be perceptually complex. 
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In light of the success of other predictors which are more related to 
problem solving complexity that are discussed in the next section, the 
authors suggest that problem solving measures are more relevant to fault 
diagnosis tasks. 
Brooke and Duncan [46] extend the work of Rouse and Rouse [12] to 
examine explicitly the effect of display formatting on measures of the 
fault diagnosis process. Results indicate that changing some of the 
perceptual characteristics of the display improves the speed and 
diagnostic efficiency with which faults are located. 
Problem solving complexity. A second form of behavioral complexity, 
which has received less attention than perceptual complexity, is problem 
solving complexity. This type of complexity measure assesses various 
problem attributes and attempts to relate them to human reasoning 
abilities and problem solving skills. Experimental assessments of 
problem solving complexity typically use syntactic or arithmetic problem 
solving tasks. Glover et al. [47], using a written learning task, finds 
that more difficult tasks result in higher levels of recall. McDaniel 
[48] reports that syntactically complicated sentences result in greater 
recall of sentence structure than do simple sentences. Ashcraft and 
Stazyk [49], using mental arithmetic tasks, discover that reaction time 
increases with increasing problem complexity. Loftus and Suppes [50] 
find that problem solving difficulty of arithmetic word problems is 
related to problem attributes like surface structure, number of words, 
and the number of different operations required to obtain a solution. 
Morgan and Alluisi [51], using a code transformation task, find that 
problem complexity has a greater effect on performance after practice 
than the early trials. 
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Kieras and Poison [52] discuss "user complexity," which is the 
complexity of a device or system from the point of view of the user. The 
authors propose that user complexity depends on the "amount, content, and 
structure of knowledge required to operate a device." In addition, the 
complexity for a novice increases as a function of the difficulty of 
acquiring that knowledge. Knowledge is composed of two components, 
task knowledge and device knowledge. Complexity, therefore, is dependent 
not only on device or task characteristics, but also on the knowledge of 
the user. In order to measure complexity, the authors suggest the 
following indices: number of productions (rules) to be learned, number 
of productions fired, number of keystrokes, number of items in working 
memory, etc. The authors propose that these measures of user complexity 
can be determined by using a computer simulation to implement a user 
model. 
With respect to measures of problem solving complexity in 
man—machine systems, the most pertinent work is that of Rouse and Rouse 
[12]. Besides their measures of number of components and optimal 
solution which have already been discussed, Rouse and Rouse also propose 
two measures of problem solving complexity: the number of relevant 
relationships (i.e., number of possible causes of a set of symptoms) and 
an information theoretic approach. These two measures are highly 
correlated with human performance in the fault diagnosis tasks (as 
measured by time to solution). The authors suggest that the success of 
these measures can be largely explained by the fact that they reflect the 
human's understanding of the problem and his resulting solution strategy. 
Wohl [53,54,55] examines the relation between the structure of 
electronic equipment and human fault diagnosis performance. He derives a 
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measure of complexity based on system connectivity which is shown to 
predict repair times very well. Wohl relates this measure to human 
cognitive limitations. He suggests that if some upper bound of 
complexity is reached (namely, human short term memory limits), some 
fraction of equipment failures will be non-diagnosable. Existing 
equipment does not exceed these human cognitive limits since designers as 
well as diagnosticians possess the same limits. However, these results 
have rather important implications for computer-aided design, which could 
allow the creation of overly connected parts. It should be noted that 
although this measure is related to the Rouse and Rouse measures of 
complexity, it differs because it reflects mostly characteristics of the 
system rather than characteristics of the human. 
Summary. The following conclusions can be made on the basis of the 
review of the behavioral complexity literature. 
1. Measures of problem solving complexity appear to be most 
relevant to the task of failure diagnosis, although perceptual 
complexity may play some part in affecting task difficulty. 
2. Complexity is caused not only by the attributes of the problem 
solving environment, but also by the human's understanding or 
perception of those attributes. 
3. Little work has assessed the complexity of problem solving in 
large-scale man-machine systems. 
Implications of complexity  
It is reasonable to assume that complexity should manifest itself in 
some measurable way; i.e., a complex system should result in longer times 
to failure diagnosis, longer reaction times, etc. In order to validate a 
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complexity measure, it is important to identify correctly and to justify 
an appropriate dependent measure. 
A survey was made of 19 behaviorally oriented studies of complexity 
reviewed in this section. The most popular dependent measure (eight) was 
reaction time or time to problem solution. Other dependent measures were 
solution success, recall of sentence structure, memory of forms, and 
dimensionality judgements of figures. Three studies used number of 
errors as the dependent measure. Few of the studies, however, (other 
than Rouse and Rouse [12]) offer any rationale for their choice of a 
dependent measure. 
Conclusions  
The preceding sections have considered definitions, measures, and 
implications of complexity within a variety of domains. On the basis of 
this review, it is instructive to make some generalizations. 
Most studies of complexity performed by systems scientists are on a 
general level. Although much work has gone into defining and measuring 
system complexity, little has been done to assess the implications of 
complexity. Furthermore, assuming that humans must play an important 
role in many large scale systems (e.g., failure diagnosis and network 
management), little research has investigated the relationship between 
large scale system complexity and human performance. Due to the strong 
theoretical flavor of this approach, it is often difficult to see its 
application to real world systems. 
On the other hand, studies of complexity performed by behavioral 
scientists are on a very applied level. Although the approach often 
lacks the theoretical rigor of the systems approach, complexity is always 
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related to some aspect of human performance. Unfortunately, differences 
between tasks and complexity measures make it difficult to generalize 
results across contexts. Moreover, the small, well-defined nature of the 
tasks seems to have little relation to human performance in large scale 
systems. 
The remainder of this paper is devoted to consideration of human 
performance in monitoring and controlling large scale systems. Thus, the 
research attempts to integrate a number of the issues raised in this 
section concerning the nature of complexity. Complexity is viewed as 
being a result of both the structure of the system and the human 
operator's understanding of the system. Complexity is also considered in 
terms of its relation to both system performance and human performance. 
In particular, the relationship between such structural variables as 
redundancy and number of levels and performance is investigated. In 
summary, the goal of this work is to "bridge the gap" between systems 
science and behavioral science and, in the process, gain practical 
insights into appropriate roles for humans in the increasingly complex 
systems that technology is producing. 
TASK DESCRIPTION 
A previous experiment [2,56] considered human performance in the 
monitoring and control of an essentially context-free representation of a 
large scale system. Subjects monitored and controlled a computer 
simulated large scale system called MABEL (Monitoring, Accessing, 
Browsing, and Evaluating Limits), trying to optimize such system 
parameters as number of customers served and customer processing time 
while trying to diagnose system failures. As noted in the Background 
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section, of interest is the assessment of measures of task complexity; 
i.e., what features of the physical system, the human—system interface, 
or the human's understanding of the system make the monitoring and 
control task difficult? A major goal of this paper is to consider the 
nature of complexity in a large scale system. 
The remainder of this section describes a contextually augmented 
version of MABEL that contains substantially higher fidelity than the 
earlier simulation. An experiment is then described, from which data are 
analyzed using the same set of performance measures as were applied to 
the experiment reported in Henneman and Rouse [2]. Data are then 
analyzed from the standpoint of assessing task complexity. 
Overview of CAIN  
Certain features of MABEL were substantially changed to develop CAIN 
(Contextually Augmented Integrated Network); however, the underlying 
structure of CAIN is identical to that of MABEL. This section summarizes 
the similarities between the context—free MABEL and the contextually—
augmented CAIN. The summary is only a very broad overview; the reader is 
referred to Henneman and Rouse [2] or Henneman [56] for much more detail 
concerning the underlying structure of the two simulations. 
CAIN is programmed in Pascal on a VAX 11/780 computer and operates 
in real time. It is structured as a large hierarchical network that can 
range in size from hundreds to thousands of nodes. Customers travel 
through the system from a randomly selected source node to a random 
destination. Subjects monitor this system activity via a CRT display. 
When they detect a problem in the system (possibly due to a failure), 
subjects issue an appropriate command through a keyboard to correct and 
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compensate for the abnormal situation. The overall objectives of the 
operator are: 
1) to maximize the number of customers served, and 
2) to minimize the time it takes for customers to travel between 
source and destination nodes. 
Because there are so many nodes in the network, it is not possible 
to display information about all nodes at one time. Thus, nodes are 
grouped into relatively small networks called clusters. Human operators 
are restricted to viewing only one cluster at a time on the CAIN display. 
Clusters are grouped into hierarchic levels. 
Effects of Node Failures  
Under normal circumstances, CAIN operates automatically without 
interference from the human operator. Since the system cannot 
automatically diagnose and repair failures, the human must monitor the 
system looking for evidence of failed components. Node failures can 
occur in two ways. The first is a randomly occuring failure mode caused 
by malfunctioning equipment. The second type, capacity failure, can be 
caused by the randomly occuring failures. Each node has a maximum number 
of customers that it can store at one time. If this limit is exceeded, 
the node fails. Thus, if a node fails randomly and a customer needs to 
visit that node, it will be retained at its previous node. This 
retention will cause the previous node to stop processing customers, 
which can lead to a capacity failure. In this way, if the operator does 
not quickly locate failures, the problems will propagate through the 
system. 
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Addition of Context  
Although the physical hierarchical structure of MABEL was preserved, 
the addition of contextual information to CAIN required changing some 
interface characteristics. In the MABEL scenario, for example, all nodes 
on a display page are identified by a number on the CRT display. Each 
displayed node in a cluster, therefore, is physically identical to nodes 
in other clusters. The MABEL interface has a generic quality in that all 
subsystems are visually similar; no contextual cues exist. On the other 
hand, nodes in CAIN are identified via specific geographic locations. 
Thus, a node in MABEL with the label "9" might be labelled "Chicago" in 
CAIN. A typical CAIN display is shown in Figure 1. 
Simply introducing geographic names as node labels is not enough, 
however, to alter subject task performance. A small experiment (n=3) 
replicated the first MABEL experiment [2,56], with the exception that 
nodes were given geographic names. Subjects still referred to nodes by 
number only; contextual labels were present but not needed to perform the 
task. No significant difference was found in terms of performance 
between subjects using the two task scenarios. This result suggests that 
the addition of context must be such that it provides associative links 
(i.e., memory aids) or cues (i.e., clues to the location of problems 
within the system) through which subject performance is enhanced or task 
difficulty is decreased. 
Associative Links. The formation of associative links in CAIN is 
facilitated by the way in which a subject identifies a node. In CAIN, 
nodes are referred to by geographic labels only, never by number. 
Subjects may input the shortest string of characters that uniquely 
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identifies the node from all other nodes in the system. Thus, "Denver" 
may be abbreviated "den". Most nodes can be identified with a three or 
four character substring of the complete name. In addition, the number 
of elements on a display page is kept constant at 16 so that the 
contextual information is invariant. 
To illustrate the effect this change has on the subject's task, 
consider the command that displays a lower level cluster. In MABEL, the 
subject inputs the command "d2", which displays the cluster beneath Node 
2. In CAIN, on the other hand, the subject types "dSanf", which displays 
the cities beneath San Francisco (e.g., Berkeley, San Jose). Thus, 
subjects can form associations or links between system parts due to the 
existence of contextual information. 
Subjects can use these learned associative links to maneuver through 
the CAIN display hierarchy. In MABEL, movement between display pages is 
constrained to the cluster of nodes immediately above or below the 
current display. Thus, it is not possible to jump laterally across the 
network. In CAIN, however, it is possible to move from one part of the 
system to any other part. For example, if a subject recalls that the 
cluster associated with Bangor, ME was previously experiencing problems, 
it is relatively easy to call up that cluster display. This is done by 
using a "find" command ("f"). In addition, subjects can return 
immediately to the highest level in the system by inputting the "a" 
command. (A complete list of commands available for use in CAIN may be 
found in Table 1. This command list is categorized by function: access, 
monitor, diagnose, or control.) 
Cues. The formation of cues in CAIN is provided by the introduction 
of context-dependent events. These events are of one of two types: 
19 
recurring failures and non-uniform loading. Although equipment in nodes 
fails randomly, some equipment experiences a higher probability of 
failure. For example, a thunderstorm in Little Rock, AR may make 
equipment in that city susceptible to lightning damage. Similarly, given 
that incidents of vandalism are more likely to occur in Newark, NJ than 
in Council Bluffs, IA, there is a greater chance of equipment damage in 
Newark. Therefore, equipment in certain cities exhibits a greater 
tendency to fail than in other cities. Subjects are informed of these 
locations via warning alarms that appear on the bottom of the display. 
Subjects can directly monitor activities within these trouble spots via a 
special "watch" ("w") command. Subjects acknowledge the alarms by 
inputting an "erase" command ("e"). Subjects add and delete trouble 
areas from the watch list by using "+" and "-" commands. 
Besides recurring failures, another type of context-dependent event 
present in CAIN is non-uniform loading. At different times, certain 
sections of the system may be prone to experience heavy loading. For 
example, certain times of day are busier in one part of the country than 
in others. Similarly, a major political or sports event in one section 
of the country may increase the number of messages sent. As with the 
recurring failures, subjects are told the location of these increased 
loads via a message at the bottom of the screen. Subjects can reduce the 
number of customers admitted to the overloaded subsystem by means of the 
"load" ("1") command. 
In summary, despite the structural isomorphism of the two 
simulations, CAIN represents a significant departure from the 
context-free scenario of MABEL. Through the addition of contextual 
detail and the addition of events that are dependent upon this contextual 
■ 
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information, the simulation fidelity has been increased 
significantly. 
MEASURES OF COMPLEXITY 
The Background section considered complexity from non-behavioral 
and behavioral perspectives. When assessing the complexity of an 
operator's task in monitoring and controlling a large scale system, both 
approaches should be taken into account. In this paper, therefore, the 
complexity of a large scale system is described in terms of: 1) the 
physical structure of the system and, 2) the operator's understanding of 
the system as reflected by his strategy. From this perspective, a system 
that is complex or difficult to control for one operator may be 
relatively easy to control for another operator. Similarly, the 
complexity of a system may vary with time for any particular operator. 
Some systems, however, may be complex regardless of any particular 
control strategy due to their inherent structural complexity. The 
following paragraphs propose two measures of complexity that incorporate 
these ideas. Structural complexity is considered first, followed by 
strategic complexity. 
Structural Complexity  
A one-to-one relationship exists between the hypothetical physical 
structure of CAIN and the actual structure of the display page hierarchy. 
Since the main control task in CAIN is to locate failures, a measure of 
structural complexity should assess the difficulty of finding failures 
given the physical arrangement of the system. A major constraint placed 
on an operator's ability to locate failures is the hierarchical display 
structure; thus, it seems reasonable to assert that structural complexity 
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can be estimated by calculating the total number of display pages the 
operator must view in order to repair all system failures. Assuming that 
the operator knows the location of all failures, this measure represents 
the minimum number of pages necessary to locate all system failures. 
Thus, the structural complexity measure represents optimal performance 
given the constraints of the structure or arrangement of the system 
components. Operator performance affects this measure only in that any 
particular operator may have more or fewer failures depending upon his 
fault finding ability. 
To illustrate how this measure is calculated, consider the system 
in Figure 2. This hypothetical system contains four nodes per display 
page and has three levels. Each group of four rectangles represents a 
cluster of nodes (i.e., one display page). For clarity, only those 
clusters of nodes that enter into the complexity calculation are shown. 
The darkened rectangles represent nodes that have failed. In this 
example, three failures exist within the system: two on the second level 
and one on the third level. 
The structural complexity measure is determined by counting the 
number of display pages that must be viewed in order to find all 
failures. The counting method assumes a strategy based on tracing higher 
level symptoms to their causes in the lower levels. (Context—specific 
cues might, of course, allow operators to locate failures in fewer 
pages.) Thus, the counting method assumes that after locating all 
failures along one subsystem branch, the subject returns to the highest 
system level to search the next branch (a depth—first strategy). Figure 
2 is self—explanatory; to repair all three failures in the system, an 
operator must view at least six display pages. The final return to the 
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top system level is not counted into the measure because it would simply 
add 1 to all estimates. 
Strategic Complexity  
The strategic complexity measure explicitly considers operator 
performance. When an operator is deciding which path through the system 
is most likely to lead to finding a failure, he makes a tradeoff between 
his uncertainty concerning the state (i.e., queue lengths) of a subsystem 
display page and his expectations of finding a failure in that subsystem. 
High uncertainty about a subsystem may be acceptable, for example, if a 
relatively low probability exists of finding a failure on that display 
page. On the other hand, high subsystem uncertainty may be unacceptable 
if a very high probability exists of finding a failure. These 
observations suggest that an appropriate measure of strategic complexity 
that reflects the trade-off between state uncertainty and probability of 
failure is the multiplication of these two metrics. 
State uncertainty (U) is defined as the real time elapsed since a 
particular display page was last tested for failures. Probability of 
failure is defined as the probability that a failure exists within a 
cluster given the state of the display (p[FIX]). For example, when a 
subject views a particular display page, features of that display provide 
information about the existence of failures in other subsystems (e.g., a 
large queue size suggests a lower level failure.) Experimental data 
files were replayed in order to estimate these probabilities empirically. 
These probabilities were determined by dividing the frequency with which 
a display state reflected a failure by the frequency with which a 
particular display state was viewed by an operator. Sets of 
23 
probabilities were calculated for different system configurations (2 vs. 
3 levels and high vs. low redundancy), and different loading rates (e.g., 
a system with a low loading rate has fewer customers in service, and 
hence, lower queue sizes will reflect failures). 
The measure of strategic complexity multiplies these two measures 
(state uncertainty and probability of failure given the system state) and 
sums the product across all clusters in the system: 
Strategic Complexity = E U(i) x p[FIX(i)] 
where 	U(i) = time since last accessing display page i 
X(i) = State of page i reflected by display one level higher 
p[FIX(i)] = probability of failure given state i 
and F denotes "failure" 
When a subject descended to a lower level, the p[FIX(i)] remained fixed 
for the previous level. When a subject returned to the higher level, the 
p[F(X(i)] values associated with the just-visited lower level cluster 
were set to zero. Thus, when an operator descended to a lower level 
subsystem and tested for failures, the strategic complexity measure was 
simultaneously increased by the "new" uncertainty present in the other 
lower-level subsystems and decreased by the certainty now associated with 
the current level. 
To illustrate how the strategic complexity measure is determined, 
consider the display in Figure 3. This system contains four nodes per 
display page and has two levels. The operator is viewing the highest 
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level page in the display hierarchy and is monitoring activity in the 
next level of the system. The operator can gather information about 
activity in the second level of the system from two sources in this 
example: the cluster display and the data displayed via the monitor 
command. The monitor command lists the number of customers in the 
clusters one level below; the cluster display shows the number of 
customers waiting at all nodes in the current cluster. 
Each of these pieces of information reflects the probability that a 
failure has occurred in a lower level cluster. These probabilities 
(which are plausible, but hypothetical) are listed in Table 2. For 
example, the queue size of 15 in Denver reflects a relatively high 
probability (0.75) that a failure exists in Level Two. Similarly, the 
monitor command reports that eight customers are currently in the cluster 
beneath Denver; these eight customers reflect a 0.60 probability that a 
failure exists. The operator has not tested the cluster beneath Denver 
for failures for U(Denver) = 20.12 seconds. Using the information that 
reflects the highest probability of failure (i.e., from the cluster 
display) results in the following measure of strategic complexity for the 
Denver region: 
U(Denver x p[Flx(Denver)] = 20.12 x 0.75 
= 15.09s 
This procedure is then repeated for the other clusters in the network and 
the measures are added together. In this way, the total strategic 
complexity is determined to be 15.61. 
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In this example, it should be noted that Denver makes a very large 
contribution to the strategic complexity measure as a result of two 
factors: first, the operator has a high degree of uncertainty concerning 
the Denver subsystem in that he has not tested that cluster for failures 
in 20.12s. Second, the display reflects a very high probability (0.75) 
that a failure exists in the Denver subsystem. The combination of these 
two factors leads to a very high measure of strategic complexity for the 
Denver subsystem. On the other hand, the other subsystems have either a 
low uncertainty measure or a low probability of failure. Thus, their 
contribution to strategic complexity is small. 
Finally, it is instructive to consider the extent to which an 
operator may "optimally" reduce strategic complexity. Since the measure 
is based on time, it will continually increase unless either the operator 
performs some action or the state of the system shifts. At any instant 
in time, therefore, it is possible for an operator to reduce strategic 
complexity optimally by viewing the display page that reduces the measure 
by the largest amount (i.e., the cluster with the largest U x P[F1X] 
value). In the long run, however, the measure may only be optimally 
reduced given the operator's performance constraints (i.e., psychomotor 
reaction and movement times,). In other words, since the measure will in 
general keep increasing with time, optimal performance will always be 
limited by how long it takes the operator to physically select the next 
display page. 
Dependent Measure of Complexity  
The literature review also suggested that an appropriate dependent 
measure of complexity is the time until failure diagnosis. In the 
context of CAIN, this measure is the average time until the subject 
issues a repair command for a failed node. Since the two independent 
complexity measures vary with time, it was necessary to use a dependent 
measure that also changes with time. Average time, therefore, includes 
the diagnosis time for the current repair plus diagnosis times for the 
four previous repairs. 
Summary of Complexity Measures  
To summarize, the structural measure reflects an inherent 
characteristic of the network, namely the number of display pages 
necessary to find all of the failures in the system. The strategic 
measure, on the other hand, reflects temporal aspects of subjects' 
strategies, i.e., subjects' paths through the network. From this 
perspective, the strategic measure reflects the complexity resulting from 
a particular strategy. 
Although the two complexity measures proposed here may have some 
general applicability (in particular, the measure of strategic complexity 
is appealing due to its temporal nature), it is not the intent of this 
paper to suggest or prove that these measures are true indices of task 
complexity. The goal instead is to show in a pragmatic sense that these 
two dimensions represent a useful distinction relative to task 





The main goal of this experiment was to investigate the nature of 
complexity in a large scale human-machine system. As emphasized in the 
preceding section, the general assumption is made that task complexity 
can only be measured relative to an individual's understanding of the 
system and his expertise in dealing with problems in that system. Thus, 
complexity is considered to be dynamic, varying across time and among 
subjects. Accordingly, as discussed below, subjects were required to 
perform the task (CAIN) over a relatively long period of time. 
Subjects  
Eight junior and senior engineering majors at Georgia Tech served as 
subjects in this experiment. Due to the nature of the task, potential 
subjects were screened via a typing test (minimum ability level was 25 
words/minute). Subjects were paid a total of $65: $5.00 for each 
training session (3) and each experimental session (10). 
Training  
Subjects were trained via a combination of written instructions and 
hands-on experience with CAIN. Subjects initially were given two sets of 
written instruction on consecutive days explaining the system, the goals 
of their task, and methods for achieving these goals. Self-test 
questions were contained within the text to insure mastery of the 
material. The experimenter reviewed this material with subjects at the 
beginning of each training session. In addition, subjects were given 
one-page summaries detailing the structure of the system, available 
commands (Table 1), and operation of the system. 
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Subjects completed the first two training sessions by controlling a 
two-level CAIN system. The third training session was spent controlling 
a three-level CAIN system. These sessions were performed using a version 
of CAIN that allowed subjects to start and stop the program execution. 
Thus, subjects could investigate normal and abnormal system functions 
without being overwhelmed by the progressive effects of failures. The 
experimenter was present during all training sessions to answer 
questions. 
Experimental Design  
Henneman and Rouse [2] reported that cluster size (number of nodes 
per display page) in MABEL had a particularly strong effect on task 
performance. Results suggested that small clusters degraded performance 
because fewer connections existed between nodes; less redundancy caused 
failures to propagate more quickly. Another result from Henneman and 
Rouse [2] showed the very strong effect of number of hierarchical system 
levels on human performance. Increasing the number of levels from two to 
three degraded performance. Thus, two independent variables selected for 
further analysis were the degree of redundancy (or connectivity) and the 
number of levels in the system. (Cluster size was kept constant at 16 as 
mentioned previously in order to emphasize the non-varying features of 
the contextual display.) Redundancy or connectivity was defined as the 
number of connections emanating from each node. Redundancy varied 
between low (6 connections/node) and high (13 connections/node) and 
number of levels varied between two and three. 
Of interest in this experiment was the way in which complexity 
changes as subjects gain expertise. Thus, the order of presentation of 
.experimental conditions was not randomized. All subjects saw the same 
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experimental conditions in the same order. A final independent variable, 
therefore, was the order of presentation of experimental conditions. 
In summary, the ten experimental sessions (S1 - S10) were performed 
in the following order (with the intent of increasing experimental 
difficulty): 81,S2: 2 levels, high redundancy; S3,S4,S5: 3 levels, 
high redundancy; S6,S7: 2 levels, low redundancy; 88,S9,810: 3 levels, 
low redundancy. Each experimental session was performed on consecutive 
days and lasted about 45 minutes. 
RESULTS 
Summary of Approach  
Data from this experiment were first analyzed using the same 
performance measures as the experiment reported in Henneman and Rouse 
[2]. Overall results from the analysis of variance supported those of 
the earlier experiment. In light of this similarity, these general 
results are only briefly summarized below. Considerably more detail may 
be found in Henneman [56]. 
Measures of fault diagnosis performance were affected as expected by 
the independent variables. Increasing the number of system levels from 
two to three corresponded to a higher average time to failure diagnosis. 
This result was largely because failures take longer to propagate upwards 
in the 3-level systems. In addition, failure-related symptoms take 
longer to emerge in highly interconnected networks; thus, the high 
redundancy systems resulted in longer average times to diagnosis. 
The fraction of failures repaired by subjects was also significantly 
affected by increasing the number of levels: as the number of levels 
increased from two to three, the fraction of failures found decreased 
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from 0.95 to 0.69. As in Henneman and Rouse [2], subjects could not cope 
with the very large search space in the three level systems. 
Data were also analyzed with the purpose of investigating 
relationships between the complexity measures, the CAIN environment and 
operator performance. This investigation was accomplished in two ways. 
First, an analysis was undertaken of average or global measures of 
complexity (i.e., the complexity time series averaged over each 
experimental run). The effect of the experimental independent variables 
(number of levels and degree of interconnectivity between nodes) on the 
average complexity measures was determined by using analysis of variance. 
The relationship between the average complexity measures and measures of 
subject fault diagnosis performance was then assessed by using 
correlation analysis. As is discussed below, this analysis of average 
complexity values provided explanations for differences that exist 
between different system configurations. 
The second way in which complexity was investigated involved using a 
fine-grained approach, namely, time series analysis. Time series 
analysis was selected due to the intrinsic time-varying nature of the 
independent and dependent complexity measures. As will be seen, this 
analysis provided insight into the way in which complexity evolves and 
affects different phases of the failure diagnosis process. 
Due to the amount of time necessary to perform these analyses, the 
results are limited to Sessions 2,5,7, and 10. Data for the analyses were 
generated by replaying subject data files. Following every three seconds 
(corresponding to the rate of display update), both complexity measures 
and the average time until failure diagnosis were calculated. Average 
values for all measures were calculated from these time series. 
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Analysis of Global Complexity Measures  
Analysis of Variance. The results of two ANOVAs (using average 
structural and strategic complexity measures as dependent measures and 
number of levels and degree of redundancy as independent measures) are 
qualitatively summarized in Figure 4. (Henneman [56] reports the results 
more fully.) Structural complexity, as measured here, may be decreased 
in two ways: 1) decreasing the number of system levels and 2) decreasing 
the number of system failures. 
The first way (decreasing number of system levels), enables subjects 
to access fewer display pages in order to diagnose failures in the lowest 
system level. The second way (decreasing number of system failures) is 
facilitated by increasing the network redundancy (i.e., increasing the 
number of connections between nodes). As network redundancy increases, 
the average number of node capacity failures decreases, which has the 
effect of decreasing the structural complexity measure. 
Strategic complexity, as measured here, may be decreased in three 
ways: 1) utilizing an effective strategy in terms of responding to 
symptoms, 2) decreasing redundancy, and 3) decreasing number of levels 
(which causes symptoms to emerge more rapidly). Subjects tended to trace 
failures to the lowest system level only when a symptom (i.e., visual 
cue) appeared on the display, even if they had not viewed a particular 
region in a large period of time. Consequently, when symptoms emerged 
slowly (as in the high redundancy/three level conditions), high 
uncertainty resulted. This uncertainty helped to create moderate to high 
strategic complexity. On the other hand, symptoms emerged more rapidly 
in the low redundancy/two level conditions. Since operators tended to 
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respond primarily to visual symptoms, low redundancy led to low values of 
strategic complexity. 
This dependence on visual cues has implications for the design of 
task performance aids. Aids should help people to overcome their 
inability or reluctance to reduce system uncertainty despite the absence 
of failure symptoms. Alternatively, cues or symptoms could be enhanced 
so that operators naturally pursue leads sooner. 
In summary, increasing redundancy (or number of connections between 
nodes) led to less structural complexity but more strategic complexity. 
This result reflects findings from the literature: more redundant 
systems (corresponding to less structural complexity) enhance the proper 
operation of the system by reducing the impact of failed components. On 
the other hand, more redundancy leads to increased strategic complexity 
(the complexity of failure diagnosis) due to the slower emergence of 
failure symptoms. 
In addition, increasing the number of system levels increased both 
types of complexity. Again, although multiple system levels might be 
desirable in that they allow supervision of larger networks and protect 
upper levels from the effects of failures, they have the undesirable side 
effect of masking symptoms from operators, thereby increasing the 
complexity of failure diagnosis. Multiple displays could possibly be 
used to reduce this complexity. 
Correlation Analysis. Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficients were calculated between the two average complexity measures 
and the two dependent measures (fraction failures diagnosed and average 
time to failure diagnosis). Results are qualitatively summarized in this 
section; again, Henneman [56] contains more detail. Since significant 
33 
interaction effects due to the experimental conditions were found, the 
analysis was limited to comparisons among correlation coefficients within 
each experimental condition. Major differences among coefficients were 
only noted when comparing across the number of levels variable. These 
results are qualitatively tabulated in Figure 5. 
Considering structural complexity first, the measures for both two 
and three level systems correlate negatively with the fraction of  
failures found (correlations range between -.31 and -.88). Thus, when 
many system failures are present on the average (as suggested by a high 
structural measure), a smaller fraction of failures are found. With 
respect to the structural measure and average time to failure diagnosis, 
no significant correlation exists for the two level systems, while high 
negative correlations (-.63 and -.70) exist for the three-level systems. 
In other words, high structural complexity in the three-level systems led 
to shorter failure diagnosis times. This result, being somewhat 
counter-intuitive, is caused by the following chain of events. High 
structural complexity is caused by a large number of failures, which are 
caused, in turn, by a high number of capacity failures. Most capacity 
failures are located in the upper system levels where failure diagnosis 
times are relatively short. 
The correlations associated with the strategic complexity measure 
tend to be smaller. Correlations between average strategic complexity 
and percent failures diagnosed are negative for two level systems (-.34 
and -.49) and positive for three level systems (.25 and .49). In the 
two-level conditions, therefore, high strategic complexity led to fewer 
diagnosed failures, although in the three level systems, high strategic 
complexity led to more diagnosed failures. Results for the two level 
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systems are as expected. High values of strategic complexity resulted 
from high uncertainty and high conditional failure probabilities. 
Apparently subjects who used strategies that tolerated these high values 
were not looking at or using the display cues to find failures; thus, 
they found few system failures. 
Results for the three level systems are less intuitive. Subjects 
who found many failures in the three level systems had to spend time 
accessing third level subsystems. Because they spent more time in the 
third level, these better subjects had to tolerate greater uncertainty 
about the rest of the system. This increased uncertainty had the effect 
of increasing the strategic complexity measure. 
Summary. In summary, the results presented in this section provide 
insight to the overall characteristics of the two complexity measures and 
their relationship to subject fault diagnosis performance. The measures 
are sensitive to variations among the system characteristics of number of 
levels and degree of redundancy. In general, the more complex systems 
have three rather than two levels. The effect of redundancy on 
complexity depends on the type of complexity: low redundancy networks 
result in more structural complexity; high redundancy networks result in 
more strategic complexity. 
An important conceptual and methodological issue raised by these 
results concerns the multidimensional nature of complexity. In 
particular, the relationship between the independent and dependent 
measures of complexity is of interest. When many failures exist in a 
system, the general tendency is for the complexity measures to increase. 
At the same time, however, the average time to failure diagnosis 
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decreases. Thus, even though complexity may be large, failure diagnosis 
time may be small. 
This observation emphasizes the distinction mentioned previously 
between proper system functioning and the complexity of failure 
diagnosis. In a localized sense, control in a complex system is simple: 
no matter what the operator does, he will find a problem. This is 
reflected by short diagnosis times. In a global sense, however, control 
in a complex system is complex: so many problems exist in the system 
that proper operation is endangered. This is reflected by a low fraction 
of failures found. The operator, dealing with only a small part of the 
system at one time, may be oblivious to the scope of problems in the 
network. Another important issue is, therefore, the impact of a richly 
interconnected, multiple-level system (that supports proper system 
functioning) on the complexity of human monitoring and control (that will 
degrade failure diagnosis performance). 
Analysis of Fine-Grained Complexity Measures  
Time Series Analysis. Time series analysis was used to identify, 
estimate, and diagnostically check transfer functions that relate the two 
input complexity measures to the average time to failure diagnosis. The 
general approach is discussed by Box and Jenkins [57]. Each transfer 
function model predicts the current average time to failure diagnosis 
through a linear combination of the complexity measures at various time 
lags. The essence of the modeling process is to determine the time lags 
to include in the model and the weight or relative contribution of each 
time lagged variable to the predicted value. Montgomery and Weatherby 
[58] provide a good tutorial on multiple input transfer function models. 
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Transfer functions for each subject were developed for Sessions 
2,5,7, and 10. (Due to space considerations, these functions are not 
shown here; the reader is referred to Henneman [56] for more detail.) 
Overall, the approach was successful. The equations remove all structure 
from the autocorrelation function of the model residuals. Furthermore, a 
comparison of the sum of squares of the original dependent time series 
(i.e., average time to failure diagnosis) to the sum of squares of the 
residuals shows that the transfer functions explain 82% to 97% of the 
variance within the original data. Nevertheless, wide differences in the 
lag and coefficient values in the models exist among both subjects and 
systems. 
The remainder of this section is devoted to the development of a 
consistent explanation for these differences. The goal is not to account 
fully for each parameter, lag value, and coefficient in the transfer 
functions. Instead, the goal is to suggest a plausible explanation for 
the transfer function characteristics and to suggest reasons for 
deviations from this explanation. 
Explanation for Transfer Functions. The initial step was to 
identify characteristics of the task, the system, or the human that could 
explain differences among transfer functions (e.g., long lags and 
inconsistency of numerical signs). For example, several different events 
are associated with the life cycle of each system failure: failure 
occurrence, symptom emergence, and failure diagnosis. Failure occurrence  
is defined as the time when a part of the system fails; symptom emergence 
is defined as the time a failure first affects any node that appears on 
the subject's video display; failure diagnosis is defined as the time a 
subject issues a repair command for a failed component. The timing of 
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these events undoubtedly has some effect on the length of time needed to 
find the failure. Moreover, the system complexity at these event times 
might also affect failure diagnosis time. 
Besides the possibility that different events associated with the 
failure life-cycle impact diagnosis time, it is also reasonable that 
different types of diagnosis might affect failure diagnosis time. The 
diagnosis of any particular failure may be classified into one of three 
types: topographic, symptomatic, or serendipitous. Subjects identifying 
failures using a topographic strategy trace failure symptoms from higher 
system levels to their causes in lower levels. Subjects identifying 
failures using a symptomatic strategy make a direct mapping from their 
knowledge of the system structure to the failed component. A symptomatic 
diagnosis relies, therefore, on the subject's contextual knowledge of the 
system. For example, when subjects make a jump from one cluster to 
another cluster in the same level to repair a failure, their action 
suggests that their context-specific knowledge of the system is providing 
guidance to system trouble areas. Finally, subjects may also identify 
failures accidentally or serendipitously. In this diagnosis mode, 
subjects locate failures while browsing through the system or while 
tracing the cause of a different failure. 
In summary, it is possible that several different types of 
failure-related event (e.g., failure occurrence and symptom emergence) 
and several different modes of failure diagnosis (e.g., symptomatic, 
topographic, and serendipitous) can affect the time to failure diagnosis 
within a system. In addition, due to the aforementioned aggregation of 
five failure diagnosis times for the dependent complexity measure, it is 
possible for many lags (possibly quite long) to enter into the transfer 
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functions. From the perspective offered in the preceding paragraphs, 
therefore, the transfer functions relating the two complexity measures to 
failure diagnosis time are affected not only by system characteristics 
and individual differences; rather, the equations are also affected by 
types of failure-related event, modes of failure diagnosis, and the way 
in which diagnosis times were aggregated. In the next section, these 
factors are considered analytically and compared with the transfer 
functions. 
Empirical Analysis. Given the preceding discussion, subject data 
files were replayed
1 in order to gather failure-related event 
information. When a subject repaired a failure, it was classified as 
being topographic, symptomatic, or serendipitous by using the following 
heuristics. A failure diagnosis was classified as topographic if the 
failure was affecting the last higher display page viewed by the subject; 
the assumption was made that the subject was tracing the cause of 
symptoms via the physical structure of the system. A diagnosis was 
classified as symptomatic if the subject jumped more than one level in 
the display hierarchy, if the subject jumped laterally on the same level, 
or if the subject diagnosed the failure on the basis of contextual 
messages. All of these instances suggested that the subject was using 
contextual knowledge of the system to recall the likely location of 
failures. Finally, a diagnosis was classified as serendipitous if no 
1The comparisons made in this section are limited to data from Session 2. 
Since the major goal is to show how the results that did arise are 
explainable, the explanation can be accomplished by examining only a 
subset of all the data. 
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symptoms existed on the previous level and for the second, third, etc. 
failures diagnosed on a single display page. 
Failure occurrence and symptom emergence times were also determined. 
This information was collected for each diagnosis mode (i.e., 
topographic, symptomatic, and serendipitous) and also aggregated across 
all diagnosis modes. Using these data, the average time from each event 
type to the time of diagnosis was calculated. A comparison of these 
average times to the transfer functions lag values for Session 2 may be 
found in Table 3. Table 3 may be interpreted as follows. For each 
subject (1-8) the total number of failures repaired for each diagnosis 
mode are listed along with the fraction of the total for each mode. The 
top row in each pair of boxed numbers corresponds to average event times 
that are approximately equal to lag values from the transfer functions. 
The lower row in each box contains information about the corresponding 
transfer function variable. The + or - represents the numerical sign of 
the transfer function coefficient, "struct" or "strat" refers to the type 
of complexity, and the final number is the time lag value. 
Table 4 presents some of the information in Table 3 in a slightly 
different form, listing only the empirical average time values paired 
with transfer function lag values. As Table 4 clearly shows, a very high 
degree of correlation exists between the time values and the lag values 
(r = 0.92, p < 0.01). 
Several patterns are evident in Table 3. First, of the eight 
subjects, seven have transfer function lags that are approximately less 
than or equal to the overall average time to failure diagnosis (all 
except Subject 8). Four of these lags involve a strategic complexity 
component (Subjects 2, 4, 5, and 7), and four involve a structural 
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component (Subjects 1, 3, 6, and 7 -- Subject 7 has both). 
Furthermore, the numerical sign of the transfer function coefficient in 
each case is positive. In each case, therefore, the strategic complexity 
measure is related positively to the predicted failure diagnosis time. 
This finding is intuitively plausible. The measure of strategic 
complexity reflects the trade-off between the subject's system state 
uncertainty and the probability of failures existing within the system. 
If this measure is at a relatively high level when a failure occurs, the 
time needed to find that failure will be increased due to the number or 
severity of potential problem areas within the system. A high measure of 
strategic complexity suggests that many subsystems (clusters) have 
potential problems and thus, require the attention of the operator. The 
time necessary to observe these clusters has the cumulative effect of 
increasing time to failure diagnosis. 
Similarly, the measure of structural complexity estimates the 
minimum number of pages that the subject would have to view in order to 
find all system failures. On the average, the time needed to locate any 
one failure in the system will increase as this measure increases. 
A second pattern that exists within these results is the similarity 
between the average time from symptom emergence and the lag values 
associated with a negative structural complexity component (Subjects 2, 
3, 4, 6, and 8). After a symptom emerges, therefore, the structural 
complexity measure decreases the predicted time to failure diagnosis: 
the greater the structural complexity of the system, the less time it 
takes to locate failures. This counter-intuitive result may be explained 
as follows: as system structural complexity increases, more failures 
exist within the system. As the number of failures in the system 
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increases, it is likely that a subject will locate some failures rather 
quickly. 
This observation reflects the relation between fault diagnosis time 
and number of failures in the system. As the number of failures in the 
system increases, one might expect the time to diagnosis for some 
failures also to increase. On the other hand, as the number of failures 
in the system increases, the chances of finding some failures fairly soon 
is relatively high. Thus, once a symptom emerges, the average time to 
failure diagnosis will decrease simply because there are more possible 
failures in the system to find. 
This conclusion is consistent with the relation between lag values 
and the calculated average time between symptom emergence and failure 
diagnosis for serendipitous diagnoses. Four of the eight subjects 
(Subjects 2, 3, 4, and 8) have a negative structural complexity component 
that is related to the symptom emergence for this mode of failure 
diagnosis. This increase/decrease effect of complexity, therefore, 
appears to be dependent upon both the type of complexity (structural or 
strategic) and the type of failure—related event (e.g., failure occurence 
or symptom emergence). 
In one situation, the measure of structural complexity at the time 
of symptom emergence appears to increase failure diagnosis time (Subject 
7). It is worthwhile noting that this subject located substantially more 
failures than any other subject (97 vs. 75 -- the next highest total). 
This high number was not due to an effective strategy; rather, the 
subject used a poor strategy that resulted in a very high number of 
capacity failures -- note the high percent of serendipitous failure 
locations relative to the other subjects. Indeed, all of the 
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coefficients in Subject 7's transfer function (Table 4) have positive 
coefficients. In short, the subject was unable to overcome the number of 
failures in the system, thereby resulting in an increasing time to 
failure diagnosis. 
So far the discussion has centered on the aggregated mode of failure 
diagnosis. Examining the individual modes of failure diagnosis, similar 
trends are apparent except in one case: the transfer function associated 
with topographic diagnoses have no lag values that correspond to any of 
the inter—event times. What characteristic of topographic diagnoses 
could cause this lack of association? One possible reason is simply that 
there are fewer topographic diagnoses made by subjects; thus, it is less 
likely to obtain an accurate measure of the true mean event time and 
transfer function lag. Inaccuracy in the measure obscures the nature of 
the relationship. 
Another possibility is related to the length of time necessary to 
find topographic failures: in general, it takes subjects more time to 
identify a failure topographically than some other way. (For example, 
the average time to failure diagnosis for topographic failures for 
Session 2 data is 124.95s; for symptomatic failures, 45.07s; and for 
serendipitous failures, 60.03s.) Because of the longer times (note in 
particular the time from first symptom emergence to failure diagnosis for 
each subject), the complexity measure is not related to the lag values. 
Failure diagnosis time in this case is more dependent upon the 
probabilistic nature of the queueing network than the skills or 
thresholds of individual subjects. 
Summary. The preceding discussion indicates that the variables and 
lags present in the transfer functions are reasonable, if not entirely 
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explainable. The real time values of the lags frequently agree with the 
average inter-failure event times calculated from subject data files. A 
comparison of these values for Session Two data suggests that certain 
recurring patterns of agreement exist between the lags and inter-event 
times. These recurring patterns are useful in terms of explaining the 
presence of both positive and negative terms in the transfer functions. 
Differences between time values can probably be accounted for by any of 
several reasons, including the high variability present within the data, 
the subjective nature of the modelling process, and the existence of 
events other than failure occurence or symptom emergence (e.g., diagnosis 
time for a particular system level or subsystem) that affect parameters 
in the transfer functions. 
Results reported in this section demonstrate how two different 
dimensions of complexity, structural and strategic, can be related to 
human fault diagnosis skills in a large scale system. The exact nature 
of the two measures is relatively unimportant beyond a certain degree of 
intuitive validity. The importance of these results, however, lies in 
the demonstration that the complexity measures are dependent upon the 
number of failures in the system and the rate at which their symptoms 
emerge. These factors are highly dependent upon both system 
characteristics (i.e., number of levels and degree of redundancy) and 
subject strategy. Of equal importance is the demonstration that the 
complexity measures relate to performance in a time-varying manner, and 
the nature of this time-varying manner is highly dependent upon events 
that occur within the system and the strategy of individual subjects. 
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CONCLUSION 
The experiment, results, and conclusions in this paper have 
considered the relationship between the design of a large scale system 
and human monitoring and control behavior. System characteristics such 
as number of levels and degree of interconnectedness can have a very 
strong effect on the ability of humans to maintain proper system 
operation in the presence of failures. Since normal system operation 
tends to be affected in the opposite direction in the presence of the 
same design characteristics, system designers must be careful to create 
environments that support both system and human performance. 
Some rather straightforward measures were used to assess the 
complexity of a large scale system as it relates to the task of 
monitoring and control. Complexity, as discussed in this paper, is a 
dynamic property of a human-machine system. Complexity varies with time 
and it varies among operators. Furthermore, complexity is 
multi-dimensional; two dimensions of complexity (i.e., structural and 
strategic) have been proposed, and it appears that this distinction is 
useful, both conceptually and practically. Complexity is not due solely 
to the structure of the system, although a system may certainly be 
complex due to its structure. Rather, complexity also arises when the 
human, trying to solve problems within the system's environment, does not 
understand the structure, and, as a result issues an inappropriate 
command, misinterprets display information, etc. In short, systems are 
also complex due to the human's understanding of the system as reflected 
by his strategy. 
Another result from this work concerns the outcome of complexity. 
Based on a review of the literature and the major control task of 
subjects (i.e., finding failures), average time to failure diagnosis was 
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used as the major dependent measure of complexity. As results suggest, 
however, average time to failure diagnosis alone does not completely 
describe the implications of complexity. For example, the most complex 
systems resulted in shorter failure diagnosis times due to the number and 
location of failures. A smaller fraction of the total number of failures 
was diagnosed, however. Thus, fraction failures diagnosed was used to 
explain a different aspect of performance related to task complexity. In 
short, the result of complexity is multi-dimensional. A single dimension 
does not capture the outcome of a complex system. 
These comments are important in light of the relationships among 
system characteristics that contribute to complexity, proper operation of 
the system, and complexity of monitoring and control by the human. As 
the system becomes more "complex" (from a non-behaviorist's perspective, 
i.e., more levels and more redundancy), it becomes more resistant to the 
effects of system failures. Failures take longer to propagate through 
the more complex systems. Moreover, the effects of any one failure on 
overall system performance are minimized due to the number of alternate 
paths through the system. Hence, normal system operation is enhanced. 
This situation is analogous to the use of redundant or stand-by equipment 
in systems to increase fault tolerance. On the other hand, as the system 
becomes more complex, the task of finding system failures becomes more 
difficult. Although the system design characteristics can help to avoid 
the short term effects of failures, they can have the dual effect of 
making the human supervisory controller's task more difficult. 
The relationship between complexity and human performance takes on 
increasing importance given the growing prevalence of large scale 
systems. Human abilities and limitations in monitoring and controlling 
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these complex systems must be identified in order to design systems that 
facilitate good failure diagnosis and network management performance. In 
short, systems must be designed such that they do not overload human 
information processing capabilities. Beyond the issue of design, an 
understanding of human performance constraints should facilitate the 
creation of effective performance aids. Such aids can be used to help 
people overcome their limitations in coping with the complex environments 
these systems create, thereby leading to safe and effective system 
performance. 
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Table 2 	Example calculation of strategic complexity 
Cluster 	 U 	 p[FIX] 	 U x p[FIX] 
uncertainty 	monitor cluster  
Denver 	 20.12 	.600 	.750 	 15.090 
Los Angeles 	0.54 	.100 	.015 	 .054 
Chicago 	 7.36 	.001 	.001 	 .007 
New York 	 9.12 	.001 	.050 	 .456 
Strategic Complexity = 	15.607 
Table 
Subject 1 
3 	Summary of average times from failure-related 
events to failure diagnosis (Session 2) 
All 	Topographic 	Symptomatic 	Serendipitous 
Total Failures 58 	 20 	 15 	 23 
Frac. of Total 0.35 0.26 0.40 
T(Failure) 63.02 81.68 27.47 69.99 
+ struct 48.1 + struct 48.1 
T(Symptom) 29.65 	 38.18 14.98 31.81 
Subject 2 
Total Failures 61 	 10 	 18 	 33 
Frac. of Total 0.16 0.30 0.54 
T(Failure) 75.85 101.03 	47.66 	83.59 
+ strat 71.1 
T(Symptom) 32.29 42.99 24.44 33.33 
- struct 22.4 - struct 22.4 - struct 22.4 
Subject 3 
Total Failures 66 	 16 	 17 	 33 
Frac. of Total 0.24 0.26 0.50 
T(Failure) 78.04 180.32 42.52 46.75 
+ struct 60.1 - struct 40.1 - struct 40.1 
19.57 
T(Symptom) 44.29 97.88 + struct 10 31.03 
- struct 40.1 - strat 16.7 - struct 23.4 
Subject 4 
Total Failures 63 	 22 	 19 	 22 
Frac. of Total 0.35 0.30 0.35 
T(Failure) 53.90 78.23 34.06 46.71 
+ strat 46.4 + strat 23.2 + strat 46.4 
T(Symptom) 31.80 47.56 14.45 31.03 










Frac. of Total 
T(Failure) 66.93 
+ strat 67.6 
T(Symptom) 28.47 56.91  19.98 21.25 
+ strat 11.6 + strat 11.6 
Subject 6 
Total Failures 43 16 20 	 7 
Frac. of Total 0.37 0.47 0.16 
T(Failure) 64.30 94.48 39.31 	66.75 
+ struct 66.2 
T(Symptom) 51.01 52.16 10.44 	41.43 
- struct 29.4 
Subject 7 
Total Failures 97 17 15 	 65 
Frac. of Total 0.18 0.16 0.67 
T(Failure) 78.89 143.59 57.35 66.94 
+ struct 49.8 + struct 49.8 
+ strat 49.8 + strat 49.8 
T(Symptom) 45.74 88.15 26.42 39.11 
Subject 8 
Total Failures 47 12 8 	 27 
Frac. of Total 0.26 0.17 0.57 
T(Failure) 103.95 174.07 61.32 85.42 
T(Symptom)  65.01 116.95 24.69 53.88 
- struct 44.2 - struct 44.2 
Table 4 	Summary of average event 
Average time 	lag value 
times and lag values 
Average time 	lag value 
63.0 48.1 19.6 10.0 
75.9 71.1 19.6 16.7 
32.3 22.4 34.1 23.2 
78.0 60.1 14.5 11.6 
44.3 40.1 20.0 11.6 
53.9 46.4 57.4 49.8 
31.8 11.6 70.0 48.1 
66.9 67.6 33.3 22.4 
64.3 66.2 46.8 40.1 
31.0 29.4 31.0 23.4 
78.9 49.8 46.7 46.4 
65.0 44.2 31.0 11.6 
24.4 22.4 21.3 11.6 
42.5 40.1 53.9 44.2 
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Abstract 
A model of human performance in monitor-
ing and controlling complex engineering sys-
tems is considered from the perspective of 
implementing the model as an on-line perfor-
mance aid. Results from the literature are 
discussed in the context of CAIN, a simulated 
large scale system that has been used to 
study human supervisory control performance 
[1,2]. A rule-based model of human perfor-
mance in CAIN is proposed and a methodology 
for evaluation is suggested. 
Tntroduction 
Recent trends in automation have facili-
tated the creation of large, complex 
engineering systems. Due to the capabilities 
of computer technology to control a large 
number of interconnected components, the nor-
mal operation of these systems is typically 
left to an automatic controller. During 
unforeseen events (such as system failures) 
that cannot be handled by the computer, how-
ever, a human controller must take corrective 
action. As many have noted [3], this increase 
in automation is fundamentally changing ways 
in which people interact with large systems. 
The human operator no longer is in charge of 
the routine, continuous control of the sys-
tem. Rather, the operator is mostly con-
cerned with the unexpected, the unusual, and 
the non-routine aspects of system control. 
Requisite human skills for system control are 
shifting from psychomotor to problem solving 
[4]. 
Recent research activity has focused on 
human supervisory control and problem solving 
in complex engineering environments [3], 
although a majority of this work has been 
restricted to the process control domain. 
Henneman and Rouse [1,2] discuss human per-
formance in monitoring and controlling a 
large scale dynamic network (such as a com-
munication network). These systems can be 
represented as discrete queueing networks. 
Henneman and Rouse [1,2] have conducted a 
series of experiments that empirically 
assessed the effects of system features (such 
as number of levels and display size) on 
human performance via two simulated large 
scale systems called MABEL and CAIN. Other 
efforts have been directed towards developing 
and evaluating measures of large scale system 
complexity. Results to this point have led 
to a good empirical understanding of the 
relationship between the structure of the 
system and human performance. 
Given this understanding of human per-
formance in this task, it is now possible to 
postulate a model of human problem solving in 
the CAIN environment. Thoughts presented in 
this paper are directed towards the develop-
ment of such a model. First, some previous 
related modeling 	efforts are reviewed- 
Second 	the CAIN environment is briefly 
described- 	Finally, the problem 	solving 
model is presented and discussed 
Rankground 
The model developed in this paper is an 
extension of a conceptual model of human 
problem solving proposed by Rouse [5]. Rouse 
has suggested that problem solving takes 
place on three levels: 1) recognition and 
classification, 2) planning. and 3) execution 
and monitoring Thus, when a problem situa-
tion develops, the first task is to detect 
that the problem exists and to categorize it 
(recognition and classification). An 
approach or plan to solving the problem must 
then be developed (planning), and finally, 
the plan must be implemented (execution and 
monitoring). The model is further character-
ized by its ability to make either a state-
or a structure-oriented response, depending 
on both the system state and the human's 
level of expertise. The model assumes that 
humans have a preference for pattern-
recognition solutions to problems -- that is, 
humans prefer to make context-specific state' 
oriented responses to situations. Moreover, 
the model operates heterarchically at all 
three problem solving levels almost simul-
taneously, with situations constantly being 
re-evaluated relative to their state- or 
structure-oriented status. 
The model as presented by Rouse [5] is 
explicitly a conceptual realization/ combina-
tion of other more restricted problem solving 
models. Knaeuper and Rouse [6] attempted to 
implement an operational model of this con-
ceptual framework in a computer simulated 
process plant environment called PLANT [7]. 
They developed a rule-based model called KARL 
(Knowledgeable Application of Rule-based 
Logic) that controlled the computer simulated 
process plant. KARL consists of a set of 
production rules that comprise the knowledge 
base and a control structure that accesses 
that knowledge base. KARL's structure is 
defined by the three levels of problem solv-
ing described above and also four major tasks 
that are associated with human performance in 
a process control environment (i.e., transi-
tion, steady-state tuning, failure detection 
and diagnosis, and failure compensation). 
Thus, changes were made to the originally 
proposed model in order to accomodate 
specific characteristics of process plants. 
In addition, the model does not explicitly 
incorporate a mechanism to distinguish 
between 	state- 	and 	structure-oriented 
responses. 
KARL's performance in controlling PLANT 
was compared with that of human subjects. 
Overall, the comparison was favorable in 
terms of such performance measures as plant 
output and plant stability. An action-by-
action comparison between KARL and subjects 
revealed, however, two major systematic 
differences: first, subjects tended to be 
more conservative in terms of selecting lev-
els of system input and output, and second, 
KARL tended to adjust input and output more 
frequently than subjects. These findings 
were probably a result of differences between 
subjects' underlying performance goals and 
KARL's goals. KARL possessed mechanisms that 
always tried to maximize plant production, a 
strategy which it, unlike subjects, pursued 
inflexibly. Consequently, KARL tended to be 
more extreme in terms of accurately following 
procedures. 
Knaeuper and Morris [8] attempted to use 
KARL as an on-line aid to subjects control-
ling PLANT. In light of the difficulties 
PLANT subjects had in accurately assessing 
situations and following appropriate pro-
cedures [9] and since KARL was good at these 
activities, the use of KARL as an on-line aid 
was a logical extension. KARL provided three 
types of aid: 1) situation assessment (i.e., 
identification of the appropriate procedure). 
2) guidance in following procedures, and 3) 
performance feedback. Comparing performance 
of subjects who received help from KARL to 
those who performed unaided, the aided sub-
jects maintained a higher level of plant sta-
bility, scored higher on a paper-and-pencil 
test of system knowledge, and were more suc-
cessful in diagnosing an unfamiliar system 
failure. 
As Knaeuper and Morris [8] indicate, the 
interpretation of the results is not 
straightforward. In fact, they conclude that 
although this experiment successfully demon-
strated the viability of the use of a model-
based performance aid, issues related to on-
line training and aiding are far from 
resolved. The framework outlined in this 
paper is an attempt to further investigate 
the use of a model-based performance aid in a 
different task domain. The next section, 
therefore, describes a simulated large scale 
system used to study human failure diagnosis 
performance. 
CAIN: A 5imulatecj Tara Scale System  
Two previous experiments [1,2] have con-
sidered human performance in the monitoring 
and control of a computer simulated large 
scale system. In the first experiment,  
subjects supervised an essentially context-
free representation of a large scale network 
called MABEL (Monitoring, Accessing, Brows-
ing, and Evaluating Limits). trying to optim-
ize such system parameters as number of cus-
tomers served and customer processing time 
while trying to diagnose system failures. In 
the second experiment, the MABEL scenario was 
substantially augmented to produce a higher 
fidelity system. This new scenario is called 
CAIN (Contextually Augmented Integrated Net- 
work). 	The remainder of this section pro- 
vides a brief overview of CAIN. 	The reader 
is referred to Henneman and Rouse [2] for 
more detail. 
Overview at CAIN  
CAIN is programmed in Pascal on a VAX 
11/780 computer and operates in real time. 
It is structured as a large hierarchical net-
work that can range in size from hundreds to 
thousands of nodes. Customers travel through 
the system from a randomly selected source 
node to a random destination. Subjects moni-
tor this system activity via a CRT display. 
When they detect a problem in the system 
(possibly due to a failure), subjects issue 
an appropriate command through a keyboard to 
correct and compensate for the abnormal 
situation. The overall objectives of the 
operator are: 1) to maximize the number of 
customers served, and 2) to minimize customer 
sojourn time. 
Because of the network size, it is not 
possible to display information about all 
nodes at one time. Thus, nodes are grouped 
into relatively small networks called clus-
ters. Human operators are restricted to 
viewing only one cluster at a time on the 
CAIN display. Clusters are grouped into 
hierarchic levels. 
effects a node failures 
Under 	normal 	circumstances. 	CAIN 
operates automatically without human inter-
vention. Since the system cannot automati-
cally diagnose and repair failures, the human 
must monitor the system looking for evidence 
of failed components. Node failures can 
occur in two ways. The first is a randomly 
occurring failure mode caused by malfunction-
ing equipment. The second type, capacity 
failure, can be caused by the randomly occur-
ring failures. Each node has a maximum 
number of customers that it can store at a 
time. If this limit is exceeded, the node 
fails. Thus, if a node fails randomly and a 
customer needs to visit that node, it will be 
retained at its previous node. This reten-
tion will cause the previous node to stop 
processing customers, which can lead to a 
capacity failure. In this way, if the opera-
tor does not locate failures quickly. the 
problems will propagate through the system. 
Addition Q context 
Although 	the 	physical 	hierarchical 
structure of MABEL was preserved, the addi-
tion of contextual information to CAIN 
required changing both interface and system 
characteristics. In CAIN, for example, each 





specific geographic location (for example, 
nodes in the highest level of the system are 
labelled Seattle, Chicago, Miami, etc.) In 
addition, the contextual fidelity was 
enhanced through the addition of associative 
links (i.e., memory aids) and cues (i.e., 
clues to the location of system problems). 
Associative links were formed by requiring 
subjects to reference nodes via their geo- 
graphic label 	Cues were formed by the 
introduction of context-dependent 	events, 
such as recurring failures and non-uniform 
loading 
A Model ol Human Performance in CAIN  
Building from the work of Rouse, Knae-
uper and Morris [5,6,81, a model is proposed 
in this section with the intent of supporting 
human performance in monitoring and control-
ling CAIN. First, some overall requirements 
of the model are specified. Second, a 
specific model is proposed, and finally, the 
way in which the model can be used as a per-
formance aid will be discussed. 
Overall requirements 
Before the model is proposed, several 
requirements that the model should meet are 
specified in this section. For example, in 
order to function as a performance aid. the 
model must be able to represent several dif-
ferent performance strategies. A result from 
Henneman and Rouse [2] indicated that sub-
jects discovered failures in CAIN using three 
modes of failure diagnosis: symptomatic, 
topographic, and serendipitous. Subjects 
using a topographic strategy trace failure 
symptoms from higher system levels to lower 
level causes. Subjects using a symptomatic 
strategy make a direct mapping from their 
system structure knowledge to the failed com-
ponent. A symptomatic diagnosis relies, 
therefore, on the subject's contextual 
knowledge of the system. Finally, subjects 
may also identify failures accidentally or 
serendipitously. When using this diagnosis 
mode, subjects locate failures while browsing 
through the system or while tracing the cause 
of a different failure. 
These failure diagnosis modes are depen-
dent upon an individual subject's understand-
ing of how the system operates as well as the 
subject's knowledge of the contextual rela-
tionship between system components. There-
fore, the model should incorporate an expli-
cit representation of both contextual 
knowledge and task knowledge. Moreover, the 
model should allow this contextual knowledge 
to be augmented over time as subjects gain 
performance expertise. 
Finally, the model should represent the 
way in which subjects prioritize sub-tasks in 
monitoring and controlling the network. Mul-
tiple system failures and the dynamic nature 
of the system may cause the operator to have 
several sub-tasks to perform at any one time. 
At one instant, for example, the system may 
have multiple failure symptoms on the 
display, heavy customer demands in one part 
of the system, and a failed node. The rela-
tive importance of each of these sub-tasks 
can vary with time. In some cases there will  
be clear-cut choices among alternatives while 
in other cases there will be indifference. ' 
It may be argued that the essence of good 
performance in this task is the subject's 
ability to prioritize sub-tasks that are 
present concurrently. An important goal of 
this model. therefore, is to represent sub-
task prioritization. 
In summary, underlying the development 
of this model is the demonstration of how a 
general representation of human problem solv-
ing [51 can be adapted to model human perfor-
mance in a complex large scale environment. 
More importantly. this model is to be used as 
an on-line performance aid. Unlike the work 
of Knaeuper and Morris [8] in which a perfor-
mance model was adapted post hoc to serve as 
an aid, the development of this model is 
motivated by the desire to use it as an on-
line aid. In order to achieve these underly-
ing goals, the model should flexibly support 
several performance strategies, explicitly 
represent contextual knowledge, and contain a 
mechanism to prioritize sub-tasks. 
A model 
A model that meets these requirements is 
shown in Figure 1. As in Knaeuper and 
Rouse's KARL [61, the model proposed here 
will be represented as a set of if-then rules 
organized into a hierarchical structure. The 
model contains two levels of activities. The 
lowest level of the model consists of the 
three stages of problem solving discussed by 
Rouse [51: recognition/classification, plan-
ning, and execution. Because multiple sub-
tasks may concurrently exist, the model can 
be operating in any of these stages. Thus, 
the highest level of the model contains a 
mechanism to prioritize the performance of 
sub-tasks in the three lower level stages. 
The remaining model component represents the 
Figure 1. A model of human performance in CAIN 
system (or contextual) knowledge needed to 
perform the task The following paragraphs 
will discuss each part of the model in more 
detail. 
Recognition/classification takes place 
when the subject identifies that an event has 
occurred or a situation exists. Examples 
include node failure, failure symptoms, 
abnormal customer demands, and normal situa-
tions. 
Once an event has been recognized and 
classified, the subject must develop an 
approach to improve the situation. A differ-
ence exists between planning at this level 
and the prioritization or the coordination of 
low level plans that occurs at the highest 
model level. Plans at this low level are 
best compared to simple scripts [10] or short 
sequences of actions. To illustrate, con-
sider a situation in which a subject observes 
an increasing queue size in a node. This 
event suggests that a failure exists in a 
lower system level; a suitable plan of action 
would be to 1) display the lower level clus-
ter, and 2) test the new cluster for failed 
components. 
After a suitable course of action is 
identified, the plan must be implemented. An 
analysis of the timing of subject's commands 
1111 indicated that these command sequences 
are frequently issued in rapid succession, 
suggesting that the plans are executed 
automatically with little conscious atten- 
tion. 	In the execution phase of this model 
these command sequences are issued. 	The 
assumption is made that once the sequence is 
started, it cannot be interrupted. 
These three phases - recognition/ clas-
sification, planning and execution - form 
the basis of activities implemented by the 
model. In general, the performance of each 
sub-task will progress sequentially through 
each of the three stages. Nevertheless, 
since multiple sub-tasks may exist, it is 
likely that this sequential process may be 
interrupted by a new sub-task of greater 
importance. As mentioned previously. the key 
to good performance in this task is the abil-
ity to prioritize sub-tasks. Thus, perhaps 
the most important feature of this model is 
the way in which activities are prioritized. 
Prioritization takes place in the highest 
model level. 
Two other components are included in the 
model, one of which is implicitly embedded 
within other model components, the other of 
which is explicitly represented. These two 
parts represent the knowledge necessary to 
perform the task: task knowledge and system 
knowledge. 
Task knowledge (analogous to Anderson's 
procedural knowledge [12]) encompasses the 
knowledge of how to do things, for example, 
how to diagnose a failed component. This 
knowledge will be embedded in the productions 
(or if-then rules) associated with the model 
components (i.e., prioritization, 
recognition/classification, and planning). 
System 	knowledge 	(analogous 	to 
Anderson's declarative knowledge [121) encom-
passes the knowledge of contextual relation-
ships among system components. For example, 
system knowledge might contain a fact like 
"Evanston is a second level city that is 
associated with Chicago." In addition to this 
static knowledge of system structure, system 
knowledge also encompasses facts that are 
related to the system dynamics. For example, 
the names of nodes with recurring problems or 
regions with high customer loading are likely 
to be remembered by subjects. In this model, 
these facts will be stored as system 
knowledge. This type of knowledge should 
only be accessed by the 
recognition/classification and prioritization 
model components. Planning and execution are 
performed independently of contextual 
knowledge. Methods of representing this task 
system knowledge are currently being investi-
gated [13], along with ways in which the sys-
tem knowledge can be augmented as subjects 
gain more expertise. 
The model ag AD Aid 
This section considers each of the model 
components and the roles they could play in 
providing performance assistance. 
Recognition/classification, for example. will 
indicate "trouble spots". i.e., regions with 
a greater liklihood of having a failure or 
heavy loading. When scanning a display, a 
subject can easily miss a salient cue. The 
model should be helpful in terms of indicat-
ing those cues that have the greatest likeli-
hood of reflecting a failure. 
The planning module can assist by tel-
ling operators what to do once they have 
recognized a situation. This information 
would be most useful for novice operators. 
Nevertheless, for some situations that are 
seen only infrequently, this advice would be 
useful for all operators. This lack of 
emphasis on procedural information is 
markedly different from the advice given by 
KARL to PLANT subjects (8]. A large part of 
the advice that KARL provided was procedural 
information. 
Probably the most important aid that the 
model can offer is in prioritizing sub-tasks. 
Certain situations are more critical than 
others; the model should be useful in identi-
fying those sub-tasks that are most impor-
tant. 
Other ways in which the aid should be 
used is by giving performance feedback and 
contextual information. As in the KARL-PLANT 
experiment [8], subjects should receive feed-
back relative to the success of their 
actions. In addition, since operators' sys-
tem knowledge is inevitably at various levels 
of completeness, the model should assist in 
augmenting the deficiencies. 
The biggest problem in using a model 
like the one proposed in this paper as an aid 
is the development of an effective interface 
between the model and the operator. Since 
the system state is constantly changing. the 
information provided by the aid will also be 
constantly changing. Advice that is relevant 
at one time may be erroneous after a few 
moments. At this time. it is unclear how to 
control the display of this information. 
Moreover, since the current CAIN display is 
already very crowded with verbal information, 
the addition of advice from a model-based aid 
may only serve to degrade performance by 
overloading the human's information process-
ing capbilities. Perhaps synthesized voice 
output would be a suitable means of present-
ing this advice. 
Future work 
On-line implementation of the model pro-
posed in this paper has just started- Future 
plans include the experimental evaluation of 
the model as an on-line performance aid. The 
proposed experiment should compare the task 
performance of two groups of subjects, one of 
which performs without the aid and the other 
with the aid. If the aid proves to be suc-
cessful, another experiment will evaluate the 
usefulness of individual model components of 
the aiding scheme. 
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ABSTRACT 
Human performance in monitoring and controlling large-scale, dynamic sys-
tems is considered. Initial efforts were directed at obtaining an empirical 
understanding of the relationship between the physical characteristics of a 
large-scale system and human performance. Results showed the very strong 
effect that number of levels and degree of interconnectedness can have on 
human performance. Later efforts formalized these empirical results into 
several measures of large-scale system complexity. Two dimensions of complex-
ity were proposed, measured, and evaluated: structural complexity results from 
the physical structure of the system, while strategic complexity results from 
an operator's understanding of the system. The knowledge gained from these 
engineering approaches was used to develop a behavioral model of the human 
operator in a large-scale environment. A comparison of the model's perfor-
mance to human performance indicated that the model was consistent with human 
behavior. The model was then used to provide cognitively plausible decision 
aid to the human operator. Results from this approach were promising in that 
they showed subtle performance improvement for the aided subjects. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent trends in automation have facilitated the creation of large, com-
plex engineering systems, such as communication networks [Henneman and Rouse 
1984b, 1986]. These systems are frequently represented as hierarchical net-
works that consist of a very large number of nodes connected by arcs. The net-
work size and degree of integration combine to create systems of potentially 
enormous complexity. Because of this complexity, computer technology is often 
used to control the systems. For example, the functions of a large-scale com-
mand and control network may depend on a distributed set of intelligent con-
trol systems. 
Although full automation often is appropriate during normal situations, 
control is likely to be transferred to a human operator during abnormal or 
infrequent events, e.g., system failures. In this way, the manner in which 
people interact with large systems is fundamentally being changed. The human 
operator is no longer in charge of the routine, continuous control of the sys- 
tem. 	Rather, the operator is mostly concerned with the unexpected, the 
unusual, and the non-routine aspects of system control. 	Requisite human 
skills for system control are shifting from psychomotor to problem solving 
[Wickens 1984]. 
The use of automation in control systems during normal operation raises 
questions about the human's ability to control the system during abnormal 
situations. Since operators infrequently interact with the system, their 
knowledge of the system dynamics, structure, and context may be inadequate to 
cope with the complex task demands of abnormal situations. This problem is 
especially critical in dynamic environments in which the state of the system 
is time-varying; timely resolution of crisis situations is dependent upon the 
human's ability to retrieve and use relevant task knowledge quickly. In addi-
tion, in a context-rich environment the human's problem solving performance is 
also dependent on the human's internal representation of that contextual 
knowledge. 
This report considers human performance in monitoring and controlling 
large-scale systems by reporting the methods, results, and conclusions of a 
series of four experiments within a particular environment. Initial efforts 
were directed at obtaining an empirical understanding of the relationship 
between the characteristics of a large-scale system and human performance. 
Later efforts formalized these empirical results into several measures of 
large-scale system complexity. Finally, the knowledge gained from these 
engineering approaches was used to develop a behavioral model of the human 
operator in a large-scale dynamic environment. This model formed the basis of 
an approach to aiding the human operator. The report roughly follows this 
chronology. 
II. SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE 
A. Characteristics Of Large-Scale Systems 
When considering human performance in interacting with a complex system, 
difficulty often arises in trying to exercise adequate experimental control 
over the characteristics of the real system. A variety of exogenous variables 
may mask the true effect of the variable of interest. Moreover, due to cost 
constraints, it is often difficult to make the changes in system characteris-
tics necessary to elicit variations in human performance. For example, if in 
a large scale system the variable of interest is the number of levels in the 
system, it is infeasible to alter the structure of a real system. Thus, a 
common approach to studying human performance in interacting with a complex 
system is to use a computer-based simulated abstraction of the real system. 
Two simulations, MABEL and CAIN, were developed for the purposes of this 
study. MABEL is a relatively context-free representation of a large scale sys-
tem in which a human operator is required to monitor and control the real time 
functioning of the system. By issuing commands, the operator accesses and 
displays activities within various parts of the hierarchical system, acquires 
information about the current system state, and issues control actions (e.g., 
component repairs and load shedding) when required. A subject's major task in 
MABEL is to diagnose and repair failed components. The CAIN system is struc-
turally isomorphic to MABEL; the difference is that CAIN is contextually aug-
mented, representing the nationwide telephone system. 
In order to provide a context for the simulations, experiments, and 
results presented in this report, the next section describes the general 
features of two existing large-scale systems, the nationwide telephone system 
of AT&T and the U.S. Army's Communications-Electronics Management System. The 
purpose is to present physical characteristics of these real systems and to 
describe ways in which people interact with the systems. 
1. Examples of Large-Scale Systems 
The nationwide telephone system [AT&T; Ash and Mummert 1984; Mocenigo and 
Tow 1984] has functioned until recently as a five-level hierarchical network 
composed of more than 170 million telephones and more than 22000 switching 
centers. The network consists of two basic elements: transmission and switch-
ing. The transmission elements are the actual communication paths that mes-
sages take through the system; the switching stations serve to interconnect 
calls economically. 
A major feature of the system is its high degree of automation. Messages 
are sent through the system hierarchy via direct or alternate paths that have 
been pre-determined. The system operates under normal conditions without any 
manual intervention. The switching stations, serving as repositories of net-
work intelligence, automatically perform such tasks as 1) determination of 
source, destination, and path through the network; 2) testing of lines for 
busy conditions before establishing a path; and 3) continual checking of cir-
cuit conditions. 
Nonetheless, human monitoring and maintaining of the system is still a 
necessity. During overload situations or in the case of major equipment 
failures, network performance can degrade rapidly. Human network controllers 
must intervene when the automatic solutions are excessively expensive or when 
a problem arises requiring human judgement. To deal with these situations, 
two general categories of control exist -- expansive and protective [Ash and 
Mummert 1984]. Expansive controls increase the network capacity by providing 
substitute or alternate routes for calls that are blocked. Protective con-
trols reduce the number of calls entering a congested portion of the network 
or reduce the number of routing alternatives. Thus, the human operator can 
implement these controls by cancelling alternate routing, rerouting calls, 
issuing line load controls, and playing recorded announcements. 
Recently the national phone network of AT&T altered its structure consid-
erably. Instead of being structured hierarchically as explained above, a new 
approach called Dynamic Nonhierarchical Routing (DNHR) is being used [Ash and 
Mummert 1984]. The system is termed dynamic because a call may be routed over 
different paths at different times of the day to take advantage of spare net-
work capacity. The system is termed nonhierarchical because switches are no 
longer separated into a hierarchy of different classes; they are equivalent in 
function. In short, any call may be routed through any part of the network to 
reach its destination. 
As Mocenigo and Tow [1984] point out, managing the DNHR network is analo-
gous to finding "a moving needle in a moving haystack" due to the increased 
dynamic nature of the system. Recent research efforts at AT&T have been 
directed towards introducing a higher degree of intelligence into the system, 
thus automating the system to an even greater degree. As Mocenigo and Two 
note, however, it will not be possible to eliminate the role that the human 
monitor must play in this system, largely due to the problems that system 
failures create. 
A very different type of large-scale system, the Army's Communications-
Electronics Management System (C-EMS) [U.S. Army 1977a, 1977b], is designed as 
a means to meet the communications requirements of the battlefield. Due to 
the dynamic nature of its environment, the system lacks the permanence and the 
level of automation of the nationwide phone system. In addition, since the 
military must be mobile during combat operations, a high degree of engineering 
and planning is required to produce an integrated, effective system. During a 
battle, for example, parts of the network may be damaged or communication 
units may change locations. The system must be able to respond quickly to 
these changing resource capacities and network configurations. 
The C-EMS is composed physically of several different forms of communica-
tion device. Although the telephone network described above is composed 
largely of phone-related equipment, the C-EMS network may consist of radio, 
wire and cable systems, radio-wire integrated systems, messenger services, and 
visual and sound communications. These system components typically are 
arranged hierarchically in a manner similar to that of the phone network. 
Each device is referred to as a node. The specific system requirements are 
dependent upon the type of information to be transmitted, the form in•which it 
will be received, and the security and speed required. Thus, not only is the 
C-EMS more mobile and less automated than the nationwide phone system, but it 
can also be described as less homogeneous. 
2. MABEL 
MABEL (Monitoring, Accessing, Browsing, and Evaluating Limits) [Henneman 
and Rouse 1984b; Henneman 1985a] is programmed in Pascal on a VAX 11/780 com-
puter and operates in real time. It is structured as a large network that can 
range in size from hundreds to thousands of nodes. Customers travel through 
the system from a randomly selected source node to a random destination. Sub-
jects monitor this system activity via a CRT display. When they detect a 
problem in the system (possibly due to a failure), subjects issue an 
appropriate command through a keyboard to correct and compensate for the 
abnormal situation. The overall system objectives are: 1) to maximize the 
number of customers served, and 2) to minimize the time it takes for customers 
to travel between their source and destination nodes. 
The following sections discuss MABEL in more detail. Emphasis is placed 
on the structure of MABEL, the operator interface, and typical system opera-
tion. 
,System structure. Several elements are basic to the structure of MABEL. 
A node represents the smallest structural unit in the network. Customers are 
processed at nodes with service times following an exponential distribution. 
Each customer is passed from node to node, following a path that will minimize 
its expected time in the system. If a node in a customer's path is currently 
busy, the customer joins a waiting line at that node until the node becomes 
idle. 
As mentioned above, MABEL can consist of hundreds or thousands of nodes. 
It is impossible for the human operator to perceive and process information 
about all of the nodes at one time. On a more practical level, it is impossi-
ble to display information about all of these nodes at one time. Thus, nodes 
are grouped into relatively small networks called clusters. Human operators 
are restricted to viewing only one cluster at a time on the MABEL display. 
These clusters are grouped into hierarchical levels. A customer typi-
cally enters the system through a cluster in the lowest level. The customer 
proceeds through that cluster to a node that connects to a cluster in the next 
higher level. This process repeats until the customer reaches the top level 
of the system. At this point, the process reverses: the customer travels 
through a cluster and then "jumps" down to the next lower level. The process 
repeats until the customer reaches his destination. 
Thus, as noted above, the system is analogous to a telephone communica-
tions system. Imagine a hypothetical three level network in which a call is 
placed from Americus, GA to Mason City, IA. The message first travels from 
Americus to Macon to Atlanta via a network of telephone lines and switching 
stations. The message then travels from Atlanta to Chicago. It is then 
transferred to Davenport, IA, and finally proceeds to Mason City. Atlanta and 
Chicago are at the highest level of the hierarchical system; Macon and Daven-
port are at the second level, while Americus and Mason City are at the lowest 
level. 
Customers initially arrive at a node in the lowest level in the system. 
These arrivals are scheduled according to a Poisson process. Routing through 
the system is completed automatically as determined by a shortest path algo-
rithm. Thus, customers are routed through nodes that will minimize the time 
they spend in the system. 
Operator interface. Subjects obtain information about MABEL from a video 
display (Figure 1). The screen is divided into several sections. The upper 
right portion of the screen displays a cluster of nodes. The dim numbers to 
the left of each node identify the node, while the numbers inside each node 
represent the current queue size (the number of customers waiting to be 
served). This portion of the screen is updated approximately every two 
seconds. A different cluster of nodes is viewed by entering an appropriate 
command. 
The lower right portion of the screen is an aid to the user to identify 
the current displayed cluster. Each letter (A,B,C) represents a level in the 
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Figure I. MABEL Display 
Bright and dim characters are used to indicate the subject's current position 
in the hierarchy. A row of characters that is completely bright represents 
the cluster that is currently displayed on the screen. One bright character 
in a row of characters indicates the node above the currently displayed clus-
ter. In Figure 1, therefore, the displayed cluster is in Level B. This clus-
ter is beneath Node 7 of Level A. 
The upper left portion of the screen is used to display the current time. 
Time is updated approximately every three seconds. Since the system operates 
in real time, customers will keep arriving to the system whether any action is 
taken by the operator or not. 
The middle left portion is used to display a variety of user-requested 
information about the system. This information is input at the prompt "Your 
action:", located at the lower left part of the screen. Ten different com-
mands are available to the user. These can be grouped into four categories: 
access, monitor, diagnosis, and control. The ten different commands are sum-
marized in Table 1. 
Typical =am operation. Under normal circumstances, MABEL will operate 
automatically without any interference from the human monitor. When a node 
failure occurs, however, the human must act to diagnose and repair it. Node 
failures can occur in two ways: 
(1) Total failure due to malfunctioning equipment: in this case a node is 
unable to service any customers waiting at it. All customers waiting at 
ACCESS Commands  
d 	down one level 
u up one level 
MONITOR Commands 
monitor next level 
s 	system summary statistics 
c cluster summary statistics 
DIAGNOSTIC Commands  
t 	test displayed cluster 
for failures 
n node information 
CONTROL Commands 
✓ replace node 
1 	reduce load 
Table 1. MABEL Command Set 
the node are lost, thereby reducing the queue size to zero. 	Addition- 
ally, the node refuses to accept any customers from another node. These 
customers are retained at their previous node. Since they are unable to 
proceed, the situation may lead to the following type of failure. 
(2) Failure due to exceeding the capacity of the node: each node has a max-
imum number of customers that it can "store" at any one time -- that is, 
each node has a maximum queue size. If this queue size is exceeded, the 
node fails. Its behavior after this point is identical to equipment 
failures. The node is unable to accept customers and, thus, new custo-
mers are retained at their old node. Once a failure occurs, therefore, 
it is likely to lead to other failures. In the extreme case, if nothing 
is done to repair failed nodes, the entire system will fail. 
It is, of course, also possible for this type of failure to be induced 
simply by trying to service too many customers, i.e., the system is trying to 
handle too much of the load. In this case, customers arrive at a node at a 
rate faster than the node can service them. 
Subjects locate failures by monitoring critical system states and testing 
suspect nodes or clusters of nodes. If a failure is found, the subject 
dispatches a crew to repair the node. If the system becomes too crowded with 
customers, the subject can issue a command to reduce the number of customers 
admitted to the system. 
3. CAIN 
Certain features of MABEL were substantially changed to develop CAIN 
(Contextually Augmented Integrated Network) ilienneman and Rouse 1986; Henneman 
1985a]; however, the underlying structure of CAIN is identical to that of 
MABEL. 	CAIN, however, is contextually augmented. The simulation has a much 
higher level of fidelity in that the addition of context produces a simulation 
with a much stronger resemblance to a real system. 
Thus, although the physical hierarchical structure of MABEL was 
preserved, the addition of contextual information to CAIN required changing 
some features of the interface. In the MABEL scenario, for example, all nodes 
on a display page are identified by a number on the CRT display. Each 
displayed node in a cluster, therefore, is physically identical to nodes in 
other clusters. The MABEL interface has a generic quality in that all subsys-
tems are visually similar; no contextual cues exist. On the other hand, nodes 
in CAIN are identified via specific geographic locations. Thus a node in 
MABEL with the label "9" might be labeled "Chicago" in CAIN. A typical CAIN 
display is shown in Figure 2. 
Simply introducing geographic names as node labels is not enough, how-
ever, to alter subject task performance. A small experiment (n=3) replicated 
the first MABEL experiment, with the exception that nodes were given geo- 
graphic names. 	Subjects still referred to nodes by number only; contextual 
labels were present but not needed to perform the task. 	No significant 
difference was found in terms of performance between subjects using the two 
task scenarios. This result suggests that the addition of context must be 
such that it provides associative links (i.e., memory aids) or cues (i.e., 
clues to the location of problems within the system) through which subject 
performance is enhanced or task difficulty is decreased. 
Associative links. The formation of associative links in CAIN is facili-
tated by the way in which a subject identifies a node. In CAIN nodes are 
referred to by geographic labels only, never by number. Subjects may input 
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Figure 2. CAIN Display 
the shortest string of characters that uniquely identifies the node from all 
other nodes in the system. Thus, "Denver" may be abbreviated "den". Most 
nodes can be identified with a three or four character substring of the com-
plete name. In addition, the number of elements on a display page is kept 
constant at 16 so that the contextual information is invariant. 
To illustrate the effect this change has on the subject's task, consider 
the command that displays a lower level cluster. In MABEL, the subject inputs 
the command "d2," which displays the cluster beneath node 2. In CAIN, on the 
other hand, the subject types "dSanf," which displays the cities beneath San 
Francisco (e.g., Berkeley, San Jose). Thus, subjects can form associations or 
links between system parts due to the existence of contextual information. 
Subjects can use these learned associative links to maneuver through the 
CAIN display hierarchy. In MABEL movement between display pages is con-
strained to the cluster of nodes immediately above or below the current 
display. Thus, it is not possible to jump laterally across the network. In 
CAIN, however, it is possible to move from one part of the system to any other 
part. For example, if a subject recalls that the cluster associated with Ban-
gor, Maine, was previously experiencing problems, it is simple to call up that 
particular cluster display. In addition, subjects can always return immedi-
ately to the highest level in the system. 
Cues. The formation of cues in CAIN is provided by the introduction of 
context-dependent events. These events are of one of two types: recurring 
failures and nonuniform loading. Although equipment in nodes fails randomly, 
some equipment experiences a higher probability of failure. For example, a 
thunderstorm in Little Rock, Arkansas, may make equipment in that city suscep-
tible to lightning damage. Similarly, given that incidents of vandalism are 
more likely to occur in Newark, New Jersey than Council Bluffs, Iowa, there is 
a greater chance of equipment damage in Newark. Therefore, equipment in cer-
tain cities exhibits a greater tendency to fail than in other cities. Sub-
jects are informed of these locations via warning alarms that appear on the 
bottom of the display. Subjects can directly monitor activities within these 
trouble spots via a special "watch" command. 
Besides recurring failures, another type of context-dependent event 
present in CAIN is nonuniform loading. At different times, some sections of 
the system may be prone to heavy loading. For example, certain times of day 
are busier in one part of the country than in others. Similarly, a major pol-
itical or sports event in one section of the country may increase the number 
of messages sent. As with the recurring failures, subjects are told the loca-
tion of these increased loads via a message at the bottom of the screen. Sub-
jects can then reduce the number of customers admitted to the overloaded sub-
system. 
In summary, despite the structural ismorphism of the two simulations, 
CAIN represents a significant departure from the context-free scenario of 
MABEL. Through the addition of contextual detail and the addition of events 
that are dependent upon this contextual information, the simulation fidelity 
has been increased significantly. 
4. Issues 
Initial efforts in this research program were to gain an understanding of 
the relationship between physical characteristics of a system and human per-
formance in monitoring and controlling such a system. For example, informa-
tion displays for computer-based large-scale systems are frequently con-
strained by their size: only a limited amount of information may be displayed 
at one time. Thus, the number of elements of a system presented at one time 
may affect the ability of the operator to perceive relevant system state 
information both rapidly and accurately. 
Another system characteristic that may affect human monitoring and con-
trol performance is the number of hierarchic levels. A system with multiple 
levels may have a very strong effect, for example, on the length of time 
needed for a human operator to find a failed component. Although some gui-
dance exists within the literature relative to trade-offs between depth and 
breadth in static display menu hierarchies [llaap and Roske-Bofstrand 1986], 
little guidance exists for dynamic systems. Finally, another system charac- 
teristic of interest is the rate at which system components fail. If the main 
role of the human operator in a large dynamic system is to diagnose failures, 
an important issue is whether or not humans can change their control stra-
tegies to adapt to changes in the quality (or reliability) of individual sys-
tem components. These system characteristics (display size, number of levels, 
and component failure rate) were considered in Experiment One. 
B. Experiment One: Empirical Analysis 
1. Method 
Twelve volunteer subjects were initially exposed to MABEL by a set of 
written instructions [Henneman and Rouse 19841)]. These instructions contained 
a detailed explanation of the overall structure and normal operation of MABEL, 
a summary of the commands, and an explanation of the subject's role in operat-
ing MABEL during off-normal situations. Summary sheets of this information 
were also available. A quiz verified subjects' understanding of the effects 
of failures on system performance. 
Training concluded with a special version of MABEL that allowed subjects 
to stop the execution of the program at any time during the experimental run. 
This training version of MABEL had the advantages of allowing subjects to 
become familiar with the commands and become aware of the effects of failures 
on both display features and system performance without being overwhelmed by 
the progressive effects of failures. If a situation became too complex, the 
subject could simply halt the dynamic system, solve the problem, and proceed. 
Subjects supervised two different training scenarios: a system with 16 
nodes/cluster and 2 levels, and a system with 9 nodes/cluster and 3 levels. 
The experiment had three independent variables: cluster size (i.e., 
number of nodes per display) and number of levels functioned as within-subject 
factors and failure rate served as a between-subjects factor. Cluster size 
varied between 4, 9, and 16 nodes; number of levels varied between 2 and 3. 
Failure rate was defined as the probability that a randomly selected node in 
the system would fail during each iteration of the MABEL program. One itera-
tion occurred after each activity in the network (for example, the arrival of 
a new customer to the system). Failure rate was either low (probability of 
failure/iteration = .0005) or high (probability of failure/iteration = .0010). 
The six subjects in each group controlled six systems corresponding to all 
possible combinations of cluster size and number of levels. The order of 
presentation to subjects was balanced in order to average out any residual 
training effect. 
Performance was assessed in several ways. The measures can be broadly 
grouped into two categories, namely, product and process [Henneman and Rouse 
1984a]. Product measures assess the final result of a problem solving session 
(such as number of customers served) and, thus, assess system-human perfor-
mance. Process measures, on the other hand, assess how that result was 
obtained by evaulating individual steps in a subject's strategic approach to 
supervising the system. 
The product measures calculated the length of time customers spend in the 
system (mean sojurn time) and the number of customers served during an experi-
mental run. (These measures were normalized to account for inherent differ-
ences that exist among the different experimental system configurations. 
Henneman and Rouse I1984b] provide a description of this bias-correcting pro-
cedure.) Process measures were classified into three types: 1) errors (e.g., 
number of times a subject viewed a failed node but did not repair it), 2) 
failure diagnosis (mean time to diagnose a failure and the fraction of 
failures found), and 3) strategy (e.g., mean amount of time spent accessing, 
monitoring, diagnosing or controlling). 
2. Results 
Analyses of variance were performed to determine the effect of the 
independent variables (cluster size, number of levels, and failure rate) on 
each of the dependent measures. Overall trends within the product measures of 
performance were very consistent: performance degraded with increasing number 
of levels and improved with increasing display size. The effect of number of 
levels was very strong, producing up to a 5-fold degradation in level of per-
formance. This effect was expected: the greater the percentage of nodes hid-
den from view, the greater the difficulty subjects experienced in supervising 
the system. For instance, the three-level systems resulted in substantially 
longer times to diagnose failures. Since it took more time for the effects of 
lower level failures to become obvious at the higher levels, the effects 
tended to be more serious than in the two-level systems. This lengthened 
diagnosis time tended to degrade most other performance dimensions. 
A trend not predicted was that increasing cluster size would lead to 
improved performance. One would suspect that larger numbers of nodes per 
display should lead to increased task complexity. Thus, as the number of com-
ponents that the human must deal with increases, performance should degrade. 
This is not the case with MABEL. A main reason for this result is that the 
larger systems are inherently more reliable than the smaller systems: the 
small systems contain fewer alternate paths between nodes through which custo-
mers can be rerouted following a failure. Thus, customers tend to be retained 
more frequently at nodes when they have fewer alternate paths through the sys-
tem. This system characteristic also accounts for the shorter failure diag-
nosis times found in the small cluster size systems: failures and their symp-
toms propagate faster in the small systems. 
Failure rate did not play a role in shaping performance except with 
respect to the measures of strategy, e.g., the percent of time subjects spent 
performing different activities (accessing, monitoring, diagnosing, and con-
trolling). Results suggested the prevalence of two basic strategies for 
supervisory control of MABEL. One strategy involved staying at higher levels 
and using monitor commands to assess the state of lower levels. The other 
strategy involved actually accessing the lower levels and performing tests to 
diagnose failures. Subjects with low failure rate conditions tended to select 
the former strategy, while subjects with high failure rate conditions tend to 
select the latter strategy. Apparently both strategies were effective in that 
performance was independent of failure rate. Thus, it appears that subjects 
could adopt strategies to compensate for decreased reliability of individual 
system components, but not for the more resource-constrained networks. 
C. Experiment Two: Measuring Complexity 
The initial experiment considered the relationship between several physi-
cal characteristics of a large-scale system and human performance. A second 
experiment addressed this relationship more quantitatively by evaluating 
several measures of task complexity. Based on a review of the literature 
[Henneman and Rouse 1986], two measures of complexity relevant to the task of 
human monitoring and control a large-scale systems were proposed. Two dom-
inant perspectives were identified within the complexity literature as being 
particularly relevant to this discussion, namely, that of the systems 
scientist and that of the behavioral scientist. 
Most studies of complexity performed by systems scientists are on a 
context-free or theoretical level. Although much work has gone into defining 
and measuring system complexity, little has been done to assess the implica-
tions of complexity. Furthermore, while humans must play an important role in 
many large-scale systems (e.g., failure diagnosis and network management), 
little research has investigated the relationship between large-scale system 
complexity and human performance. Finally, due to the strong theoretical fla-
vor of the systems science approach, it is often difficult to see its applica-
tion to real-world systems. 
On the other hand, studies of complexity performed by behavioral scien-
tists are on a very applied level. Although the approach often lacks the 
mathematical rigor of the systems approach, complexity is always related to 
some aspect of human performance. Unfortunately, differences between tasks 
and complexity measures cause difficulty in generalizing results across con-
texts. Moreover, the small, well-defined nature of the tasks seems to have 
little relation to human performance in large-scale system. 
The research described in the remainder of this section attempts to 
integrate several perspectives concerning the nature of complexity, as well as 
illustrate the impact of this conceptualization of complexity on human perfor-
mance in CAIN. Complexity is viewed as being a result of both the structure 
of the system and the human operator's understanding of the system. Complex-
ity is also considered in terms of its relation to both system performance and 
human performance. Thus, both nonbehavioral and behavioral approaches are 
taken into account. 
In this report, the complexity of a large-scale system is described in 
terms of: 1) the physical structure of the system and 2) operators' under-
standing of the system as reflected by their strategy. From this perspective, 
a system that is complex or difficult to control for one operator may be rela-
tively easy to control for another operator. Similarly, the complexity of a 
system may vary with time for any particular operator. Some systems, however, 
may be complex regardless of any particular control strategy due to their 
inherent structural complexity. The following paragraphs propose two measures 
of complexity that incorporate these ideas. Structural complexity is con-
sidered first, followed by strategic complexity. 
1. Complexity measures 
Structural complexity. A one-to-one relationship exists between the 
simulated physical structure of CAIN and the actual structure of the display-
page hierarchy. Since the main control task in CAIN is to locate failures, a 
measure of structural complexity should assess the difficulty of finding 
failures given the physical arrangement of the system. A major constraint 
placed on an operator's ability to locate failures is the hierarchical display 
structure; thus, it seems reasonable that structural complexity can be 
estimated by calculating the total number of display pages the operator must 
view in order to repair all system failures. Assuming that the operator knows 
the location of all failures, this measure represents the minimum number of 
pages necessary to find all system failures. Therefore, the structural com-
plexity measure represents optimal performance given the constraints of the 
structure or arrangement of the system components. Operator performance 
affects this measure only in that individual operators may have more or fewer 
failures depending upon their fault finding ability. 
To illustrate how this measure is calculated, consider the system in Fig-
ure 3. This hypothetical system contains four nodes per display page and has 
three levels. Each group of four rectangles represents a cluster of nodes 
(i.e., one display page). For clarity, only those clusters of nodes that 
enter into the complexity calculation are shown. The darkened rectangles 
represent nodes that have failed. In this example, therefore, three failures 
exist within the system: two on the second level and one on the third level. 
The structural complexity measure is determined by counting the number of 
display pages that must be viewed in order to find all failures. The counting 
method assumes a strategy based on tracing higher level symptoms to their 
lower level causes. (Context—specific cues might, of course, allow operators 
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Figure 3. Example calculation of structural complexity. 
to locate failures in fewer pages.) Thus, the counting method assumes that 
after locating all failures along one subsystem branch, the subject returns to 
the highest system level to search the next branch (a depth-first strategy). 
Figure 3 is self-explanatory: to repair all three failures in the system, an 
operator must view at least six display pages. The final return to the top 
system level is not counted into the measure because it would simply add one 
to all estimates. 
Strategic complexity. The strategic complexity measure explicitly con-
siders operator performance. When operators are deciding which path through 
the system is most likely to lead to finding a failure, they make a tradeoff 
between their uncertainty concerning the state of a subsystem display page 
(i.e., queue lengths) and their expectations of finding a failure in that sub-
system. High uncertainty about a subsystem may be acceptable, for example, if 
a relatively low probability exists of finding a failure on that display page. 
On the other hand, high subsystem uncertainty may be unacceptable if a very 
high probability exists of finding a failure.' 
State uncertainty U is defined as the real time elapsed since a particu-
lar display page was last tested for failures. Probability of failure is 
defined as the probability that a failure exists within a cluster, given the 
state of the display X, and is denoted by p[F1X). For example, when a subject 
views a particular display page, features of that display provide information 
about the existence of failures in other subsystems (e.g., a large queue size 
' Of course, the acceptance of uncertainty will also vary as a function of 
the consequences of a failure. If, for example, a failure is likely to lead 
soon to another failure, high uncertainty about that subsystem would be unac-
ceptable. Subjects, however, do not have any knowledge of these possibly 
unequal probabilities. Thus, it is reasonable to assume equal effects of 
failures for this discussion. 
suggests a lower level failure.) Experimental data files were replayed in 
order to estimate these probabilities empirically. These probabilities were 
determined by dividing the frequency with which a display state reflected a 
failure by the frequency with which a particular display state (i.e., queue 
length) was viewed by an operator. Sets of probabilities were calculated for 
different system configurations (2 vs. 3 levels and high vs. low redundancy) 
and different loading rates (e.g., a system with a low loading rate has fewer 
customers in service and, hence, lower threshold or queue size will reflect 
failures). 
The measure of strategic complexity multiplies these two measures (state 
uncertainty and probability of failure given the system state) and sums the 
product across all clusters in the system: 
strategic complexity *5.: U( i) * p[FIX(i)] 
where U(i) is the time since last accessing display page i; X(i) is the state 
of page i reflected by the display one level higher; p[FIX(i)] is the proba-
bility of failure given state i; and F denotes "failure." Strictly speaking, 
this conceptualization results in strategic complexity having units of 
seconds. The U(i) values are really just "proxy" measures [Keeney and Raiffa 
1976] of complexity, however, and thus, strategic complexity is left unitless. 
When a subject descends to a lower level, the p[FIX(i)1 remain fixed for 
the previous level. When a subject returns to the higher level, the p[FIX(i)] 
value associated with the just-visited lower-level clusters is set to zero. 
Thus, when an operator descends to a lower-level subsystem and tests for 
failures, the strategic complexity measure is simultaneously increased by the 
"new" uncertainty (i.e., increased U(i)) present in the other lower-level sub-
systems and decreased by the certainty (i.e., U(i) 11. 0) now associated with 
Monitor Display  
Cluster 	Number of customers 
Denver 	 8 
Los Angeles 	5 
Chicago 	 1 
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the current level. 
To illustrate how the strategic complexity measure is determined, con-
sider the display in Figure 4. This system contains four nodes per display 
page and has two levels. The operator is viewing the highest level page in 
the display hierarchy and is monitoring activity in the next level of the sys-
tem. The operator can gather information about activity in the second level 
of the system from two sources in this example: the cluster display and the 
data displayed via the monitor command. The monitor command lists the number 
of customers in the clusters one level below; the cluster display shows the 
number of customers waiting at all nodes in the current cluster. 
Each of these pieces of information reflects the probability that a 
failure has occurred in a lower level cluster. These probabilities (which are 
plausible but hypothetical) are listed in Table 2. For example, the queue 
size of 15 in Denver reflects a relatively high probability (0.75) that a 
Figure 4. Example monitor and cluster display for calculation 
of strategic complexity. 
Cluster U P(FIX] U x Win 
uncertainty monitor 	cluster 
Denver 20.12 .600 	.750 15.090 
Los Angeles 0.54 .100 	.015 .054 
Chicago 7.36 .001 	.001 .007 
New York 9.12 .001 	.050 .456 
Strategic Complexity 15.607 
Table 2. Example Calculation of Strategic Complexity 
failure exists in level two. Similarly, the monitor command reports that 
eight customers are currently in the cluster beneath Denver; these eight cus-
tomers reflect a 0.60 probability that a failure exists. The operator has not 
tested the cluster beneath Denver for failures for U(Denver) = 20.12 s. Using 
the information that reflects the highest probability of failure (i.e., from 
the cluster display) results in the following measure of strategic complexity 
for the Denver region: 
U(Denver) * p[FIx(Denver)) = 20.12 * 0.75 
= 15.09 
This procedure is then repeated for the other clusters in the network and the 
measures are added together. In this way the total strategic complexity is 
determined to be 15.61. 
In this example, it should be noted that Denver makes a large contribu-
tion to the strategic complexity measure for two reasons: first, the operator 
has a high degree of uncertainty concerning the Denver subsystem in that it 
has not been tested for failures in 20.12 s. Second, the display reflects a 
very high probability (0.75) that a failure exists in the Denver subsystem. 
The combination of these two factors leads to a very high measure of strategic 
complexity for the Denver subsystem. On the other hand, the other subsystems 
have either a low uncertainty measure or a low probability of failure. Thus, 
as shown in Table 2, their contribution to strategic complexity is small. 
Dependent measure la .complexity. The literature review also suggested 
that an appropriate dependent measure of complexity is the time to failure 
diagnosis. In the context of CAIN, this measure is the mean time from when a 
failure occurs to when the subject issues a repair command for a failed node. 
Since the two independent complexity measures vary with time and since there 
are multiple repairs occurring in conjunction with the assessment of the vari-
ables, it was necessary to use a dependent measure that also changes with 
time. Average time, therefore, includes the diagnosis time for the current 
repair plus diagnosis times for the four previous repairs. 
To summarize, the structural measure reflects an inherent characteristic 
of the network, namely, the number of display pages necessary to find all the 
failures in the system. The strategic measure, on the other hand, reflects 
temporal aspects of subjects' strategies, i.e., subjects' paths through the 
network. From this perspective, the strategic measure reflects the complexity 
resulting from a particular strategy. 
Although the two complexity measures proposed here may have some general 
applicability (in particular, the measure of strategic complexity is appealing 
due to its temporal nature), it is not the intent of this work to suggest or 
prove that these measure are true indices of task complexity. The goal 
instead is to show in a pragmatic sense that these two dimensions represent a 
useful distinction relative to task complexity. These measures are a com-
venient means to demonstrate data distinction. 
2. Method 
The main goal of Macperimemt Sao was to imvestigate the mature of complier-
ity in a large-scale kommormachime system. As emphasized im the precetimg 
section, the general asommptina is made that task complexity *am only be mess-
ured relative to an imdimidmal's mederstamding of the system and expertise in 
dealing with problems sun' that system. Ilmo, complexity is considered ta be 
dynamic, varying acmes time and anon subjects. Accordimgly. as disonamed 
below, subjects were reqmired to perfume the teak (CAM) over a relatively 
long period of time. 
Results from the 	 One indicated that cloister size (=meat of 
nodes per display page) is RIMEL had as particularly strong effect om oaddiect 
task performance. Meamlts ammested that at 	clusters degraded performance 
because fewer connect 	 ; less redmodancy rammed 
failures to propagonelmoreqpirkIy..tether remelt from Raga:anent Ome shamed 
the very strong effect of smoker of hierarchical 'system levels cm kazoo pet-
formance. Thus, two imMegemdeot variables selected for fortber amalysio were 
the degree of redundancy tor connectivity among coopomemto) and the moniker of 
levels in the system. (Cluster size was kept constant at 26 in order to 
emphasize the norvaryimg feanures of the contextual display.) ReAmmismy or 
connectivity was defined as the member of commectious emanating from each 
node. Redundancy varied' between lam (mix commectiona ketmeem nodes) and 
(13 connections per mode). sad the umber of levels varied between mum amd 
three. 
Of interest in this experiment was the way in which complexity changes as 
subjects gain expertise. Thus, the order of presentation of experimental con-
ditions was not randomized. All subjects saw the same experimental conditions 
in the same order. A final independent variable, therefore, was the order of 
presentation of experimental conditions within each combination of number of 
levels and redundancy. 
Eight paid subjects were trained in three sessions via a combination of 
written instructions and hands-on experience with CAIN, similar to that used 
in Experiment One. Subjects completed the first two training sessions by con-
trolling a two-level CAIN system. The third training session was spent con-
trolling a three-level CAIN system. As in Experiment One, these sessions were 
performed using a version of CAIN that allowed subjects to start and stop the 
program execution. 
Summarizing the ten experimental sessions (S1-S10), they were performed 
in the following order (with the intent of increasing experimental diffi-
culty): S1 and S2 had two levels with high redundancy; S3, S4, and S5 had 
three levels with high redundancy; S6 and S7 had two levels with low redun-
dancy; and S8, S9, and S10 had three levels with low redundancy. Each experi-
mental session was performed on consecutive days and lasted about 45 minutes. 
3. Results 
Summary gi Anproacti. Data from this experiment were first analyzed using 
the same performance measures used in Experiment One, e.g., mean time to 
failure diagnosis and fraction of failures repaired. Overall results from the 
analysis of variance of subject performance measures supported those of Exper-
iment One. Measures of fault diagnosis performance were affected as expected 
by the independent variables. Increasing the number of system levels from two 
to three corresponded to a higher mean time to failure diagnosis. This result 
was largely because failures take longer to propagate upwards in the three-
level systems. In addition, failure-related symptoms take longer to emerge in 
highly interconnected networks; thus, the high redundancy systems resulted in 
longer mean times to diagnosis. The fraction of failures repaired by subjects 
was also significantly affected by increasing the number of levels: as the 
number of levels increased from two to three, the fraction of failures found 
decreased from 0.95 to 0.69. As in Experiment One, subjects had difficulty 
coping with the very large search space in the three-level systems. 
The data were also analyzed with the purpose of investigating relation-
ships between the complexity measures, the CAIN environment, and operator per-
formance. This investigation was accomplished in two ways. First, an 
analysis was undertaken of average or global measures of complexity (i.e., the 
complexity time series averaged over each experimental run). The effect of 
the experimental independent variables (number of levels and degree of inter-
connectivity between nodes) on the mean complexity measures was determined 
using analysis of variance. The relationship between the mean complexity 
measures and measures of subject failure-diagnosis performance was then 
assessed by using correlation analysis. As is discussed below, this analysis 
of mean complexity values provided explanations for differences that exist 
between different system configurations. 
The second way in which complexity was investigated involved using a 
fine-grained approach, namely, time-series analysis. Time-series analysis was 
selected due to the intrinsic time-varying nature of the independent and 
dependent complexity measures. This analysis provided insight into the way in 
which complexity evolves and affects different phases of the failure-diagnosis 
process. 
Due to the amount of time necessary to perform these analyses, the 
results are limited to Sessions 2, 5, 7, and 10. Data for the analyses were 
generated by replaying subject data files. Every three seconds (corresponding 
to the rate of display update), both complexity measures and the mean time to 
failure diagnosis were calculated. Mean values for all measures were calcu-
lated from these time series. 
Ana lysis 	Average complexity measures. The results of two ANOVAs using 
mean structural and strategic complexity measures as dependent measures and 
number of levels and degree of redundancy as independent measures are summar-
ized in this section. Structural complexity, as measured here, was decreased 
in two ways: 1) decreasing the number of system levels and 2) decreasing the 
number of system failures. 	The first way enables subjects to access fewer 
display pages in order to diagnose failures in the lowest system level. 	The 
second way is facilitated by increasing the network redundancy (i.e., increas-
ing the number of connections between nodes). As network redundancy 
increases, the mean number of node capacity failures decreases, which has the 
effect of decreasing the structural complexity measure. 
Strategic complexity, as measured here, may be decreased in three ways: 
1) using an effective strategy in terms of responding to symptoms, 2) decreas-
ing redundancy, and 3) decreasing number of levels (which causes symptoms to 
emerge more rapidly). Subjects tended to trace failures to the lowest system 
level only when a symptom (i.e., visual cue) appeared on the display, even if 
they had not viewed a particular region in a large period of time. Conse-
quently, when symptoms emerged slowly (as in the high-redundancy/three-level 
conditions), high uncertainty resulted. 	This uncertainty helped to create 
moderate to high strategic complexity. On the other hand, symptoms emerged 
more rapidly in the low-redundancy/two-level conditions. Since operators 
tended to wait for symptoms to emerge on the top-level display, low redundancy 
led to low values of strategic complexity. 
This dependence on visual cues has implications for the design of task 
performance aids. One possibility is to have aids that help people to over-
come their inability or reluctance to reduce system uncertainty despite the 
absence of failure symptoms. Alternatively, failure-related cues or symptoms 
could be enhanced so that operators naturally pursue leads sooner. 
These results provide insight to the overall characteristics of the two 
complexity measures and their relationship to subject fault diagnosis perfor-
mance. The measures are sensitive to variations among the system characteris-
tics of number of levels and degree of redundancy. In general, the more com-
plex systems have three rather than two levels. Although multiple system lev-
els might be desirable in that they allow supervision of large networks and 
protect upper levels from the effects of failures, they have the undesirable 
side effect of masking symptoms from operators, thereby increasing the com-
plexity of failure diagnosis. Multiple displays could possibly be used to 
reduce this complexity. The effect of redundancy on complexity depends on the 
type of complexity: more redundant systems (corresponding to less structural 
complexity) enhance the proper operation of the system by reducing the impact 
of failed components. On the other hand, more redundancy leads to increased 
strategic complexity (the complexity of failure diagnosis) due to the slower 
emergence of failure symptoms. 
Beyond the characteristics of these single complexity dimensions is 
another important conceptual and methodological issue: the multidimensional 
nature of complexity, i.e., the relationship between the independent and 
dependent measures of complexity. A correlation analysis between the two 
average complexity measures and the two independent measures indicated that 
when many failures exist in a system, the general tendency is for the complex-
ity measures to increase. At the same time, however, the mean time to failure 
diagnosis decreases. Thus, even though complexity may be large, failure-
diagnosis time may be small. 
This observation emphasizes the distinction mentioned previously between 
proper system functioning and the complexity of failure diagnosis. In a 
localized sense, control in a complex system is simple: no matter what the 
operator does, it will result in finding a problem (as reflected by short 
diagnosis times). In a global sense, however, control in a complex system is 
complex: so many problems may exist in the system that proper operation is 
endangered, as reflected by a low fraction of failures found. The operator, 
dealing with only a small part of the system at one time, may be oblivious to 
the scope of problems in the network. Another important issue is, therefore, 
the impact of a richly interconnected multiple-level system (that supports 
proper system functioning) on the complexity of human monitoring and control 
(that will degrade failure diagnosis performance). 
Analysis al fine,-grained sanninnitx measures Time-series analysis [Box 
and Jenkins 1976] was used to identify, estimate, and diagnostically check 
transfer functions that relate the two input complexity measures (structural 
and strategic) to the mean time to failure diagnosis. Each transfer function 
model predicted the current mean time to failure diagnosis through a linear 
combination of the complexity measures at various time lags. The essence of 
the modeling process was to determine the time lags to include in the model 
and the weight or relative contribution of each time-lagged variable to the 
predicted value. 
Overall, the approach was successful. The equations removed all struc-
ture from the autocorrelation function of the model residuals. Furthermore, a 
comparison of the sum of squares of the original dependent time series (i.e., 
mean time to failure diagnosis) to the sum of squares of the residuals showed 
that the transfer functions explained 82 to 97 percent of the variance within 
the original data. Nevertheless, wide differences in the lag and coefficient 
values in the models existed among both subjects and systems. 
A plausible explanation for these differences was derived by identifying 
certain characteristics of the task, the system, and the human related to the 
the process of failure diagnosis. For example, several different events are 
associated with the life cycle of each system failure: failure occurrence, 
symptom emergence, and failure diagnosis. Failure occurrence is when a part 
of the system fails. Symptom emergence is the time period between failure 
occurrence and the time a failure first affects any node that appears on the 
subject's video display. Failure diagnosis is the time period from failure 
occurrence to when a subject issues a repair command for a failed component. 
The timing of these events undoubtedly has some effect on the length of time 
needed to find the failure. Moreover, the system complexity at these event 
times might also affect failure diagnosis time. 
Besides the possibility that different events associated with the failure 
life-cycle affect diagnosis time, it is also reasonable that different types 
of diagnosis might affect failure diagnosis time. The diagnosis of any 
particular failure may be classified as one of three types: topographic, symp-
tomatic, or serendipitous. Subjects identifying failures using a topographic 
strategy trace failure symptoms from higher system levels to their causes in 
lower levels. Subjects identifying failures using a symptomatic strategy make 
a direct mapping from their knowledge of the system structure to the failed 
component. A symptomatic diagnosis relies, therefore, on the subject's con-
textual knowledge of the system. For example, when subjects make a jump from 
one cluster to another in the same level to repair a failure, their action 
suggests that their context-specific knowledge of the system is providing gui-
dance to system trouble areas. Finally, subjects may also identify failures 
accidentally or serendipitously. In this diagnosis mode, subjects locate 
failures while browsing through the system or while tracing the cause of a 
different failure. 
In summary, it is possible that several different types of failure-
related events (e.g., failure occurrence and symptom emergence) and several 
different modes of failure diagnosis (e.g., symptomatic, topographic, and 
serendipitous) affected the time to failure diagnosis within a system. In 
addition, due to the aforementioned averaging window of five failure-diagnosis 
times for the dependent complexity measure, it is possible for many lags (pos-
sibly quite long) to have entered the transfer function. From the perspective 
offered in the preceding paragraphs, therefore, the transfer functions relat-
ing the two complexity measure to failure diagnosis time were affected by 
types of failure-related event, modes of failure diagnosis, and the way in 
which diagnosis time were aggregated. 
These factors were considered analytically by replaying subject data 
files and comparing measures of the characteristics described above to the 
transfer functions. Results showed that the variables and lags present in the 
transfer function were reasonable, if not entirely explainable. The real-time 
values of lags frequently agreed with the mean inter-failure event times cal-
culated from subject data files. A comparison of these values suggested that 
recurring patterns of agreement existed between the lags and inter-event 
times. These recurring patterns were useful to explain the presence of both 
positive and negative terms in the transfer functions. Differences between 
time values can probably be accounted for by any of several reasons, including 
the high variability present within the data, the subjective nature of the 
modeling process, and the existence of events other than failure occurrence or 
symptom emergence (e.g., diagnosis time for a particular system level or sub-
system) that affected parameters in the transfer functions. 
These results demonstrate how two different dimensions of complexity, 
structural and strategic, can be related to human fault-diagnosis skill in a 
large-scale system. The exact nature of the two measures is relatively unim-
portant beyond a certain degree of intuitive validity. The importance of 
these results, however, lies in the demonstration that the complexity measures 
were dependent upon the number of failures in the system and the rate at which 
their symptoms emerge. These factors were highly dependent upon both system 
characteristics (i.e., number of levels and degree of redundancy) and subject 
strategy. Of equal importance is the demonstration that the complexity meas-
ures related to performance in a time-varying manner, and the nature of this 
time-varying manner was highly dependent upon events that occurred within the 
system and the strategy of individual subjects. 
D. Conclusions 
The experiments, results, and conclusions up to this point have con-
sidered the relationship between the design of a large-scale system and human 
monitoring and control behavior. System characteristics such as number of 
levels and degree of interconnectedness can have a very strong effect on the 
ability of humans to maintain proper system operation in the presence of 
failures. Since the normal system operation tends to be affected in the oppo-
site direction in the presence of the same design characteristics, system 
designers must be careful to create environments that support both system and 
human performance. 
Straightforward measures were used to assess the complexity of a large 
scale system as it relates to the task of monitoring and control. Complexity, 
as discussed in this report, is a dynamic property of a human-machine system. 
Complexity varies with time and it varies among operators. Furthermore, com-
plexity is multidimensional: two dimensions of complexity (i.e., structural 
and strategic) have been proposed, and it appears that this distinction is 
useful both conceptually and practically. Complexity is not due solely to the 
structure of the system, although a system may certainly be complex due to its 
structure. Rather, complexity also arises when the human, trying to solve 
problems within the system's environment, does not understand the structure 
and as a result issues an inappropriate command, misinterprets display infor-
mation, etc. In short, systems are also complex due to humans' understanding 
of the system as reflected by their strategies. 
Another result from this work concerns the outcome of complexity. Based 
on a review of the literature and the major control task of subjects (i.e., 
finding failures), mean time to failure diagnosis was used as the major 
dependent measure of complexity. As results suggest, however, mean time to 
failure diagnosis alone does not completely describe the implications of com-
plexity. For example, the most complex systems resulted in shorter failure-
diagnosis times due to the number and location of failures. A smaller frac-
tion of the total number of failures was diagnosed, however. Thus fraction of 
failures diagnosed was used to explain a different aspect of performance 
related to task complexity. In short, the result of complexity is multidimen-
sional. A single dimension does not capture the outcome of a complex system. 
These comments are important in light of the relationships among system 
characteristics that contribute to complexity, proper operation of the system, 
and complexity of monitoring and control by the human. As the system becomes 
more "complex" (from a nonbehavioral perspective, i.e., more levels and more 
redundancy), it becomes more resistant to the effects of system failures. 
Failures take longer to propagate through the more complex systems. Moreover, 
the effects of any one failure on overall system performance are minimized due 
to the number of alternate paths through the system. Hence, normal system 
operation is enhanced. This situation is analogous to the use of redundant or 
standby equipment in systems to increase fault tolerance. On the other hand, 
as the system becomes more complex, the task of finding system failures 
becomes more difficult. Although the system design characteristics can help 
to avoid the short-term effects of failures, they can have the dual effect of 
making the human supervisory controller's task more difficult. These findings 
lend support to Nawrocki's 11981] conjecture that efforts to simplify the task 
of equipment operation through hardware design tend to complicate the task of 
equipment maintenance. 
The relationship between complexity and human performance takes on 
increasing importance given the growing prevalence of large-scale systems. 
Human abilities and limitations in monitoring and controlling these complex 
systems must be identified in order to design systems that facilitate good 
failure diagnosis and network management performance. In short, systems must 
be designed such that they do not overload human information processing capa-
bilities. Beyond the issue of design, an understanding of human performance 
constraints should facilitate the creation of effective performance aids. 
Such aids can be used to help people overcome their limitations in coping with 
the complex environments these systems create, thereby leading to safe and 
effective system performance. 
III. MODELING HUMAN PERFORMANCE 
The work described in the preceding sections has implicitly modeled human 
performance as a function of various system characteristics. Powerful sta-
tistical evidence illustrated the strong effect that a system designed for 
good automatic control can have on a human operator's ability to exercise 
accurate and timely system intervention. From a behavioral viewpoint, however, 
the statistical models that have been described do not offer sufficient cogni-
tive explanation for human performance. The empirical analyses describe what  
happens when humans interact with a large-scale system, but they do not help 
to explain silly things happen that way. Therefore, the second phase of this 
research program concentrated on the development of a behaviorally valid model 
of human performance in monitoring and controlling a large scale system 
[Henneman 1985b; Zinser 1986; Zinser and Henneman 1986]. 
Modeling is a good approach in this problem area for several reasons. 
First, a modeling approach will contribute to a better understanding of human 
performance in this task. From the previous experiments, much knowledge (both 
formal and anecdotal) was obtained about how people perform this task. The 
modeling process allows the formal codification of knowledge and cognitive 
mechanisms relevant to a complex monitoring and control task. Both human 
abilities and limitations must be identified by this process. Thus, the model 
should contain appropriate knowledge representations and implementation 
mechanisms to provide a high level of behavioral fidelity to human perfor-
mance. 
Second, the modeling approach should facilitate the development of an 
approach to aiding the human operator. A model that incorporates mechanisms 
coherent with human cognitive functions should be able to provide meaningful 
and timely aid to the human operator. Thus, a focus of this work is the use 
of the model as the basis of an on-line human performance aid. 
A. MURRAY : A Model Of Human Problem Solving 
The model developed in this report is an extension of a conceptual model 
of human problem solving proposed by Rouse [1983]. Rouse has suggested that 
problem solving takes place on three levels: 1) recognition and classifica-
tion, 2) planning, and 3) execution and monitoring. Thus, when a problem 
situation develops, the first task is to detect that the problem exists and to 
categorize it (recognition and classification). An approach or plan to solv-
ing the problem must then be developed (planning), and finally, the plan must 
be implemented (execution and monitoring). The model is further characterized 
by its ability to make either a state- or a structure-oriented response, 
depending on both the system state and the human's level of expertise. The 
model assumes that humans have a preference for pattern-recognition solutions 
to problems -- that is, humans prefer to make context-specific state-oriented 
responses to situations. Moreover, the model operates heterarchically at all 
three problem solving levels almost simultaneously, with situations constantly 
being re-evaluated relative to their state- or structure-oriented status. 
Several efforts have used this generic problem solving model. Domains 
have included automotive and aircraft powerplants [Hunt and Rouse 1984], pro-
cess control networks [Knaeuper and Rouse 1985], and communication networks 
[Viteri 1984]. Performance of these models was, in general, quite good; how-
ever, they were constrained by the lack of real "understanding" of the domain 
by the model. The models lacked knowledge structures that would allow flexi-
ble performance strategies to be pursued. Thus, results from efforts at using 
Rouse's model as the basis for an on-line performance aid [Knaeuper and Morris 
1984] were equivocal. A major reason appeared to be the rigidity of the per-
formance strategy of the model. 
1. Overview of the Model 
The model proposed for the CAIN environment, MURRAY, is illustrated in 
Figure 5. MURRAY operates in the three stages of Recognition and Classifica-
tion, Planning, and Execution and Monitoring. Situations are continually re-
evaluated as system states change due to the system dynamics or operator 
actions. An important feature of this task is that at any given time the 
human operator may have several different tasks that could be performed. The 
key to good performance is the ability to choose among these possibly con-
flicting subtasks. These model components, their associated representations, 
and how they interact will be considered below. The section concludes with an 
example of how the model operates. 
2. Knowledge Representation 
MURRAY's fidelity to human performance is dependent on the representation 
of three different types of knowledge needed to perform the task: system 
knowledge, contextual knowledge, and task knowledge. System knowledge and con-
textual knowledge are shown explicitly in Figure 3, while the task knowledge 
is embedded within the Recognition/Classification and Planning components. The 
Execution component of the model is realized by implementational procedures 
and the command that is issued. 
The first type of knowledge, syste knowledge, consists of information 
from CAIN about the current system state, e.g., the number of customers wait-
ing to be served in a city. Thus, the system knowledge of MURRAY is identical 
to the information presented on the CAIN display. System knowledge is only 
















Figure 5. Components of the Conceptual Model 
accessed by the model's Recognition/Classification component and the Prioriti-
zation mechanism. The system knowledge is structured as a hierarchical frame 
system [Minsky 1975]. The frame of the highest structural level represents 
the cluster currently displayed by CAIN. A cluster frame contains information 
regarding its location relative to other clusters and levels in the network. A 
cluster frame also contains 16 city frames that correspond to each of the 
cities (i.e. communication nodes) in the cluster. Each city frame has several 
"slots" that contain such information as the number of customers waiting for 
service at the city and the average length of time they have been waiting. 
These slots are either filled by data that appear on the CAIN display or by 
appropriate default values. The information contained within this set of 
frames will change as the information on the display changes. If a new 
cluster is displayed, the slots in the 16 city frames change to reflect the 
features of the newly displayed cluster. The slots in the cluster frame will 
also inherit information from the city of the level above. 
The second type of knowledge, contextual knowledge, consists of informa-
tion concerning the context of the system at a given time, such as locations 
of individual cities in the network and cities that have high loading and 
abnormal failure rates. Thus, contextual knowledge is augmented over time; as 
the model gains 'expertise', the knowledge stored by this component will 
change. Contextual knowledge is represented by a network of context frames. 
This network contains a hierarchy of city and cluster frames as described 
above, and also data structures that describe both the evolution of the system 
to the current state, and the human operator's monitoring behavior and 
knowledge about the system at any given time. Since the human operator's 
knowledge of the contextual features of individual cities (e.g., high failure 
rate) and the contextual relationships among cities (e.g., Decatur is associ-
ated with Atlanta) will vary with time, the model's contextual knowledge also 
is augmented as time and, hence, experience increases. 
Finally, the third type of knowledge, task knowledge, represents the 
operator's behavior in monitoring, problem solving, and failure detection. In 
other words, task knowledge refers to the knowledge needed by operators to 
perform their jobs, for example, repairing failed equipment. Task knowledge 
is represented as a production system [Newell and Simon 1972]. The operator's 
heuristics correspond to productions (or rules), while the operator's internal 
model of the system corresponds implicitly to 'metarules' that organize the 
application of the 'normal', explicit rules. The metarules are directly imple-
mented in the procedures of the model's Prioritization component (or inference 
engine), which will be explained later. 
MURRAY contains 22 rules in its representation of task knowledge. These 
rules have a fixed syntax, and thus, they can be manipulated from outside the 
program by a text editor. The set of rules is based on a combination of 
expert judgement and empirical evidence from Experiments One and Two. Each 
rule consists of a situation and an action part made up of predicates. The 
situation part of a rule contains one or more predicates. Each predicate may 
have a value associated with it that relates to either the system or contex-
tual knowledge of MURRAY. The predicates of a rule's condition part have the 
function of matching that rule to a CAIN system state or recalled contextual 
information. Thus, the condition part of a rule corresponds to the Recognition 
and Classification component of the conceptual model in Figure 5. The action 
part of a rule contains a command for CAIN. Thus, the identification of a set 
of potential actions corresponds to the Planning component in the conceptual 
model. 
To summarize, the model depicted in Figure 5 consists of three interact-
ing types of knowledge. System knowledge includes system state information as 
presented on the CAIN display screen. Contextual knowledge is also acquired 
from the display, although it is less transient in nature. Contextual 
knowledge is acquired over time and represents some of the long term relations 
among system components. Thus, both system and contextual knowledge can be 
thought of as forms of declarative knowledge [Anderson 1976]. Task knowledge, 
on the other hand, is a form of procedural knowledge [Anderson 1976] that del-
ineates how the task should be performed. Details of the implementation of 
these representations in MURRAY and the way they interact are considered in 
the next section. 
3. Implementation 
An important part of MURRAY is the inference mechanism of the rule base 
representation of the task knowledge. This mechanism determines the way that 
rules are applied and evaluated. The mechanism is implemented whenever the 
system state changes, i.e., whenever the model observes a set of new data from 
CAIN (as a reaction to a command issued by the operator or a dynamic change in 
the system). At this point, the condition predicates of all the rules are 
evaluated successively in the Classification component of the model. Those 
rules whose condition parts match are then prioritized. This prioritization 
is partially based on A, priori importance weights that are associated with 
each rule. 
These A priori importance weights of applicable rules are dynamically 
altered by the characteristics of the current system state to which a rule is 
applied. Fuzzy set theory methodologies are applied to the set of all applica-
ble rules. The use of fuzzy sets can be regarded as a means of representing 
the phenomenon of activation levels involved in human cognitive processes. 
(Hunt and Rouse [1984] describe a similar use of fuzzy sets in human perfor-
mance modeling.) Three factors alter the initial importance weight values to 
determine the actual importance of a rule in a given situation. These factors 
are described below. 
The first factor is determined by linear fuzzy membership functions. 
Several of the rules contain fuzzy predicates that describe the current system 
state in the form of qualitative expressions such as 'high' or 'low'. These 
values are used to define the membership of the rule in the set of applicable 
rules. The deviation of the value of the current system state from a 'normal' 
system state is proportionally weighted by the membership function. Thus, a 
city with a queue size of 16 customers yields a higher membership function 
than another city with 12 customers. The membership value always lies between 
1 and 2. 
The second and third factors are based on memory functions embedded 
within the model. MURRAY contains two types of memory. The simplest type, on 
which the second weighting factor is based, is the model's ability to remember 
previously issued commands. MURRAY is restricted from reissuing the same com-
mand within a certain span of time. The factor derived from this kind of 
memory is a function of time and frequency of usage of a given command. Com-
mands that are used more frequently are more "automatic", and thus, are 
retained for less time in memory Nenneman and Rouse 1984c]. The numerical 
value resulting from this factor is also presented to the prioritization of a 
given rule and always lies between 0 and 1. The more recently a command was 
issued, the lower is the value of this second factor. (A value of 1 
represents the fact that memory retrieval for a given command failed.) 
The second type of memory, which is more complicated than the simple 
command memory described above, is the contextual knowledge that an operator 
accrues over time due to learning. This type of memory is the basis for the 
third rule weighting factor. The factor is bounded between 1 and 2 and its 
value increases with contextual representativeness. This form of memory is 
implemented by the context frame structures that were explained earlier and 
accessed by the inference mechanism upon application of rules that allow 
actions to be activated from the contextual memory instead of solely from a 
system state. Information in the context frames is updated whenever a par-
ticular city is displayed. If no updates occur, the retention of the context 
frame decreases over time until it is eventually deleted from the contextual 
memory. 
The dynamic importance of a rule in the given context is finally obtained 
by multiplying the AL _priori weight value of that rule by each of these three 
factors. The rule that is eventually chosen is determined by ordering the 
applicable rules in descending order of derived importance in a priority queue 
and using a head-of-the-line queueing discipline. The first element of the 
priority queue is the model's first choice of the next CAIN command. The fol-
lowing section presents an example of how this mechanism works. 
4. Example 
Consider a situation in which the currently displayed cluster is at the 
highest level of the system. The previously observed cluster was on the second 
system level below Chicago, and the operator's last command that was issued 
was an 'up' command. Information available in the cluster frame structure 
includes the queue sizes of the 16 top level cities and their locations. For 
simplification, only three cities with the largest queue sizes will be con-
sidered (Seattle(17), Chicago(14) and Atlanta(15)). Previously, the cluster 
below Boston had a large number of customers and Dubuque (in the level below 
Chicago) indicated a high queue size. This information was retrieved from the 
model's contextual memory. Also, the cluster below Seattle was recently 
displayed. Both the 'monitor' and 'test' commands were issued recently. The 
watch list of cities with recurring failures was also observed fairly recently 
and the only city on it was Houston. 
The rules applicable to this situation (as derived by the 
Recognition/Classification component of the model) are listed in Table 3. The 
numbers in brackets represent the importance weight, the factors derived from 
the fuzzy functions (fuzz), from the simple command memory (cmd), and from the 
contextual memory (ctxt), and finally the overall dynamic importance of the 
rule is listed. All the values of the three weighting factors can be explained 
by the above given information about the situation. For example, the dynamic 
importance for 'down (Chicago)' is obtained by its current queue size of 12 
(1.20), the fact that the same command was given before (0.60) and its contex-
tual situation (1.10). 
During the prioritization process, 'down (Seattle)' is initially selected 
as a command (*). The next several possibilities are not considered as com-
mands since their final importance is less than 72. The 'test' command ulti-
mately yields the highest priority in the given context (**), and thus, is 
implemented as the next CAIN command. It is interesting to see how close some 
of the prioritization decisions are. This phenomenon (which suggests that in a 
given situation more than one action may be 'correct') will be further dis-






#2 down(Seattle) [47 1.70 0.90 1.00 72] (*) 
#2 down(Chicago) [47 1.20 0.60 1.10 37] 
#2 down(Atlanta) [47 1.50 1.00 1.00 70] 
#3 mon (36 1.00 0.95 1.00 34] 
#6 test [84 1.00 0.87 1.00 74] (**) 
#11 mon [44 1.00 0.95 1.00 42] 
#20 down(Boston) [25 1.10 1.00 1.30 36] 
#21 down(Dubuque) [24 1.05 1.00 1.20 30] 
#22 down(Houston) [21 1.12 1.00 1.15 27] 
Table 3. A Fuzzy Set of Rules 
B. Experiment Three: Model Evaluation 
1. Method 
Experimental data were collected to validate MURRAY. Ten junior and 
senior Industrial Engineering majors participated in a total of nine sessions 
(3 training, 6 data collection) monitoring and controlling CAIN. Subjects 
read 2 sets of written instructions that described CAIN and its operation 
prior to Sessions 1 and 2. At the end of Session 3, subjects took a quiz to 
verify their knowledge of CAIN and to assess their level of contextual 
knowledge. Subjects took a similar quiz at the end of Session 9. Each ses-
sion lasted approximately 45 minutes, and subjects were paid $50.00 for their 
participation. 
Independent variables considered in the experiment were Session (6 lev-
els) and Subject (10 levels). Session was of interest to assess if subject or 
model performance (and level of agreement between the two) improved or 
degraded with time. Individual subject performance was of interest to assess 
if degree of model-subject agreement was a function of individual strategy 
differences. 
Comparison of MURRAY and subject performance was done in two ways. 
First, an "open-loop" comparison was made in which subject performance was 
compared with MURRAY's performance. Second, a "closed-loop" analysis was per-
formed. Subject data files were replayed concurrently with a version of MUR-
RAY. Whenever a subject action was performed, MURRAY generated the action it 
would implement, along with a list of its other applicable rules. The 
subject's action was then implemented. This form of analysis allowed an 
action-by-action (or process) performance comparison to be made. 
2. Open-loop Evaluation 
MURRAY's performance was compared to subjects' performance in a number of 
ways and, from all perspectives, MURRAY consistently performed very well. 
For example, MURRAY's performance on such measures as mean customer sojurn 
time, number of customers served, and fraction of failures repaired was always 
between the best and worst subject's performance and usually better than aver-
age. When the experimental results were averaged across sessions for each of 
the subjects, MURRAY outperformed all of the subjects. The only measure for 
which this result did not hold was the fraction of failures found: MURRAY 
repaired a smaller fraction of failures than most subjects. This result fol-
lows, however, from the fact that MURRAY allowed fewer failures to occur; in 
short, MURRAY's control resulted in a more stable system. There was not, how-
ever, any statistical difference between MURRAY's and subjects' performance as 
measured by Duncan's Multiple Range Test. 
Subject and MURRAY performance was also compared based on individual com-
mand usage. A comparison of single command usage showed a high degree of 
similarity; major differences involved MURRAY's preference for monitoring the 
system. This activity resulted in much information being displayed. Subjects 
were apparently reluctant to ask for all of this information, whereas MURRAY 
could easily process all of these data. A comparison of command sequences 
showed similar results: MURRAY tended to favor commands that would generate 
the most information on which to base future actions. 
3. Closed-Loop Evaluation 
Subject and MURRAY performance were also compared on an action-by-action 
basis, thereby facilitating a comparison of subject and model in exactly the 
same environmental conditions. This type of analysis allows a validation of 
the behavioral 'processes and representations present in the model. Matches 
were differentiated in three different ways: Type I - same command issued by 
MURRAY and subject at same time; Type II - same command, different time (i.e., 
one command earlier or later); Type III - commands that belong to the same 
class, issued at the same time (e.g., a 'down' command to different clusters). 
In addition, subject commands were compared to the first three choices that 
MURRAY had listed in its priority queue of applicable actions. By averaging 
across subjects and sessions, MURRAY matched subjects' actions across Type I, 
II, and III matches 75.3% of the time. MURRAY exactly matched (Type I match-
ing) subject performance 64% of the time. These results are impressive given 
the subjective nature of the rule identification method and development of 
prioritization weights. 
These results for each experimental session were analyzed with ANOVA. 
The difference between sessions was not significant, whereas the difference 
between subjects was highly significant (p<0.0001). This result suggests that 
some subjects used different strategies from the model but did not change them 
over time. 
It can be argued that a critical decision that subjects must make in this 
task is when a new cluster should be displayed and which one it should be. 
One reason for the 25% of the commands that were not explained by the model 
was found by comparing the degree of matches with just the 'down' (or 'change 
screen') commands. Considering only the first three of MURRAY's choices, sub-
ject performance (with respect to only 'd' commands) agreed just 12% of the 
time (Type I matching). The differences between subjects were significant 
(p<0.0001), but there were no significant differences between sessions. This 
• 
result is consistent with the findings of Henneman and Rouse [1986]: humans 
not only use symptomatic and topographic search strategies, but also use 
serendipitous and other random-appearing search strategies; these strategies 
are not represented or supported by MURRAY in its task knowledge. Neverthe-
less, relying on its task description provided in the rule base, MURRAY 
resulted in uniformly excellent performance. Therefore, a model-based aid 
might be useful in providing the operator with procedural instructions; MURRAY 
could support the operator with additional or alternative strategies to moni-
tor or control CAIN. In addition, MURRAY could provide support in accessing 
the network by identifying problem areas that are most critical. 
C. Conclusions 
To summarize, MURRAY proved to be a reasonable means of describing human 
behavior in a complex monitoring and control task. Open-loop analysis of 
model performance indicated that the model consistently did as well as human 
operators. Closed-loop, action-by-action comparison of subject and MURRAY 
performance revealed a high degree of behavioral congruence. Thus, it appears 
that the structures and mechanisms present in the model produce quite similar 
behaviors to humans' structures and mechanisms used in performing this task. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the level of matching was not per-
fect. Both MURRAY and human operators appear to have different strengths that 
are useful in this environment: MURRAY is good at prioritizing tasks; the 
human operator is good at improvising flexible search strategies. Thus, a 
combination of the two could result in improved overall system performance. 
The next step in this research program, therefore, was to implement a human 
performance aid based on MURRAY. Such an aid should provide cognitively plau-
sible assistance to the human operator. 
IV. AIDING HUMAN PERFORMANCE 
Aiding human performance in a system may be done in many ways. For exam-
ple, it may be possible to aid human performance simply by altering the 
characteristics of the display of information to the human operator [Mitchell 
and Saisi 1986]. Alternatively, the aid may provide advice to the human based 
on some normative representation of a task, such as multi-attribute utility 
theory [Freedy, et al. 1985]. Still other approaches may use system simula-
tion to allow the human operator to ask "what if" questions of potential 
actions [Moon and Hammer 1986]. Coupled with decisions regarding the selec-
tion of an appropriate aiding scheme are decisions concerning task allocation. 
For example, if an aid is able to suggest appropriate operator actions, it 
might be acceptable to allow the aid to implement its own suggestions in some 
situations. 
In the context of CAIN, one can imagine potential operator performance 
aids. A simple alteration of the displays (e.g., highlighting-the most 
salient visual cues) could likely lead to a performance improvement. Another 
approach might be based on the complexity measures described earlier: the aid 
could make recommendations based on actions that would reduce complexity by 
the greatest amount. In this section, one particular approach to aiding the 
human operator is developed and evaluated. The approach proposed here is 
based on the model of human operator performance, MURRAY, that was discussed 
in the preceding section. Since the model contains knowledge structures and 
mechanisms congruent with those underlying humans' behaviors, the model should 
be effective in providing meaningful advice to the human operator [Knaeuper 
and Morris 1984]. Thus, the model-based aid evaluated here is significantly 
different from the decision support available from expert systems or other 
normative approaches. Although MURRAY's advice is always derived from a set 
of if-then rules (as is an expert system), MURRAY's decisions are based on its 
embedded knowledge structures (i.e., contextual and system) and its prioriti-
zation mechanism to resolve conflicts among rules. The model is only expert 
in the sense that it makes use of all available information on the complex 
CAIN display, has a good memory, is not pressured by time-critical situations, 
etc. 
The implementation of the MURRAY-based aid is largely one of designing an 
appropriate interface. The design of this interface is critical in that the 
operator should be neither overloaded with information nor preoccupied with 
requesting advice. In view of the complexity of the existing CAIN display and 
associated operator functions, the decision was made to implement a simple, 
straightforward interface for the aid. The mechanism works as follows. MUR-
RAY operates in real-time in parallel with the human operator who is control-
ling the system. MURRAY suggests a single command to the operator upon 
request, i.e., whenever the operator issues an 'h'-command ('help'). MURRAY's 
highest ranked choice for the next command is presented on the CAIN display 
next to the command entry line at the lower center part of the display [Figure 
2]. Considering factors such as the operator's mental workload and the time-
constrained dynamic environment, this rather simple augmentation of the 
display was selected over other possible implementations, such as multiple 
command options, displaying further information relative to MURRAY's prioriti-
zation process, or even adding another display with aiding information. This 
interface is directed at the expert end user (such as the CAIN operator) 
rather than a sporadic novice user. 
A. Experiment Four: Aid Evaluation 
1. Method 
The evaluation of the on-line aid was performed by augmenting Experiment 
Three described in the previous section. The main goal of Experiment Four was 
to assess the effects of on-line aiding on operator performance in the CAIN 
environment. The experimental design used to evaluate this issue was a 
between-subjects design in each of two treatment groups: unaided (using the 
subject performance data from Experiment Three) and aided operation of CAIN (a 
new group of 10 subjects). Thus, the treatment structure is a one-way fac-
torial design with aiding being the independent variable of interest. 
A second group of ten paid subjects participated in operating CAIN for 
nine sessions. Instructions, training, and questionnaires were presented in 
three sessions as in Experiment Three. The difference in this experimental 
condition was the availability of the on-line aid. The instructional material 
was augmented by a description of the 'help' command. The new command was 
introduced in the second training session. The subjects were instructed to 
use the aid when uncertain about what to do next or to enhance their own stra-
tegies. Subjects were also told to implement the aid's suggestion only if 
they felt it was reasonable. 
2. Results 
From several perspectives, the aid had no impact on subject performance. 
ANOVA revealed no statistical differences between groups on the various meas-
ures of subject performance, although the aided group frequently performed 
slightly better. A comparison of command usage also showed no major sys-
tematic differences between groups. 
At first observation, these results are disappointing. However, a more 
fine-grained analysis of the data revealed ways in which the aid was quite 
helpful. First, although there were no statistical differences between 
groups, aided subjects were able to find failures faster than unaided sub-
jects, thus maintaining a more stable system. Accordingly, unaided subjects 
had more failures occur during their experimental sessions. Second, the aid 
enjoyed a high level of acceptance by subjects. On the average, 83% of all 
commands that were suggested by the aid were actually implemented by subjects. 
Given that aid requests constituted only 8% of all commands issued, however, 
this high level of acceptance was not reflected in the overall performance 
scores. These results suggest that more emphasis should be given in the 
future to training operators in the use of the aid to illustrate its benefits. 
Third, the questionnaires completed by subjects at the end of the experimental 
sessions indicated that aided subjects had a higher level of contextual 
knowledge (as measured by number of second-level city locations correctly 
recalled) than unaided subjects. 
Finally, as emphasized in Section III, one of the strengths of MURRAY is 
its ability to prioritize tasks. In fact, a key to good performance in this 
task is the ability to decide which part of the network should be observed 
next. It is interesting to note, therefore, that the percentage of times a 
'd'-command suggested by the aid led to finding a failure was 34%; the percen-
tage of times any "e-command issued by a subject that was not suggested by 
the aid led to finding a failure was only 10%. Clearly, from this perspective 
the aid was quite beneficial in providing useful aid to the operator. 
Nevertheless, since the aid was requested infrequently, these fine-grained 
results were not reflected in the overall performance scores. As mentioned 
above, the low level of use masked any overall performance improvement. 
B. Conclusions 
In the final phase of this research program, an on-line performance aid 
based on MURRAY for human monitoring and control in a large-scale system was 
introduced, described, and evaluated. Model-based on-line aiding was selected 
because previous efforts have shown its potential benefits [Knaeuper and 
Morris 1985]. Experimental results, however, failed to show significantly 
improved overall performance of aided subjects. Nevertheless, more fine-
grained evaluation of the results demonstrated subtle subject improvement in 
some performance aspects. One of these aspects was a more stable operation of 
the CAIN system by aided subjects. The second and most important result was 
improved subject performance in the critical decision of selecting which part 
of the network to observe next. The aid provided clear performance improve-
ment with respect to failure-detection strategies. These subtle performance 
improvements suggest that further research is needed to determine if alterna-
tive implementations of the aiding approach could result in more definitive 
results. 
Several other aiding approaches are viable given the experimental results 
presented in this report. For example, the fact that subjects did not request 
the aid very often suggests that different results could be obtained if the 
model's suggestion was always available. (Such an approach would be con-
sistent with the model-based aid used by Knaeuper and Morris [1984]). Alter-
nately, the aid could present its recommendation only if the derived impor-
tance ranking of the rule exceeded some threshold value. A related approach 
would be to emphasize the use of the aid through training as mentioned above. 
Another alternative would be to alter the strategy of the model so that it 
would support problem-solving strategies significantly different from the 
human's. Zinser [1986], for example, found that if the Avriori weightings of 
the model's rules that were related to contextual knowledge were increased, 
command matches with human performance decreased; the model began to place 
more emphasis on context-dependent strategies (e.g., recalling that Dubuque 
has recurring failures). Given that approximately half the failures in CAIN 
were dependent on the context, a strategy based more on contextual recall and 
augmented with 'normal' human strategies should be very effective. In light 
of the ambiguity of the current results, these ideas merit careful further 
consideration. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The research described in this report has considered human performance in 
the monitoring and control of large-scale systems from many perspectives. 
Initial efforts empirically examined the effects of system design parameters 
on human performance. The results clearly illustrated the problems that peo-
ple have in controlling a multiple-level system. Large performance differ-
ences were noted when the number of system levels increased from two to three. 
Multiple-level systems tend to mask failure symptoms from the human operator. 
Although such systems protect upper system levels from the effects of 
failures, when the failures do propagate upwards, their effects are more seri-
ous. Unfortunately, the results presented here indicate that people tend to 
wait until symptoms emerge rather than pursuing a more active search strategy. 
Similar comments can be made regarding the degree of redundancy present 
in a system. Increased connectivity between system parts led to improved 
automatic system performance but degraded human failure-diagnosis performance. 
Thus, system designers need to be aware of the tradeoffs that can be made 
between supporting automated system control and human failure-diagnosis per-
formance. Moreover, if the physical structure of the system cannot be altered 
to support good human performance, then aids must be designed within the sys-
tem to cause the human operator to adopt effective control strategies. 
Other human limitations in dealing with large multiple-level systems were 
also noted. For example, when contextual information was introduced to the 
system, humans did not adopt strategies that took any great advantage of this 
information, even though they were aware of certain types of failure that 
could be located more readily by using contextual knowledge. Humans used a 
rather mechanical strategy that did not rely on the context. People also had 
difficulty in prioritizing subtasks in time-critical situations. It was shown 
that by relying on a model-based aid with a very good prioritization method 
the human could make better search decisions. Again, people tended to learn 
one way of performing the task and not change as the environmental conditions 
shif ted. 
The notion of relying on an aid based on human cognitive functions 
deserves much closer scrutiny. Despite some ambiguity, the results discussed 
in this report are promising: subtle performance improvements were shown when 
the aid was used by subjects. The approach is consistent with the views 
espoused by Rasmussen [1985] regarding the support of human operators in com-
plex systems. In particular, Rasmussen argues that an aspect to consider in 
the design of a system is "a representation of the information processing 
capabilities and limitations of the decision maker and of the subjective for-
mulation of goals and criteria for choice among possible strategies..." MURRAY 
provided such a representation of the human operator that was shown to be of 
use in decision support. MURRAY gave "cognitively plausible" advice to the 
human operator when that information was needed. 
Nevertheless, the CAIN system (as augmented with MUREAY's advice) is lim-
ited in the support it can provide the operator. Rasmussen [1985] argues that 
systems should support an operator at various levels in an abstraction hierar-
chy of functions and according to various levels of aggregation. Although 
CAIN does support various levels of aggregation, CAIN's level of abstraction 
to the human operator is fixed. Future work should concentrate on defining 
the system functions and representations at various levels of abstraction. 
Concurrent efforts should be directed at considering some of the issues 
related to aiding mentioned in Section IV. In particular, alternate interface 
design methods, task allocation strategies, and issues related to user accep-
tance should be considered. Also, the notion of implementing a model with 
search strategies complementary to (as opposed to coincident with) human stra-
tegies (e.g., based on the contextual information) should be explored. Aids 
based on models complementary to human strategies may have more potential to 
improve overall performance but may be difficult for the human operator to 
understand. On the other hand, aids based on models coincident with human 
strategies may be easy for the human to understand but may not enable any 
improvement over unaided performance. This potential trade-off deserves more 
consideration. 
In summary, the material presented here has made several important con- 
tributions. 	First, it has added to a general understanding of the relation- 
ship between system design characteristics and human performance. 	Second, 
from a theoretical perspective, this project has contributed a framework for 
measuring the complexity of a system based on the physical system characteris-
tics and the human's understanding of these characteristics. Third, a model 
of human performance was proposed and evaluated that was made up of several 
different interacting knowledge structures and cognitive mechanisms. The model 
was shown to produce behavior consistent with human performance. Finally, 
this model was shown to be effective as a means of aiding human performance in 
a complex monitoring and control task. 
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